
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

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GLEANINGS OF PAST YEARS,

1843–78.

BY THE RIGHT HON.

W. E. GLADSTONE, M.P.

VOL. IV.

FOREIGN

LONDON:
JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET.
1879.

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I.

FIRST LETTER

TO

THE EARL OF ABERDEEN,

ON THE STATE PROSECUTIONS OF THE NEAPOLITAN GOVERNMENT.*

1851.

"Il fetore è fetor di sbirreria."—*Teofilo Folengo.*

6 Carlton Gardens,
April 7, 1851.

My dear Lord Aberdeen,

1. I must begin a letter, which I fear you will find painful, nay revolting, to the last degree, with offering you my cordial thanks for the permission to address it to you.

After a residence of between three and four months at Naples, I have come home with a deep sense of the duty incumbent upon me to make some attempt towards miti-

* [Inasmuch as these Letters, through the countenance given to them by Lord Palmerston as Foreign Minister of this country, and through the notoriety they acquired, became a kind of historical document, I have thought it right to reprint them *verbatim et literatim* as they were originally published.—W. E. G., 1878.]

gating the horrors, I can use no weaker word, amidst which the Government of that country is now carried on.

2. As I shall have to detail startling facts, and as I cannot avoid in describing them the use of the strongest language, I must state at the outset, that it was not for the purposes of political criticism or censorship that I went to Naples. Circumstances purely domestic* took me and kept me there. I did not carry with me the idea, that it was any part of my duty to look for grievances in the administration of the Government, or to propagate ideas belonging to another meridian. I admit, in the most unqualified manner, the respect that is due from Englishmen as from others, to Governments in general, whether they be absolute, constitutional, or republican, as the representatives of a public, nay, of a Divine authority, and as the guardians of order. I do not know that there is any other country in Europe, I am sure there is none unless it is in the South of Italy, from which I should have returned with anything like the ideas and intentions which now press upon my mind. On this, among other grounds, I am grateful for your consent to be the recipient of my statement, because it will give weight to my asseveration, that this grievous subject has forced itself upon me, that I am sincere in disclaiming what is called political propagandism, that I have not gathered wholesale and without examination the statements I am about to make, that an important part of them are within my own personal knowledge, and that as to the rest of those which are stated without qualification, after no want of care in examining their sources and their grounds, I firmly and deliberately believe them.

* [The illness of a very young daughter.—W. E. G., 1878.]

3. Without entering at length into the reasons which have led me thus to trouble you, I shall state these three only. First, that the present practices of the Government of Naples, in reference to real or supposed political offenders, are an outrage upon religion, upon civilisation, upon humanity, and upon decency. Secondly, that these practices are certainly, and even rapidly, doing the work of republicanism in that country: a political creed, which has little natural or habitual root in the character of the people. Thirdly, that as a member of the Conservative party in one of the great family of European nations, I am compelled to remember, that that party stands in virtual and real, though perhaps unconscious, alliance with all the established Governments of Europe as such; and that, according to the measure of its influence, they suffer more or less of moral detriment from its reverses, and derive strength and encouragement from its successes. This principle, which applies with very limited force to the powerful States, whose Governments are strong, not only in military organisation, but in the habits and affections of the people, is a principle of great practical importance in reference to the Government of Naples, which, from whatever cause, appears to view its own social, like its physical, position, as one under the shadow of a volcano, and which is doing everything in its power from day to day to give reality to its own dangers, and fresh intensity, together with fresh cause, to its fears.

4. In approaching the statement of the case, I must premise that I pass over an important prefatory consideration, with respect to the whole groundwork of governing authority in the kingdom of the Two Sicilies at this moment; and that I shall not inquire whether,

according to reason and social right, the actual Government of that country be one with or without a title, one of law or one of force. I shall assume that the Constitution of January 1848, spontaneously given, sworn to as irrevocable with every circumstance of solemnity, and never to this day either legally or even ostensibly revoked (although contravened in almost every act of the Government), never existed, and is a pure fiction. I will not appeal to it, because such an appeal might give colour to the idea that my desire was to meddle with the form of Government, and might thus interfere with those purposes of humanity which, and which alone in the first instance, I propose to myself and to you: whereas, in truth, I am firmly of opinion that this very important matter may much more safely and wisely, and indeed can only with propriety, be regarded as an internal question, which it is for the Sovereign of the country to settle with his subjects, apart from any intervention of ours; unless indeed questions should incidentally arise affecting it under the treaty of 1844 between the Two Sicilies and England, upon some parts of which, as a colleague of your Lordship, I had the honour to be employed. With such a topic at present I can have nothing to do; nor should I have alluded to the Neapolitan Constitution in this place at all, but because a recollection of the main facts connected with it is necessary in order in any manner to explain the recent conduct of the Government of Naples, and to give full credibility to statements so astonishing as those which I shall have to make.

5. I must not suppress the expression of my full persuasion, that in reading this letter you will feel disposed to ask, how can conduct so inhuman and monstrous be pursued without a motive, and what can be the motive

here? To answer that question fully, I must enter upon the history of the Neapolitan Constitution. But for the present, and so long as I have the hope of any prompt amendment without a formal controversy, I am content at whatever disadvantage to leave that question unanswered though a reply to it is certainly essential to the entire development of my case.

6. One other prefatory word yet remains. In these pages you will find no reference to the struggle waged, and waged successfully, by the King of Naples against his Sicilian subjects, or to the conduct of any of the parties either immediately or indirectly concerned in it. My subject-matter is wholly different: it is the conduct of the Government of that Sovereign towards the Neapolitan or continental subjects, through whose fidelity and courage the subjugation of Sicily was effected.

7. There is a general impression that the organisation of the Governments of Southern Italy is defective—that the administration of justice is tainted with corruption—that instances of abuse or cruelty among subordinate public functionaries are not uncommon, and that political offences are punished with severity, and with no great regard to the forms of justice.

I advert to this vague supposition of a given state of things, for the purpose of stating that, had it been accurate, I should have spared myself this labour. The difference between the faintest outline that a moment's handling of the pencil sketches, and the deepest colouring of the most elaborately finished portrait, but feebly illustrates the relation of these vague suppositions to the actual truth of the Neapolitan case. It is not mere imperfection, not corruption in low quarters, not occasional severity, that I am about to describe: it is in

cessant, systematic, deliberate violation of the law by the Power appointed to watch over and maintain it. It is such violation of human and written law as this, carried on for the purpose of violating every other law, unwritten and eternal, human and divine; it is the wholesale persecution of virtue when united with intelligence, operating upon such a scale that entire classes may with truth be said to be its object, so that the Government is in bitter and cruel, as well as utterly illegal, hostility to whatever in the nation really lives and moves, and forms the mainspring of practical progress and improvement; it is the awful profanation of public religion, by its notorious alliance, in the governing powers, with the violation, of every moral law under the stimulants of fear and vengeance; it is the perfect prostitution of the judicial office, which has made it, under veils only too threadbare and transparent, the degraded recipient of the vilest and clumsiest forgeries, got up wilfully and deliberately, the immediate advisers of the Crown, for the purpose of destroying the peace, the freedom, ay, and even if not by capital sentences the life, of men among the most virtuous, upright, intelligent, distinguished, and refined of the whole community; it is the savage and cowardly system of moral, as well as in a lower degree of physical, torture, through which the sentences extracted from the debased courts of justice are carried into effect.

8. The effect of all this is, total inversion of all the moral and social ideas. Law, instead of being respected, is odious. Force, and not affection, is the foundation of Government. There is no association, but a violent antagonism, between the idea of freedom and that of order. The governing power, which teaches of itself that it is the image of God upon earth, is clothed, in the

view of the overwhelming majority of the thinking public, with all the vices for its attributes. I have seen and heard the strong and too true expression used, "This is the negation of God erected into a system of Government."*

9. I confess my amazement at the gentleness of character which has been shown by the Neapolitan people in times of Revolution. It really seems as if the hell-born spirit of revenge had no place whatever in their breasts. I know that at any rate some illustrious victims are supported by the spirit of Christian resignation, by their cheerful acceptance of the will of God. But the present persecution is awfully aggravated, as compared with former ones; it differs too in this, that it seems to be specially directed against those men of moderate opinions, whom a Government well stocked even with worldly prudence, whom Macchiavelli, had he been minister, would have made it his study to conciliate and attach. These men, therefore, are being cleared away; and the present efforts to drive poor human nature to extremes cannot wholly fail in stirring up the ferocious passions, which never, to my belief, since the times of the heathen tyrants, have had so much to arouse, or so much to palliate when aroused, their fury.

I must first speak of the extent and scale of the present proceedings.

10. The general belief is, that the prisoners for political offences in the kingdom of the Two Sicilies are between fifteen, or twenty, and thirty thousand. The Government withholds all means of accurate information, and accordingly there can be no certainty on the point. I have, however, found that this belief is shared by persons the

* "È la negazione di Dio eretta a sistema di governo."

most intelligent, considerate, and well-informed. It is also supported by what is known of the astonishing crowds confined in particular prisons; and especially by what is accurately known in particular provincial localities, as to the numbers of individuals missing from among the community. I have heard these numbers for example at Reggio, and at Salerno; and from an effort to estimate them in reference to population, I do believe that twenty thousand is no unreasonable estimate. In Naples alone some hundreds are at this moment under indictment *capitally;* and when I quitted it, a trial was expected to come on immediately (called that of the fifteenth of May), in which the number charged was between four and five hundred; including (though this is a digression) at least one or more persons of high station, whose opinions would in this country be considered more Conservative than your own.

11. The Neapolitan Government, indeed, appears to have something of the art which Mr. Burke declared to be beyond him; he "did not know how to frame an indictment against people." After considering what I have said, pray consider next, that the number of refugees and persons variously concealed, probably larger, perhaps much larger, than that of the prisoners, is also to be reckoned. We must then remember, that a very large proportion of these prisoners belong to the middle class (though there are also considerable numbers of the working class), and further, that the numbers of the middle class, in the kingdom of Naples (of which region I shall speak all through, meaning the Regno, or continental dominions, of his Sicilian Majesty), must be a much smaller part of the entire population than they are among ourselves. We must next consider that of these persons very few

have independent means of support for their families; not to mention that, as I *hear*, confiscation or sequestration upon arrest is frequent. So that generally each case of a prisoner or refugee becomes the centre of a separate circle of human misery; and now there may be some inkling of the grounds for saying that the system, the character of which I am about to examine further, has whole classes for its object, and those classes the very classes upon which the health, solidity, and progress of the nation mainly depend.

12. But why should it seem strange that the Government of Naples should be at open war with those classes? In the schools of the country it is, I have heard, compulsory to employ the political Catechism ascribed to the Canonico Apuzzi, of which I have a copy. In this catechism, civilisation and Barbarism are represented as two opposite extremes, both of them vicious; and it is distinctly taught, taught therefore by the Government of Naples, that happiness and virtue lie in a just *mean* between them.

13. But again. Shortly after I reached Naples I heard a man of eminent station accused, with much vituperation, of having stated that nearly all those who had formed the "Opposition" in the Chamber of Deputies under the Constitution were in prison or in exile. I frankly own my impression was, that a statement apparently so monstrous and incredible deserved the reprobation it was then receiving. It was (I think) in November last. The Chamber had been elected by the people under a Constitution freely and spontaneously given by the King; elected twice over, and with little change, but that little in favour of the Opposition. No *one* of the body, I think, had then been brought to trial (although I may state, in

passing, one of them had been assassinated by a priest named Peluso, well known in the streets of Naples when I was there, never questioned for the act, and said to receive a pension from the Government). So that I put down the statement as a fiction, and the circulation of it as, at the very least, a gross indiscretion or more. What was my astonishment when I saw a list in detail which too fully proved its truth; nay, which in the most essential point proved more.

14. It appears, my dear Lord, that the full complement of the Chamber of Deputies was 164; elected by a constituency which brought to poll about 117,000 votes. Of these about 140 was the greatest number that came to Naples to exercise the functions of the Chamber. An absolute majority of this number, or seventy-six, besides some others who had been deprived of offices, had either been arrested or had gone into exile. So that after the regular formation of a popular representative Chamber, and its suppression in the teeth of the law, the Government of Naples has consummated its audacity by putting into prison, or driving into banishment for the sake of escaping prison, an actual majority of the representatives of the people.

I have now said enough upon the scale of these proceedings; and I pass to the examination of their character: and first their character in point of law, because I have charged the Government with systematic violation of it.

15. The law of Naples, as I have been informed, requires that personal liberty shall be inviolable, except under a warrant from a Court of Justice authorised for the purpose. I do not mean the Constitution, but the law anterior to, and independent of the Constitution. This

warrant, I understand, must proceed upon actual depositions, and must state the nature of the charge, or it must be communicated immediately afterwards, I am not sure which.

In utter defiance of this law, the Government, of which the Prefect of Police is an important member, through the agents of that department, watches and dogs the people, pays domiciliary visits, very commonly at night, ransacks houses, seizing papers and effects and tearing up floors at pleasure under pretence of searching for arms, and imprisons men by the score, by the hundred, by the thousand, without any warrant whatever, sometimes without even any written authority at all, or anything beyond the word of a policeman; constantly without any statement whatever of the nature of the offence.

Nor is this last fact wonderful. Men are arrested, not because they have committed, or are believed to have committed, any offence; but because they are persons whom it is thought convenient to confine and to get rid of, and against whom therefore some charge must be found or fabricated.

16. The first process, therefore, commonly is to seize them and imprison them; and to seize and carry off books, papers, or whatever else these degraded hirelings may choose. The correspondence of the prisoner is then examined, as soon as may be found convenient, and he is himself examined upon it: in secret, without any intimation of the charges, which as yet in fact do not exist; or of the witnesses, who do not exist either. In this examination he is allowed no assistance whatever, nor has he at this stage any power of communication with a legal adviser! He is not examined only, but, as I *know*, insulted at will and in the grossest manner, under pretence

of examination, by the officers of the police. And do not suppose that this is the fault of individuals. It is essential to the system, of which the essential aim is, to *create* a charge. What more likely than that, smarting under insult, and knowing with what encouragement and for whose benefit it is offered, the prisoner should for a moment lose his temper, and utter some expression disparaging to the sacred majesty of the Government? If he does, it goes down in the minutes against him: if he does not, but keeps his self-command, no harm is done to the great end in view.

17. His correspondence is examined as well as himself. Suppose him a man of cultivated intelligence: he has probably watched public affairs and followed their vicissitudes. His copies of letters, or the letters to him which he may have kept, will contain allusions to them. The value of this evidence as evidence would of course depend upon giving full effect to all these allusions taken in connection one with the other. But not so: any expression which implies disapproval (since nothing is easier than to construe disapproval into disaffection, disaffection into an intention of revolution or of regicide) is entered on the minutes. Suppose there happens to be some other, which entirely destroys the force of the former, and demonstrates the loyalty of its victim: it is put by as of no consequence; and if he remonstrate, it is in vain. In countries where justice is regarded acts are punished, and it is deemed unjust to punish thoughts: but in this case thoughts are forged in order that they may be punished. I here speak of what I know to have happened, and have imagined or heightened *nothing*.

18. For months, or for a year, or for two years, or three, as the case may be, these prisoners are detained before

their trials; but very generally for the longer terms. I do not happen to have heard of any one tried at Naples on a political charge, in these last times, with less than sixteen or eighteen months of previous imprisonment. I have *seen* men still waiting, who have been confined for six-and-twenty months; and this confinement, as I have said, began by an act not of law, but of force in defiance of law. There may be cases, doubtless there are, of arrests under warrant, after depositions: but it is needless to enter upon what is, I believe, purely exceptional.

19. I do not scruple to assert, in continuation, that when every effort has been used to concoct a charge, if possible, out of the perversion and partial production of real evidence, this often fails: and then the resort is to perjury and to forgery. The miserable creatures to be found in most communities, but especially in those where the Government is the great agent of corruption upon the people, the wretches who are ready to sell the liberty and life of fellow-subjects for gold, and to throw their own souls into the bargain, are deliberately employed by the Executive Power, to depose according to their inventions against the man whom it is thought desirable to ruin. Although, however, practice should by this time have made perfect, these depositions are generally made in the coarsest and clumsiest manner; and they bear upon them the evidences of falsehood in absurdities and self-contradictions, accumulated even to nausea. But what then? Mark the calculation. If there is plenty of it, some of it, according to the vulgar phrase, will stick. Do not think I am speaking loosely. I declare my belief that the whole proceeding is linked together from first to last; a depraved logic runs through it. Inventors must shoot at random, therefore they take many strings to their bow. It would

be strange indeed, and contrary to the doctrine of chances, if the whole forged fabric were dissolved and overthrown by self-contradiction.

20. Now let us consider practically what takes place. Suppose nine-tenths too absurd to stand even before the Neapolitan Courts; of this portion some is withdrawn by the police and not carried into the trial at all, after they have been made aware, through the prisoner's or his counsel's assistance, of its absurdity; the rest is overlooked by the judges. In any other country it would of course lead to inquiry, and to a prosecution for perjury. Not so there; it is rather regarded as so much of well-meant and patriotic effort, which, through untoward circumstances, has failed. It is simply neutralised and stands at *zero*. But there remains the *one*-tenth not self-contradicted. Well, but surely, you will say, the prisoner will be able to rebut that, if false, by counter-evidence. Alas! he may have counter-evidence mountains high, but *he is not allowed to bring it*. I know this is hardly credible, but it is true. The very men tried while I was at Naples named and appealed to the counter-evidence of scores and hundreds of men of all classes and professions —military, clergy, Government functionaries, and the rest; but in every instance, with, I believe, one single exception, the Court, the Grand Criminal Court of Justice, refused to hear it: and in that one case the person, when called, fully bore out the statement of the prisoner. Of course the assertion of the accused, however supported by the evidence of station and character, goes for nothing against the small remaining fragment not self-destroyed of the fictions of the vilest wretch, however such a fragment be buried beneath presumptions of falsehood; and this fragment, being thus secured from confutation, forms

the pillow on which the consciences of the judges, after the work of condemnation, calmly and quietly repose.

I ought, however, to point out, for the sake of accuracy, that, when the forged testimony has been procured, the Government are in a condition to present it to the Court, obtain a warrant, and so far legalise the imprisonment.

21. Now, how are these *detenuti* treated during the long and awful period of apprehension and dismay between their illegal seizure and their illegal trial? The prisons of Naples, as is well known, are another name for the extreme of filth and horror. I have really seen something of them, but not the worst. This I have seen, my Lord: the official doctors not going to the sick prisoners, but the sick prisoners, men almost with death on their faces, toiling upstairs to them at that charnelhouse of the Vicaria, because the lower regions of such a palace of darkness are too foul and loathsome to allow it to be expected that professional men should consent to earn bread by entering them. As to diet, I must speak a word for the bread that I have seen. Though black and coarse to the last degree, it was sound. The soup, which forms the only other element of subsistence, is so nauseous, as I was assured, that nothing but the extreme of hunger could overcome the repugnance of nature to it. I had not the means of tasting it. The filth of the prisons is beastly. The officers, except at night, hardly ever enter them. I was ridiculed for reading with some care pretended regulations posted up on the wall of an outer room. One of them was for the visits of the doctors to the sick. I saw the doctors with that regulation over them, and men with one foot in the grave, visiting them, not visited by them.

22. I have walked among a crowd of between three

and four hundred Neapolitan prisoners: murderers, thieves, all kinds of ordinary criminals, some condemned and some uncondemned, and the politically accused indiscriminately: not a chain upon a man of them, not an officer nearer than at the end of many apartments, with many locked doors and gratings between us; but not only was there nothing to dread, there was even a good deal of politeness to me as a stranger. They are a self-governed community, the main authority being that of the *gamorristi*, the men of most celebrity among them for audacious crime. Employment they have none. This swarm of human beings all slept in a long low vaulted room, having no light except from a single and very moderate-sized grating at one end. The political prisoners, by payment, had the privilege of a separate chamber off the former, but there was no division between them.

23. This is not well, but it is far from being the worst. I will now give your Lordship another specimen of the treatment administered at Naples to men illegally arrested, and as yet uncondemned. From the 7th of December last to the 3rd of February, Pironte, who was formerly a judge, and is still a gentleman, and who was found guilty on or about the last-named day, spent his whole days and nights, except when on his trial, with two other men, in a cell at the *Vicaria*, about eight feet square, below the level of the ground, with no light except a grating at the top of the wall, out of which they could not see. Within the space of these eight feet, with the single exception I have named, Pironte and his companions were confined during these two months; neither for Mass were they allowed to quit it, nor for any other purpose whatsoever! This was in Naples, where by universal consent matters are far better than in the provinces. The presence of strangers

has some small influence on the Government: the eye of humanity, or of curiosity, pierces into some dark crannies here, that are wholly unpenetrated in the remoteness of the Provinces, or in those lonely islands scattered along the coast, whose picturesque and romantic forms delight the eye of the passing voyager, ignorant what huge and festering masses of human suffering they conceal. This, I say, was in Naples; it was the case of a gentleman, a lawyer, a judge, accused but uncondemned. Do not suppose it is selected and exceptional. I had no power to select, except from what happened to become known to me, from among a sample quite insignificant in comparison with what must have remained unknown to me. And now, after this one fact, does not the strange and seemingly mad charge I have made against the Neapolitan Government begin, as the light of detail flows in upon it, to assume method and determinate figure?

24. There was another case that I learned, which I believe I can report with accuracy, though my knowledge of it is not quite the same as of the last. When I left Naples, in February, the Baron Porcari was confined in the Maschio of Ischia. He was accused of a share in the Calabrian insurrection, and was awaiting his trial. This Maschio is a dungeon without light, and 24 feet or palms (I am not sure which) below the level of the sea. He is never allowed to quit it day or night, and no one is permitted to visit him there, except his wife—once a fortnight.

25. I have now probably said enough of the proceedings previous to trial; but there is one small gap to fill up. If the arrest is contrary to law, why not, it may be asked, bring an action for false imprisonment? I have made some inquiry upon that head. I understand that as in

other points, so neither in this, is the *law* defective; that such an action might probably be brought, and might in argument be made good, but the want is that of a Court which would dare to entertain it. This will be better understood when I come to speak of the political sentences: for the present I pass on.

26. And now, perhaps, I cannot do better than to furnish a thread to my statement by dealing particularly with the case of Carlo Poerio. It has every recommendation for the purpose. His father was a distinguished lawyer. He is himself a refined and accomplished gentleman, a copious and eloquent speaker, a respected and blameless character. I have had the means of ascertaining in some degree his political position. He is strictly a Constitutionalist; and while I refrain from examining into the shameful chapter of Neapolitan history which that word might open, I must beg you to remember that its strict meaning there is just the same as here, that it signifies a person opposed in heart to all violent measures, from whatever quarter, and having for his political creed the maintenance of the monarchy on its legal basis, by legal means, and with all the civilising improvements of laws and establishments which may tend to the welfare and happiness of the community. His pattern is England, rather than America or France. I have never heard him charged with error in politics, other than such as can generally be alleged with truth against the most high-minded and loyal, the most intelligent and constitutional, of our own statesmen. I must say, after a pretty full examination of his case, that the condemnation of such a man for treason is a proceeding just as much conformable to the laws of truth, justice, decency, and fair play, and to the common sense of the community, in fact just as

great and gross an outrage on them all, as would be a like condemnation in this country of any of our best-known public men, Lord John Russell, or Lord Lansdowne, or Sir James Graham, or yourself. I will not say it is precisely the same as respects his rank and position, but they have scarcely any public man who stands higher, nor is there any one of the names I have mentioned dearer to the English nation—perhaps none so dear—as is that of Poerio to his Neapolitan fellow-countrymen.*

27. I pass by other mournful and remarkable cases, such as that of Settembrini, who, in a sphere by some degrees narrower, but with a character quite as pure and fair, was tried with Poerio and forty more, and was capitally convicted, in February, though through an humane provision of the law the sentence was not executed; but he has, I fear, been reserved for a fate much harder: double irons for life, upon a remote and sea-girt rock: nay, there may even be reason to fear that he is directly subjected to physical torture. The mode of it, which was specified to me upon respectable though not certain authority, was the thrusting of sharp instruments under the finger-nails.

28. I shall likewise say very little upon the case of Faucitano, who, like Settembrini, was tried with Poerio in the same batch of forty-two prisoners during the winter. His case is peculiar, since there really was a foundation for the charge. The charge was an intention to destroy, by means of some terrible explosive agents, several of the Ministers and other persons. The foundation was, that

* [Baron Carlo Poerio was chosen to preside at a dinner given to me by a number of the Deputies to the Italian Chamber, in January 1867, at Florence. His eloquent speech excited among them an unbounded enthusiasm. His death was, however, near at hand.—W. E. G., 1878.]

he had in his breast-pocket, on a great public occasion, a single bottle, which exploded there without injuring him in life or limb! It is likely that he had intended some freak or folly, but he was condemned to death. Till within a few hours of the time appointed, it was believed he would be executed. The Bianchi were in the streets, collecting alms to purchase masses for his soul. He was in the chapel of the condemned, with the priests about him, when, during the night, his case having been discussed at a council in the daytime, there came down from Caserta a messenger with orders for his reprieve. I have learned the agency through which that reprieve was procured, but the notice of it is unnecessary for my present purpose.

29. Carlo Poerio was one of the Ministers of the Crown under the Constitution, and had also one of the most prominent positions in the Neapolitan Parliament. He was, as regarded the Sicilian question, friendly to the maintenance of the unity of the kingdom. He was also friendly to the War of Independence, as it was termed; but I have never heard that he manifested greater zeal in that matter than the King of Naples; it is a question, of course, wholly irrespective of what we have now to consider. Poerio appeared to enjoy the King's full confidence; his resignation, when offered, was at first declined, and his advice asked even after its acceptance.

30. The history of his arrest, as detailed by himself, in his address of February 8, 1850, to his judges, deserves attention. The evening before it (July 18, 1849), a letter was left at his house by a person unknown, conceived in these terms:—"Fly; and fly with speed. You are betrayed! the Government is already in possession of your correspondence with the Marquis Dragonetti,—From one

who loves you much." Had he fled, it would have been proof of guilt, ample for those of whom we are now speaking. But he was aware of this, and did not fly. Moreover, no such correspondence existed. On the 19th, about four in the afternoon, two persons, presenting themselves at his door under a false title, obtained entry, and announced to him that he was arrested in virtue of a verbal order of Peccheneda, the Prefect of Police. He protested in vain: the house was ransacked: he was carried into solitary confinement. He demanded to be examined, and to know the cause of his arrest within twenty-four hours, according to law, but in vain. So early, however, as on the sixth day, he was brought before the Commissary Maddaloni; and a letter, with the seal unbroken, was put into his hands. It was addressed to him, and he was told that it had come under cover to a friend of the Marquis Dragonetti, but that the cover had been opened in mistake by an officer of the police, who happened to have the same name, though a different surname, and who, on perceiving what was within, handed both to the authorities. Poerio was desired to open it, and did open it, in the presence of the Commissary. Thus far, nothing could be more elaborate and careful than the arrangement of the proceeding.

31. But mark the sequel. The matter of the letter of course was highly treasonable; it announced an invasion by Garibaldi, fixed a conference with Mazzini, and referred to a correspondence with Lord Palmerston (whose name was miserably mangled), who promised to aid a proximate revolution. "I perceived at once," says Poerio, "that the handwriting of Dragonetti was vilely imitated, and I said so, remarking that the internal evidence of sheer forgery was higher than any amount of material

proof whatever." Dragonetti was one of the most accomplished of Italians; whereas this letter was full of blunders, both of grammar and of spelling. It is scarcely worth while to notice other absurdities; such as the signature of name, surname, and title in full, and the transmission of such a letter by the ordinary post of Naples. Poerio had among his papers certain genuine letters of Dragonetti's; they were produced and compared with this; and the forgery stood confessed. Upon the detection of this monstrous iniquity, what steps were taken by the Government to avenge not Poerio, but public justice? None whatever: the papers were simply laid aside.

I have taken this detail from Poerio himself, in his Defence; but all Naples knows the story, and knows it with disgust.

Poerio's papers furnished no matter of accusation.

32. It was thus necessary to forge again; or rather perhaps to act upon forgeries which had been prepared, but which were at first deemed inferior to the Dragonetti letter.

A person named Jervolino, a disappointed applicant for some low office, had been selected for the work both of espionage and of perjury; and Poerio was now accused, under information from him, of being among the chiefs of a republican sect, denominated the *Unità Italiana*, and of an intention to murder the King. He demanded to be confronted with his accuser. He had long before known, and named Jervolino to his friends, as having falsely denounced him to the Government; but the authorities refused to confront them; the name was not even told him; he went from one prison to another; he was confined, as he alleges, in places fit for filthy brutes rather than men; he was cut off from the sight of friends; even his mother, his sole remaining near relation in the country,

was not permitted to see him for two months together. Thus he passed some seven or eight months in total ignorance of any evidence against him, or of those who gave it. During that interval Signor Antonio de' Duchi di Santo Vito came to him, and told him the Government knew all; but that if he would confess, his life would be spared. He demanded of his judges on his trial that Santo Vito should be examined as to this statement: of course it was not done. But more than this. Signor Peccheneda himself, the director of the police, and holding the station of a cabinet minister of the King, went repeatedly to the prison, summoned divers prisoners, and with flagrant illegality examined them himself, without witnesses, and without record. One of these was Carafa. By one deposition of this Carafa, who was a man of noble family, it was declared, that Peccheneda himself assured him his matter should be very easily arranged, if he would only testify to Poerio's acquaintance with certain revolutionary handbills. It could not be; and the cabinet minister took leave of Carafa with the words—"Very well, sir; you wish to destroy yourself; I leave you to your fate."

Such was the conduct of Peccheneda, as Poerio did not fear to state it before his judges. I must add, that I have heard, upon indubitable authority, of other proceedings of that minister of the King of Naples, which fully support the credibility of the charge.

33. Besides the *denunzia*, or accusation, of Jervolino, on which the trial ultimately turned, there was against Poerio the evidence given by Romeo, a printer, and co-accused, to the effect that he had heard another person mention Poerio as one of the heads of the sect. The value of this evidence may be estimated from the fact that it included along with Poerio two of the persons *then*

ministers, the Cav. Bozzelli and the Principe di Torella. It was in fact abandoned as worthless, for it spoke of Poerio as a chief in the sect; but this was in contradiction with Jervolino, and the charge of membership only was prosecuted against him. But again, you will remark, the prisoner in no way took benefit from the explosion or failure of any charge; all proceedings went on the principle that the duty of Government was to prove guilt, by means true or false, and that public justice has no interest in the acquittal of the innocent.

34. There was also the testimony of Margherita, another of the co-accused. He declared, upon an afterthought, that Poerio attended a meeting of the high council of the sect. He declared also that, as a member of this republican and revolutionary sect, Poerio was one of three who contended for maintaining the monarchical constitution; and that he was accordingly expelled! On this ground, not to mention others, the evidence of Margherita was unavailable.

It is too easy to understand why these efforts were made by the co-accused at inculpating Poerio and other men of consideration. But they did not issue in relief to the parties who made them, perhaps because their work was so ill executed, or even their treachery not thought genuine. Margherita was confined at Nisida, in February, in the same room with those whom he had denounced. Nay, he had actually been chained to one of them. I shall hereafter describe what this joint chaining is.

The accusation then of Jervolino* formed the sole real basis of the trial and condemnation of Poerio.

* Poerio was named in the evidence of Carafa; but in a manner tending positively to prove his innocence.

Upon this evidence of a man without character or station, and who was a disappointed suitor for office that he thought he should have had by Poerio's means, a gentleman of the highest character, recently a confidential and favoured servant of the King, was put upon trial for his life.

35. The matter of the accusation was this. Jervolino stated that, having failed to obtain an office through Poerio, he asked him to enrol him in the sect of the *Unità Italiana*. That Poerio put him in charge of a person named Attanasio, who was to take him to another of the prisoners, named Nisco, that he might be admitted. That Nisco sent him to a third person named Ambrosio, who initiated him. He could not recollect any of the forms, nor the oath of the sect! Of the certificate or diploma, or of the meetings, which the rules of the sect when published (as the Government professed to have found them) proved to be indispensable for all its members, he knew nothing whatever!

36. How did he know, said Poerio, that I was of the sect when he asked me to admit him? No answer. Why could not Nisco, who is represented in the accusation as a leader, admit him? No answer. If I, being a Minister of the Crown at the time, was also a member of the sect, could it be necessary for me to have him thus referred to one person, and another, and a third, for admission? No answer. Why has not Ambrosio, who admitted him, been molested by the Government? No answer. Could I be a sectarian when, as a Minister, I was decried and reviled by the exalted party in all their journals for holding fast by the Constitutional Monarchy? No answer. Nay, such was the impudent stupidity of the informer, that in detailing the confidences which Poerio, as he said, had

made to him, he fixed the last of them on May 29, 1849; upon which Poerio showed that on May 22, or seven days before, he was in possession of a written report and accusation, made by Jervolino, as the appointed spy upon him, to the police: and yet, with this in his hand, he still continued to make him a political confidant!

37. Such was a specimen of the tissue of Jervolino's evidence; such its contradictions and absurdities. Jervolino had, shortly before, been a beggar; he now appeared well dressed and in good condition. I have stated that the multitudes of witnesses called by the accused in exculpation were in no case but one allowed to be called. That one, as I have learned it, was this:—Poerio alleged that a certain archpriest declared Jervolino had told him he received a pension of twelve ducats a month from the Government for the accusations he was making against Poerio: and the archpriest, on the prisoner's demand, was examined. The archpriest confirmed the statement, and mentioned two more of his relatives who could do the same. In another case I have heard that six persons to whom a prisoner appealed as witnesses in exculpation, were thereupon themselves arrested. Nothing more likely.

I myself heard Jervolino's evidence discussed, for many hours, in court; and it appeared to me that the tenth part of what I heard should not only have ended the case, but have secured his condign punishment for perjury.

I must, however, return to the point, and say, even had his evidence been self-consistent and free from the grosser presumptions of untruth, the very fact of his character, as compared with Poerio's, was enough to have secured the acquittal of the accused with any man who had justice for his object. Nor do I believe there is one

man in Naples, of average intelligence, who believes one word of the accusation of Jervolino.

38. Two exceptions were taken in the course of these proceedings. It was argued by the counsel for Poerio, that the Grand Court Extraordinary, before which the trial took place, was incompetent to deal with the case, because the charge referred to his conduct while a minister and a member of the Chamber of Deputies: and by the 48th Article of the Constitutional Statute all such charges were to be tried by the Chamber of Peers. The exception was rejected: and the rejection confirmed upon appeal.

39. The second exception was this. It was distinctly charged against the prisoners that their supposed sect had conspired against the life of some of the Ministers, and of the judge Domenic-antonio Navarro, the President of the Court; first, by means of the bottle, that exploded in the pocket of Faucitano; secondly, by means of a body of *pugnalatori* or assassins, who were to do the work if the bottle failed. This intention purported to be founded on the cruelty of the judgments he had pronounced upon innocent persons. The prisoners protested against being tried by him, and he himself presented a note to the Court stating he felt scruples about proceeding with the case, and desired to be guided by the rest of the Court. The Court unanimously decided that he ought to sit and judge these men upon a charge including the allegation of their intent to murder him; and fined the prisoners and their counsel 100 ducats for taking the objection! This decision, too, was confirmed upon appeal; and the Courts both sagely observed that the scruple felt by Navarro was itself such a proof of the impartial, delicate, and generous nature of his mind, as

ought to show that he could not possibly be under any bias; while they admitted, that under the law of Naples, if he had even within five years been engaged in any criminal suit as a party against them, he could not have sat. So this delicate, impartial, and generous-minded man, accordingly, sat and tried the prisoners.

40. In the case where I have heard the detail of the voting of the judges, Navarro voted for condemnation, and for the severest form of punishment. I have been told, and I believe he makes no secret of his opinion, that all persons charged by the King's Government ought to be found guilty. I have been told, and I fully believe, that Poerio, whose case was certainly a pretty strong one, even for the Neapolitan judges, would have been acquitted by a division of four to four (such is the humane provision of the law in case of equality), had not Navarro, by the distinct use of intimidation, that is of threats of dismissal, to a judge whose name has been told me, procured the number necessary for a sentence.* But I need not go into these foul recesses. I stand upon the fact that Navarro, whose life, according to the evidence for the charge, was aimed at by the prisoners, sat as President of the Court that tried them for their lives; and I ask whether language can exaggerate the state of things in a country where such enormities are perpetrated under the direct sanction of the Government?

41. So much for the exceptions. I must observe on another curious point, with reference to the court of justice. It did not sit as an ordinary, but as a special, Court. When a Court sits specially, it is with a view to

* He appears to have been finally found guilty (of belonging to the sect) by six of his judges.—NOTE, July 11, 1851.

dispatch. On these occasions the process is shortened by the omission of many forms, most valuable, as I am assured, for the defence of the prisoner. Above forty persons, on that single occasion, were thus robbed of important aids, with a view to expedition; and yet these men had been sixteen or eighteen months and upwards in prison before they were brought to trial!

42. I shall now give an indication, not of the impartiality of the Court, but of the degree of decency with which its partiality is veiled. In two cases it happened to be within the knowledge of the counsel for the prisoners that the perjured witnesses against them did not even know them by sight. In one of these the counsel desired to be allowed to ask the witness to point out the accused persons among the whole number of those charged, who were all sitting together. The Court refused permission. In the other case, the counsel challenged the witness to point out the man of whose proceedings he was speaking. If I am rightly informed, Navarro, whom I have so lately mentioned, affecting not to hear the question, called out to the prisoner, "Stand up, Signor Nisco; the Court has a question to ask you." This was done, and Counsel then informed that he might pursue his examination. A laugh of bitter mockery ran through the Court.

43. I must now place before you an example of the humanity with which invalid prisoners are treated by the Grand Criminal Court at Naples. The statement is not mine; but it proceeds from a gentleman and an eye-witness, and one who thoroughly understands the language.

"The original number of the persons under trial for forming part of the imaginary society christened by the

police the Unità Italiana, was forty-two. The list was headed by the name of Antonio Leipnecher, now no more. His illness prevented the Court sitting for some days. At last Navarro informed the medical men attached to the prisons, that their consciences must find means to certify the possibility of Leipnecher's attendance on the following morning.

"On the following morning I was on my way to the tribunal with a friend, when we met one of the doctors with whom my friend was acquainted. He began to talk about Leipnecher, and said the man was dangerously ill, but that his position was such that he could not safely certify to the impossibility of his attendance, and that he had consequently informed the President that Leipnecher might be brought into Court in a sedan chair, provided restoratives were allowed him and *no question were asked him.*

"I entered the Court, and after the other prisoners had taken their places a sedan chair was brought in, from which Antonio Leipnecher was led, or rather carried, in a state of mental and bodily prostration.

"Navarro opened the proceedings by calling upon the *Cancilliere* to read the *interrogatorio* of Antonio Leipnecher; and, when finished, called upon him for his observations. His lawyer said that he had already endeavoured to speak to him, but that he was unable to answer or understand. Navarro then addressed him in a menacing tone, cautioning him that by shamming illness he was ruining his own cause. Leipnecher made some inaudible observations, which were repeated by another prisoner, to the effect that the doctors had not taken any pains to cure him. 'Oh!' said Navarro, 'write down that he says the doctors would not cure

him.' The *Procuratore Generale*, Angelillo, then desired that the doctors might be again called in to give their opinion as to his present state, which they did in an hour, and reported him suffering from an acute fever and unable to remain. 'But,' said Angelillo, 'as he is here, why can he not remain?' 'He cannot,' said the doctors, 'without immediate danger to his life.' The Court then broke up, and when it again met in the course of two or three days Leipnecher was in his grave."

44. But I know that, after what I have said of the Grand Criminal Court of Naples, I must have stirred up incredulity in the breast of any one accustomed to perceive in the judges of a country the very highest impersonation of the principles of honour and dispassionate equity. I do not then intend to urge that the judges of Naples are all monsters, but they are slaves. They are very numerous, very ill-paid, and they hold their offices during pleasure. They are in general of far less eminence and weight, and of a lower moral standard, than the higher members of the Bar who plead before them. The highest salary of any person on the bench of judges is, I believe, 4000 ducats a year. Perhaps the eight judges who are now trying political prisoners by the hundred in Naples, may have among them about half the salary of one English Puisne Judge. But the main element in the case is, the tyrannical severity with which they are treated in case of their defeating the accusations brought by Government. Not, indeed, that acquittal in all cases signifies much. As the Government arrest and imprison without any warrant, or any charge; so, on the same broad and cherished principle of illegality, they think nothing of keeping men in prison after they have been first punished by some two or three years of impri-

sonment and terror, and then solemnly declared guiltless. For example, out of the forty-one * prisoners (reduced from forty-two by the death of Leipnecher) whose cases were finally disposed of by the sentences of last February, six, I think, were acquitted; and the last I heard of those six persons, some time after their acquittal, was, that they were all still in prison!

45. Under these circumstances, it will perhaps excite no surprise that the judges escaped with impunity, in consideration of their having condemned thirty-five to punishments for the most part awfully severe. But woe be to the judges themselves if they baulk the main object of a prosecution. In Naples itself, I understand that a gentleman of eighty years of age, who had exercised the office of judge for half a century, was turned out upon the world a short time ago, for having acquitted the parties charged with having composed or published an obnoxious article in a newspaper. A more notorious case has recently happened at Reggio. A batch of prisoners were there brought to trial for some matter connected with the period of the ill-fated Constitution. They were acquitted; and the arm of vengeance descended upon the judges. After such an outrage on their part, the entire Court, as if an Augean stable, was swept clear. Two, I believe—probably the docile minority—had only a nominal deprivation, being classed as *disponibili*, and held qualified for new appointments, which, for all I know, they may now have received. But six judges, the offending majority, were mercilessly and absolutely dismissed. How can we be surprised

* This number, I think, should be forty: the number acquitted, eight: the number condemned, thirty-two.—NOTE, July 11, 1851.

that, with this perfection of discipline, the word of command should even by judges be readily obeyed?

46. Three of the forty-one prisoners in what I may call the Poerio case were condemned to death—Settembrini, Agresti, and Faucitano. Poerio himself was condemned to twenty-four years of irons. I believe the vote on him was as follows:—Three judges for acquittal; two for irons; three (including the delicate, scrupulous, and impartial mind of Navarro) for DEATH—on that testimony of Jervolino, which I have sufficiently described. The two latter sections then joined in voting for the lighter punishment, and thus the majority was obtained, one vote having been at first drawn off from the side of acquittal by the bullying process to which I have before referred, and which was fitly intrusted to the delicate, scrupulous, impartial, and generous Navarro.

47. A strange error is stated to have occurred. It seems that the Neapolitan law humanely provides that when three persons are found guilty capitally, the sentence can be pronounced only on one; but that *this* was forgotten by the judges, and only found out by the Procurator-General, or some other party, after they thought they had finished. I have even heard it stated that Settembrini and Agresti received, as of mercy, a reprieve, to which they were entitled as of right. As to Faucitano, I will not enter into details of what occurred at Caserta in the palace, but I have heard them, and minutely too; and there appears to me too good reason to believe that the threat of the withdrawal of certain useful support from the Government of Naples, and not humanity, dictated, at the last moment, the commutation of his punishment.

48. Now there is no doubt that the infliction of capital punishment, under judicial sentences, is extremely rare in

the kingdom of Naples; but whatever capital punishment may be in other points of view, I do not hesitate to say it would be a refined humanity, in respect to the amount of suffering which it inflicts, in whatever form, through the agency of man, as compared with that which is actually undergone in sentences of imprisonment. Yet even on the severity of these sentences I would not endeavour to fix attention so much as to draw it off from the great fact of illegality, which seems to me to be the foundation of the Neapolitan system: illegality, the fountain-head of cruelty and baseness, and every other vice: illegality which gives a bad conscience, that bad conscience creates fears, those fears lead to tyranny, that tyranny begets resentment, that resentment creates true causes of fear where they were not before; and thus fear is quickened and enhanced, the original vice multiplies itself with fearful speed, and old crime engenders a necessity for new.

I have spoken of Settembrini and his reputed and too credible torture; I come now to what I have either seen, or heard on the most direct and unquestionable authority.

49. In February last, Poerio and sixteen of the co-accused (with few of whom, however, he had had any previous acquaintance) were confined in the *Bagno* of Nisida near the Lazaretto. For one half-hour in the week, a little prolonged by the leniency of the superintendent, they were allowed to see their friends outside the prison. This was their sole view of the natural beauties with which they were surrounded. At other times they were exclusively within the walls. The whole number of them, except I think one, then in the infirmary, were confined, night and day, in a single room of about sixteen palms in length by ten or twelve in breadth, and about ten in height; I think with some small yard for exercise.

Something like a fifth must be taken off these numbers to convert palms into feet. When the beds were let down at night, there was no space whatever between them; they could only get out at the foot, and, being chained two and two, only in pairs. In this room they had to cook or prepare what was sent them by the kindness of their friends. On one side, the level of the ground is over the top of the room; it therefore reeked with damp, and from this, tried with long confinement, they declared they suffered greatly. There was one window—of course unglazed—and let not an Englishman suppose that this constant access of the air in the Neapolitan climate is agreeable or innocuous; on the contrary, it is even more important to health there than here to have the means of excluding the open air, for example, before and at sunset. Vicissitude of climate, again, is quite as much felt there as here, and the early morning is sometimes bitterly cold.

50. Their chains were as follows. Each man wears a strong leather girth round him above the hips. To this are secured the upper ends of two chains. One chain of four long and heavy links descends to a kind of double ring fixed round the ankle. The second chain consists of eight links, each of the same weight and length with the four, and this unites the two prisoners together, so that they can stand about six feet apart. Neither of these chains is ever undone day or night. The dress of common felons, which, as well as the felon's cap, was there worn by the late cabinet minister of King Ferdinand of Naples, is composed of a rough and coarse red jacket, with trousers of the same material—very like the cloth made in this country from what is called devil's dust; the trousers are nearly black in colour. On his head he had a small cap, which makes up the suit; it is of the same material. The

trousers button all the way up, that they may be removed at night without disturbing the chains.

51. The weight of these chains, I understand, is about eight rotoli, or between sixteen and seventeen English pounds for the shorter one, which must be doubled when we give each prisoner his half of the longer one. The prisoners had a heavy limping movement, much as if one leg had been shorter than the other, but the refinement of suffering in this case arises from the circumstance that here we have men of education and high feeling chained incessantly together. For no purpose are these chains undone; and the meaning of these last words must be well considered: they are to be taken strictly.

52. Well, it may be thought, the practice is barbarous, and ought not to prevail; still, as it does prevail, it might be difficult to exempt these persons, although gentlemen, from it. But this, my Lord, is not the true explanation. On the contrary, it was for the sake of these very gentlemen that the practice of chaining two and two was introduced into the *Bagno* of Nisida. I was assured that two or three weeks before, among eight hundred prisoners in that *Bagno* (which to the passer-by looks hardly bigger than a martello tower) these double irons were totally unknown; and there were many political offenders then there, but they were men of the lower class, to whom this kind of punishment would have been but a slight addition. But just about the time when Poerio and his companions were sent to Nisida, an order came from Prince Luigi, the brother of the King, who, as Admiral, has charge of the island, ordering that double irons should be used for those who had been brought into the prison since a certain rather recent date—I think July 22, 1850. Thus it was contrived to have them put on Poerio and his friends, and

yet to have a plea, such as it is, for saying that the measure was not adopted with a view to their case, and to the extreme moral (as well as the not slight physical) suffering which it would secure for them. Among these, as I have already said, had been chained together the informer Margherita and one of his victims. Among these, I myself saw a political prisoner, Romeo, chained in the manner I have described, to an ordinary offender, a young man with one of the most ferocious and sullen countenances I have seen among many hundreds of the Neapolitan criminals.

53. The inspector of this prison, General Palomba, had, I was informed, never, or not for a very long time, visited it. But he had come just before I was there, and it is impossible to avoid the inference that he came in order to make certain that the orders for increased severity were not evaded or relaxed.

I had heard that the political offenders were obliged to have their heads shaved; but this had not been done, though they had been obliged to shave away any beard they might have had.

54. I must say I was astonished at the mildness with which they spoke of those at whose hands they were enduring these abominable persecutions, and at their Christian resignation as well as their forgiving temper, for they seemed ready to undergo with cheerfulness whatever might yet be in store for them. Their health was evidently suffering. I saw the aunt of one of these prisoners, a man of about eight-and-twenty, weep when she spoke of his altered looks, and of the youthful colour but a few weeks before in his cheeks. I should have taken him for forty. I had seen Poerio in December, during his trial; but I should not have known him at Nisida.

He did not expect his own health to stand, although God, he said, had given him strength to endure. It was suggested to him from an authoritative quarter, that his mother, of whom he was the only prop, might be sent to the King to implore his pardon, or he might himself apply for it. He steadily refused. That mother, when I was at Naples, was losing her mental powers under the pressure of her afflictions. It seemed as if God, more compassionate than her fellow-creatures, were taking them away in mercy, for she had, amidst her sorrow, trances and visions of repose; she told a young physician, known to me, that she had been seeing her son, and with him another person. The two were in different gaols, and she had seen neither.

55. Since I have left Naples, Poerio has sunk to a lower depth of calamity. He has been taken, I understand, from Nisida to Ischia, farther from public interest, and perhaps to some abode like the Maschio of Porcari. What I saw was quite enough. Never before have I conversed, and never probably shall I converse again, with a cultivated and accomplished gentleman, of whose innocence, obedience to law, and love of his country I was as firmly and as rationally assured as of your Lordship's or that of any other man of the very highest character, whilst he stood before me amidst surrounding felons, and clad in the vile uniform of guilt and shame. But he is now gone where he will scarcely have the opportunity even of such conversation. I cannot honestly suppress my conviction that the object in the case of Poerio, as a man of mental power sufficient to be feared, is to obtain the scaffold's aim by means more cruel than the scaffold, and without the outcry which the scaffold would create.

56. It is time for me to draw to a close. I might,

indeed, detail circumstances to show that language is used by the highest authority in Naples, demonstrating that attachment to the Constitution, that is the fundamental law of the State, is there regarded and punished as a crime; and again, to show that men, ay, ecclesiastics as well as laymen, are confessedly detained in prison there, not because they have committed crime, not because they are even suspected of it, but because it is thought that through their means may possibly be obtained, at some future time, some imaginary information tending to inculpate somebody else. But I will wind up this repulsive narration, with noticing a circumstance that too clearly shows what value is placed by those in power at Naples upon human life as such.

57. I have spoken of the Neapolitan prisons. It appears that, not long ago, exasperated by the treatment they received, the inmates of the State prison of Procida revolted, and endeavoured to gain possession of the prison. The mode of quelling this revolt was as follows. The soldiers in charge of them threw hand-grenades among them, and killed them to the number of one hundred and seventy-five. In this number were included seventeen invalids in the infirmary, who had no part in the revolt. I have been told that, for perpetrating this massacre, the serjeant who commanded the troops was decorated with, and may now be seen wearing, a military order. I refer to this incident without forgetting that a revolt or riot in a prison is a formidable thing, and requires strong measures; but with the overwhelming force everywhere at the command of the Executive power, and with the mild character of Neapolitans, even as criminals, taken into view, no one will believe that there was the slightest call for this wholesale slaughter.

58. Enough, it seems to me, has now been said to show that there are the strongest reasons for believing that, under the veil of secrecy, which covers the proceedings of the Government of Naples, there lie hid the gigantic horrors, to which I have alluded as afflicting that country, desolating entire classes upon which the life and growth of the nation depend, undermining the foundation of all civil rule, and preparing the way for violent revolution by converting the Power, which is set up in human societies to maintain law and order, and to defend innocence and punish crime, into the grand law-breaker and malefactor of the country, the first in rank among oppressors, the deadly enemy of freedom and intelligence, and the active fomentor and instigator of the vilest corruption among the people.

59. While I speak thus freely and strongly of the acts of the Neapolitan Government, I have deliberately refrained (with the exception of certain clear cases) from any attempt to point out the agents, or to distribute or fix the responsibility. Beyond the limits I have named I know not, and have not the desire to know, to whom it belongs. I am aware that, although the Sovereign be the effective governor of the country, an impenetrable veil may pass between his eyes and the actual system of means by which this main department of his Government is worked; I know it to be the belief of some persons that this is actually the case; I must add that I am acquainted with an instance of a direct and unceremonious appeal to the King's humanity, which met with a response on his part evidently sincere, although, according to the latest accounts I have received, his intentions have as yet been thwarted by other influences, and have not taken practical effect.

60. And now, my dear Lord, I conclude, as I began, with expressing my gratitude to you for allowing me to place this letter in your hands. But for this permission, I might have found myself wholly without the means of putting any such engine into operation as would offer me the least hope of quietly producing a salutary effect upon the proceedings of the Neapolitan Government. I took leave, indeed, of Naples with a fixed resolution to strain every nerve for effecting that purpose, and for effecting it with promptitude. But I am very sensible of the hazards attending any appeal to the public opinion of this and other countries, and how such an appeal, if strong enough to be effective, must also be so strong as to run some risk of quickening the action of the elements of social and political disorder. I freely own that my sense of the actual evils pressing upon the Neapolitan people, of the other and opposite evils which these are rapidly engendering, and of the obligations arising out of the whole, is so deep and so intense, that I must, but for the expectation of some prompt and marked signs of improvement, to be brought about through the channels which your just personal weight will, as I trust, open for me, have at once encountered the hazards of publicity, whatever they might be, as I might still, in contingencies I am unwilling to contemplate, be compelled to encounter them.

61. But this I must add. Into some one or more particulars of the statements I have made, error of form, and even error of fact, may have crept. I am prepared for the possibility, that if those statements should in any manner reach the persons whose conduct they principally concern, they may be met with general denial, and that denial may even be supported and accredited with some instance or

instances of apparent, nay, possibly of real confutation. I now state that I cannot and shall not entail upon your Lordship the charge of handing to and fro replications and rejoinders. I will not discuss the correctness of my statements with those who alone are likely to impugn them, because I cannot do it upon equal terms. First, inasmuch as in Naples secrecy is the almost universal rule of the proceedings of Government, and the perfect servitude of the press cuts off the means of sifting controverted matter, and thus the ordinary avenues to truth. Secondly, because my entering upon such details would infallibly cause unjust suspicion to light upon individuals, and would thus at once give rise to further persecutions. Thirdly, and even most of all, because I am so entirely certain of the accuracy of my statements in the general picture they present, and the general results to which they lead, as to feel that they are beyond *bonâ fide* dispute, and that to engage in any such dispute would be to postpone, perhaps indefinitely, the attainment of the practical ends which I propose to myself the hope of gaining.

62. I have the less scruple in attaching my own credit to them, because I am convinced that as a whole, they are within the truth. Not in one word or syllable, of course, have I consciously heightened the colouring of the case beyond the facts: I have omitted much, which even my short residence in Naples forced upon my knowledge; I have endeavoured to avoid multiplicity of detail, and have referred particularly to the case of Poerio, not because I have the slightest reason to believe it more cruel or wicked than others, but because I was able to follow it somewhat better through its particulars, and because it is one which will more readily than most others attract

interest out of his own country. *Crimine ab uno disce omnes.* It is time that either the veil should be lifted from scenes fitter for hell than earth, or some considerable mitigation should be voluntarily adopted. I have undertaken this wearisome and painful task, in the hope of doing something to diminish a mass of human suffering as huge, I believe, and as acute, to say the least, as any that the eye of Heaven beholds. This may, as I fondly trust, be effected, through your Lordship's aid, on the one hand without elusion or delay, on the other without the mischiefs and inconveniences which I am fully sensible might, nay in some degree must, attend the process, were I thrown back on my own unaided resources.

I remain, my dear Lord Aberdeen,

Most sincerely yours,

W. E. GLADSTONE.

The Earl of Aberdeen, K.T.,
&c. &c. &c.

II.

LETTER II.*

1851.

My dear Lord Aberdeen,

1. The letter, of which this contains the sequel, was of a personal and private nature; and was addressed to you with the ardent and even sanguine hope, that it need never have to bear any other character. I had such a conviction of the general truth and strength of the statements it contained, and of the extreme urgency of the case, and I knew so well, as indeed all men know, the just weight attaching to your Lordship's name, even while you act in a personal and private capacity alone, that when at my request you consented to make my representations known in those quarters to which it appeared most desirable to resort, my mind was disburdened of a heavy weight, and I cheerfully anticipated some such practical consequences as, even if small in themselves, might, notwithstanding, by their character, have encouraged and justified a patient waiting for more considerable results from farther and more mature deliberation.

2. It was in itself a thing so reasonable, that private representation and remonstrance should in the first instance be attempted, that I cannot regret the course that was taken, though it entailed the serious delays required for

* [Reprinted as above, p. 1, n.]

your own mature consideration of the case, and for making it known in those other spheres to which I have referred. But the manner in which it had been received in the quarter directly affected by my allegations, had entirely convinced me that it would not be warrantable to trust any longer in this case to the force of mere expostulation, before, driven from the definite hopes which I had founded upon your assistance, I committed my first letter to the press. I wish, however, to make it clearly understood, that I am alone responsible for that proceeding.

3. I have felt it, then, my bounden duty to remit my statements by publication to the bar of general opinion— of that opinion which circulates throughout Europe with a facility and force increasing from year to year, and which, however in some things it may fall short or in others exceed, is, so far at least, impregnated with the spirit of the Gospel, that its accents are ever favourable to the diminution of human suffering.

4. To have looked for any modification whatever of the reactionary policy of a government, in connection with a moving cause so trivial as any sentiments or experience of mine, may be thought presumptuous or chimerical. What claim, it may be asked, had I, one among thousands of mere travellers, upon the Neapolitan Government? The deliberations which fix the policy of States, especially of absolute States, must be presumed to have been laborious and solid in some proportion to their immense, their terrific power over the practical destinies of mankind; and they ought not to be unsettled at a moment's notice in deference to the wishes or the impressions of insignificant, or adversely prepossessed, or at best irresponsible individuals.

5. My answer is short. On the Government of Naples

I had no claim whatever; but as a man I felt and knew it to be my duty to testify to what I had credibly heard, or personally seen, of the needless and acute sufferings of men. Yet, aware that such testimony, when once launched, is liable to be used for purposes neither intended nor desired by those who bear it, and that in times of irritability and misgiving, such as these are on the Continent of Europe, slight causes may occasionally produce, or may tend and aid to produce, effects less inconsiderable, I willingly postponed any public appeal until the case should have been seen in private by those whose conduct it principally touched. It has been so seen. They have made their option; and while I reluctantly accept the consequences, their failing to meet it by any practical improvement will never be urged by me as constituting an aggravation of their previous responsibilities.

6. It may, again, disappoint some persons that I should now simply appear in my personal capacity through the press, instead of inviting to this grave and painful question the attention of that House of Parliament to which I have the honour to belong. To such I would say, that I have advisedly abstained from mixing up my statements with any British agencies or influences which are official, diplomatic, or political. I might indeed, by thus associating them with the interests of parties or individuals, have obtained for them an increased amount of favourable attention; but I might on the other hand have arrayed against my representations, and against what I believe to be the sacred purposes of humanity, the jealousies of those connected with other European States; and, in the kingdom of the Two Sicilies itself, those laudable sentiments of national independence, which lie at the root of patriotism. I should in effect have caused, if not made, a

fundamental misrepresentation of the whole case. The claims, the interests, which I have in view are not those of England. Either they are wholly null and valueless, or they are broad as the extension of the human race, and long-lived as its duration. It might, indeed, be better to obtain some partial redress of these grievances through the political influence and power of this country, than to remain wholly without it: but I am so deeply sensible of the evils attendant, under the circumstances of the case, upon that mode of proceeding, and upon its tendency to multiply the number and enhance the force of obstructive and even counteracting causes, that I deliberately abstain from appealing to the generous sympathies, with which I am certain the British Parliament would meet the statement of such a case; and if the case shall penetrate within those precincts it will be by no agency, encouragement, or assent of mine.

7. Upon reviewing and reconsidering the terms of the letter addressed by me to your Lordship, on the 7th of April, I find in them a warmth which may be open to criticism, but which then appeared, and still appears, to me to be generally justified by the circumstances of the case. I find a great variety of allegations which will excite horror and indignation in some, incredulity in others, surprise in most: but which few will pass by with indifference. I find these strong statements made with the avowal on my part, that there are many of them which it has been impossible for me to verify with precision in their detail; because the ordinary sources of information are closed; because statements when received cannot, at Naples, be subjected to the test of free discussion; and because the supposition once entertained against a Neapolitan that he conveyed to any one, especially to an English-

man (perhaps I might add especially, even as among Englishmen, to myself), ideas or intelligence unfavourable to the Government, would have marked him out as the object of the spy and the victim of the informer. I stand now, as I stood then, upon the conviction that my general representation is not too highly charged; upon the consciousness that I have done all that could be done to attain to accuracy in detail; upon the fact that perhaps the most disgraceful circumstances are those which rest upon public notoriety, or upon my own personal knowledge; and upon the assurance I have too good reason to entertain, that any attempt on my part to confer habitually with Neapolitan subjects, or to conduct any regular search for information through their means, or any indication, direct or indirect, of any individuals among them as the source from which I have derived my knowledge and impressions, would be fatal to their personal liberty and happiness.

8. But I do not stand upon these grounds alone. My assurance of the general truth of my representations has been heightened, my fears of any material error in detail have been diminished, since the date of my first letter, by the negative but powerful evidence of the manner in which they have been met. Writing in July, I have as yet no qualification worth naming to append to the allegations which I first put into shape in April. I am indeed aware, that my opinion with respect to the number of political prisoners in the kingdom of the Two Sicilies has been met by an assertion, purporting to be founded on returns, that instead of twenty thousand they are about two thousand. Even this number has not always been admitted; for I recollect that in November last they were stated to me, by an Englishman of high honour and in

close communication with the Court, to be less than one thousand. I have carefully pointed out, that my statement is one founded on opinion: on reasonable opinion as I think, but upon opinion still. Let the Neapolitan Government have the full benefit of the contradiction I have mentioned. To me it would be a great relief, if I could honestly say it at once commanded my credence. The readers of my letters will not be surprised at my hesitation to admit it. But this I would add: the mere number of political prisoners is in my view, like the state of the prisons, *in itself*, a secondary feature of the case. If they are fairly and legally arrested, fairly and legally treated before trial, fairly and legally tried, that is the main matter. Where fairness and legality preside over the proceedings, we need have no great fear about an undue number of prisoners. But my main charges go to show that there is gross illegality and gross unfairness in the proceedings; and it is only in connection with the proof of this, that the number of prisoners and the state of the prisons come to be matters of such importance.

9. It will have been remarked in my former letter that I have spoken of what I myself saw in the Neapolitan prisons, and even in a few cases of what I heard from prisoners. I think it necessary to state the motive which led me to seek entrance there. It was not an idle curiosity, but an impression of the duty incumbent upon me to be an eye-witness, so far as was in my power, to the facts, before deciding upon any ulterior step. It is likewise a sacred obligation that I should state that those unfortunate persons are in no sense or degree responsible for my having visited their melancholy abodes, nor were they in any manner privy or auxiliary to it, or to anything I have said or done, before or subsequently. If

they have since been subjected, as has been reported to me, to an increase of suffering and hardship, that increase can derive no justification from any such act or knowledge of theirs. It is right too for me to add that, when I refer to their views or statements concerning the trials, I simply quote from printed records which I obtained without their aid or knowledge. If a measure taken by me simply and solely to get at the truth, by the only means which were open to me, should have resulted in the aggravation of the condition of innocent men, it does but afford another proof of the miserable tendency of tyranny, like every other evil, to multiply and reproduce itself. We call necessity the tyrant's plea, and such it is; but it is not a plea only, it is a reason: It is a hard and cruel task-mistress; and the wilful abuse of our high faculty of choice for the purposes of evil, soon brings about a state of things in which common volition is well nigh superseded, and a resolution almost heroic is required to arrest the fatal course.

10. I do not intend to add to the statements of fact contained in my last letter, though they are but a portion, and not always the most striking portion, of those which I might have produced. One reason of this is, that they are, as I think, sufficient for their purpose; and another, that by a different course I should probably put in jeopardy, not indeed the persons who made them to me, but those whom the agents of the police might suppose, or might find it convenient to pretend that they supposed, to have so made them.

My chief purpose at present is, to sustain the general probability of my statements, by a reference to unquestionable facts, which have occurred both in other parts of Italy and in Naples itself; facts such as exhibit a state

of things to us most difficult to believe or even to apprehend, but there, alas! too familiar and too true.

11. That my statements should be received in the first instance with incredulity, can cause me no dissatisfaction. Nay, more: I think that, for the honour of human nature, statements of such a kind ought to be so received. Men ought to be slow to believe that such things can happen, and happen in a Christian country, the seat of almost the oldest European civilisation. They ought to be disposed rather to set down my assertions to fanaticism or folly on my part, than to believe them as an over true tale of the actual proceedings of a settled government. But though they ought to be thus disposed at the outset, they will not, I trust, bar their minds to the entrance of the light, however painful be the objects it may disclose. I have myself felt that incredulity, and wish I could have felt it still; but it has yielded to conviction step by step, and with fresh pain at every fresh access of evidence. I proceed accordingly to bring the reader's mind, so far as I am able, under the process through which my own has passed, and to state some characteristic facts, which may convey more faithfully than abstract description an idea of the political atmosphere of Italy.

12. For example, I have within the last few lines spoken of the Neapolitan police in such a manner as I should be sorry to apply in most countries to those classes which a police, according to our notions, is appointed specially to coerce. Among ourselves the police constable is, as such, the object of general respect; tradition suggests, and the conduct of the body confirms, this feeling; nor have we at present a word in use to describe the character, which conveys any unfavourable idea. But

in the Italian tongue he is a *sbirro* or a *sgherro*, words which carry the united idea of degradation in the person described, and loathing in those who utter them: words, too, which it is impossible to render perfectly into English. And now, having spoken of the way in which others think of them, let us give a specimen of the manner in which the Italian police officer estimates himself. I take my example from Lombardy: yet I am very far from implying that the police of that country has sunk to the level of the corresponding class in Naples.

13. There was lately a well-known officer of police in Milan, named Bolza. In the time of the Revolution of 1848 the private notes of the Government on the character of its agents were discovered. Bolza is there described as a person harsh, insincere, anything but respectable, venal, a fanatical Napoleonist until 1815, then an Austrian partisan of equal heat, "and to-morrow a Turk, were Soliman to enter upon these States;" capable of anything for money's sake against either friend or foe. Still, as the memorandum continues, "he understands his business, and is right good at it. Nothing is known of his morals, or of his religion." But a work published at Lugano contains his last will, and this curious document testifies to the acute sense which even such a man retained of his own degradation. "I absolutely forbid my heirs," he says, "to allow any mark, of whatever kind, to be placed over the spot where I shall be interred: much more any inscription or epitaph. I recommend my dearly beloved wife to impress upon my children the maxim that, when they shall be in a condition to solicit an employment from the generosity of the Government, they are to ask for it elsewhere than in the department of the executive police; and not, unless

under extraordinary circumstances, to give her consent to the marriage of any of my daughters with a member of that service." *

14. I shall next name two facts which are related by Farini, the recent and esteemed writer of a History of the States of the Church since 1815:—"There exists a confidential circular of Cardinal Bernetti, in which he orders the Judges, in the case of Liberals charged with ordinary offences or crimes, invariably to inflict the highest degree of punishment." †

Bernetti was not an Austrian partisan; it is alleged that he was supplanted (early in the reign of Gregory XVI.) through Austrian influence. His favourite idea was the entire independence of the Pontifical State; and therefore the circular to which I have referred is purely Italian.

15. This was under Gregory XVI. Under Leo XII., Cardinal Rivarola went as legate *à latere* into Romagna. On the 31st of August 1825, he pronounced sentence on five hundred and eight persons. Seven of these were to suffer death. Forty-nine were to undergo hard labour for terms varying between ten years and life. Fifty-two were to be imprisoned for similar terms. These sentences were pronounced privately, at the simple will of the Cardinal, upon mere presumptions that the parties belonged to the liberal sects; and what is to the ear of an Englishman the most astounding fact of all, after a process simply analogous to that of a Grand Jury (I compare the process, not the person), and without any opportunity given to the accused for defence! ‡

* Gualterio, 'Gli ultimi Rivolgimenti Italiani,' vol. i. p. 431, *note.*
† Farini, 'Lo Stato Romano,' vol. i. p. 77, book. I. chap. v. *note.*
‡ *Ibid.* chap. ii.

16. I may add a reference to an edict published by the Duke of Modena on the 18th of April 1832. This edict ordains that political prisoners may be sentenced to any punishment materially less than that provided by law upon proof of the offence, without any trial or form of proceeding whatever, in cases where it has been agreed not to disclose the names of the witnesses, or not to make known the purport of their evidence. With these reduced punishments exile was to be ordinarily combined: and fines, as well as other appendages, might be added at discretion! The edict may be seen in the notorious newspaper called *La Voce della Verità*, No. 110.

17. Having now recited a few circumstances illustrative of the machinery by which, and of the principles on which, an Italian Government has sometimes been conducted, I proceed to set forth some material points connected with the political position of the present Government of Naples. In my first letter, while expressing an anxiety to avoid the discussion of the subject, I likewise intimated that some reference to it was necessary, in order to make the present policy comprehensible. *Nemo repente fuit turpissimus;* and no such extremities of fear, cruelty, and baseness, as it has been my irksome duty to describe, could be reached by any Government but one already unmanned by a bad conscience, and driven on by necessity to cover old misdeeds by heaping new ones on them.

18. In the month of January 1848, a Constitution was granted to the kingdom of Naples. It was proclaimed and sworn to by the monarch amidst every circumstance of solemnity, and the universal joy of the people. Liberatore, one of the Jesuits of Naples, in a sermon deli-

vered on the 15th of April 1848, says—"The sovereign has shown himself neither obstinately tenacious, nor precipitately pliable. He procrastinated, nay repelled, until it was demonstrated that the demand proceeded from the universal desire of a people, and not from the isolated assumptions of a party; he deigned to accede with joy, when it was still in his power to resist: thus it plainly appeared, that he took the step not through violence or from apprehension, but of his own free and sagacious will." *

19. On the 15th of May came the struggle, of which the origin is described in the most opposite colours by persons of opposite sentiments. It ended, however, in the unquestionable and complete victory of the King and the troops: and I will now quote the words in which the triumphant monarch reiterates his assurances in regard to the Constitution:—

"NEAPOLITANS!

"Profoundly afflicted by the horrible calamity of the 15th of May, Our most lively desire is to mitigate, as far as possible, its consequences. It is Our most fixed and irrevocable will to maintain the Constitution of the 10th of February, pure and free from the stain of all excess. As it is the only one compatible with the true and immediate wants of this portion of Italy, so it will be the sacrosanct altar, upon which must rest the destinies of Our most beloved people and of Our crown. . . .

"Resume, then, all your customary occupations: confide with the utmost fulness of your hearts in Our good faith, in Our sense of religion, and in Our sacred and spontaneous oath." †

20. I now proceed to give extracts from this Constitu-

* 'Napoli e la Costituzione, Stamperia del Fibreno, Strada Trinità Maggiore, No. 26, 1848.'

† Farini, Book III. Chap. viii.

tion. It opens thus: and I request particular attention to its very solemn preamble:—

"With reference to Our Sovereign Act of the 29th of January 1848, by which, concurring with the unanimous desire of Our most beloved subjects, We have promised, of Our own full, free, and spontaneous will, to establish in this kingdom a Constitution, conformable to the civilisation of the times, whereof we then indicated, by a few rapid strokes, the fundamental bases, and reserved our ratification of it till it should be set out and arranged in its principles, according to the draft which Our present Ministry of State was to submit to Us within ten days' time;

"Determined to give immediate effect to this fixed resolution of our mind;

"In the awful Name of the Most Holy and Almighty God, the Trinity in Unity, to whom alone it appertains to read the depths of the heart, and whom We loudly invoke as the judge of the simplicity of Our intentions, and of the unreserved sincerity with which We have determined to enter upon the paths of the new political order;

"Having heard with mature deliberation Our Council of State;

"We have decided upon proclaiming, and We do proclaim, as irrevocably ratified by Us, the following Constitution."

21. Then follow the particular provisions, of which I need only cite four for the present purpose:—

"Art. I. The kingdom of the Two Sicilies shall be from henceforward subject to a limited, hereditary, constitutional monarchy, under representative forms.

"Art. IV. The legislative power resides jointly in the King, and a National Parliament, consisting of two Chambers, the one of Peers, the other of Deputies.

"Art. XIV. No description of impost can be decreed, except in virtue of a law: communal imposts included.

"Art. XXIV. Personal liberty is guaranteed. No one can be arrested except in virtue of an instrument proceeding in due form of law from the proper authority; the case of flagrancy or quasi-flagrancy, excepted. In the case of arrest by way of prevention the accused must be handed over to the proper authority

within the terms at farthest of twenty-four hours, within which also the grounds of his arrest must be declared to him."*

22. Those who wish for detail may consult the histories of these events:† I shall only sketch the actual state of things.

In regard to Article I.; the monarchy of Naples is perfectly absolute and unlimited.

In regard to Article IV.; there exists no Chamber of Peers or Chamber of Deputies.

In regard to Article XIV.; all the taxes are imposed and levied under royal authority alone.

In regard to Article XXIV.; persons were arrested by the hundred, while I was in Naples, a little before last Christmas, without any legal warrant whatever, and without the slightest pretext of flagrancy or quasi-flagrancy: they were not handed over to the competent authority within twenty-four hours, or even at all, and were detained in the most rigorous confinement by the police, without any reference whatever to the Courts, and without any communication to them whatever of the grounds of their arrest.

Such is the state of facts in respect to the origin of the Neapolitan Constitution, to its terms, and to the present actual conduct of the Government of the country, in contradiction and in defiance, at every point, of its indisputable fundamental law.

It will be too clearly seen how such a relation between the law of a country and the acts—not the occasional, but the constant and most essential acts of its Govern-

* 'La Costituzione politica del Regno di Napoli, presso Gaetano Nobile, Strada Toledo, No. 166, 1849.'

† Such as Massari's 'Casi di Napoli,' Torino, 1849. Massari is an ex-deputy.

ment—throw light upon the distressing, and at first sight scarcely credible, allegations of my first letter.

23. But I have yet another source of evidence which I am bound to open: one which illustrates, in a form the most painful and revolting, the completeness, the continuity, the perfect organisation of the system which I have thought it my duty to endeavour, according to my limited ability, to expose and to denounce.

I need hardly observe, that in the kingdom of Naples both the press and the education of the people, are under the control of the Government: and that, setting aside the question how far points of conflicting interest with the Church may be an exception, nothing is taught or printed there, unless with its sanction, and according to its mind.

24. I am going to refer to, and quote from a work, one of the most singular and detestable that I have ever seen. It is called the *Catechismo Filosofico, per uso delle Scuole Inferiori:* and the motto is, "*Videte ne quis vos decipiat per philosophiam.*" I have two editions of it; one bearing as follows: '*Napoli, presso Raffaele Miranda, Largo delle Pigne*, No. 60, 1850.' The other is part of a series called '*Collezione di buoni Libri a favore della Verità e della Virtù. Napoli, Stabilimento Tipografico di A. Festa, Strada Carbonara*, No. 104. 1850.' I am thus particular, because I feel that if I were not so, I might now once more raise the smile of a not irrational incredulity.

25. The doctrine of the first chapter is, that a true philosophy must nowadays be taught to the young, in order to counteract the false philosophy of the liberals, which is taught by certain vicious and bad men, desirous to make others vicious and bad like themselves. The notes of these liberal philosophers are then enumerated:

and one of them is "disapproval of the vigorous acts of the legitimate authorities." They produce, it is taught, all manner of evils, especially the eternal damnation of souls. The pupil then asks with great simplicity of his teacher, not whether all liberals are wicked, but "whether they are all wicked in one and the same fashion?" And the answer is—

"Not all, my child, because some are thorough-paced and wilful deceivers, while others are piteously deceived: but notwithstanding, they are all travelling the same road; and if they do not alter their course, they will all arive at the same goal."

The plain meaning, as I read it, is, that those who hold what in Naples are called liberal opinions (and many who are included in the name there, would not be so designated here), even in the more innocent form of the mere victims of deceit, will, unless they abandon them, be lost eternally on account of those opinions.

The next question of the scholar is, whether all who wear moustaches or a beard are liberal philosophers?

26. In subsequent chapters the scholar is instructed in the true nature of Sovereign power. The author plainly denies all obligation to obey the laws in a democracy: for he says it would be essentially absurd, that the governing power should reside in the governed; and therefore God would never give it them. In the United States, accordingly, there would be no Sovereign power. Thus is the most revolutionary and anarchical doctrine propagated under the pretexts of loyalty and religion.

The Sovereign power, we are here taught, is not only Divine (which I shall never quarrel with an author for asserting), but unlimited; and not only unlimited in fact, but unlimited from its own nature and by reason of its Divine origin. And now we come near the gist of the

whole book, for the sake of which it is that Philosophy has been brought down by the Neapolitan sages from high heaven to the level of "inferior schools." This power, of course, cannot be limited by the people, for their duty is simply to obey it:—

"*Scholar.*—Can the people of itself establish fundamental laws in a State?

"*Master.*—No: because a Constitution, or fundamental laws, are of necessity a limitation of the sovereignty: and this can never receive any measure or boundary except by its own act: otherwise it would no longer constitute that highest and paramount power, ordained of God for the well-being of society."*

27. And now I shall continue to translate: the whole matter will repay perusal, and it will be seen that the express and not mistakable features of the Neapolitan case are carefully described and fully met in the abominable doctrines here inculcated:—

"*S.*—If the people, in the very act of electing a Sovereign, shall have imposed upon him certain conditions and certain reservations, will not these reservations and these conditions form the Constitution and the fundamental law of the State?

"*M.*—They will, provided the Sovereign shall have granted and ratified them freely. Otherwise they will not; because the people, which is made for submission and not for command, cannot impose a law upon the Sovereignty, which derives its power not from them, but from God.

"*S.*—Supposing that a prince, in assuming the Sovereignty of a State, has accepted and ratified the Constitution, or fundamental law of that State; and that he has promised OR SWORN to observe it; is he bound to keep that promise, and to maintain that Constitution and that law?

"*M.*—He is bound to keep it, provided it does not overthrow the foundations of Sovereignty; and *provided it is not opposed to the general interests of the State.*

"*S.*—Why do you consider that a Prince is not bound to

* Chap. vii.

observe the Constitution, whenever this impugns the rights of Sovereignty?

"*M.*—We have already found that the Sovereignty is the highest and Supreme power, ordained and constituted by God in society, for the good of society; and this power, conceded and made needful by God, must be preserved inviolate and entire; and cannot be restrained or abated by man, without coming into conflict with the ordinances of nature, and with the Divine Will. Whenever, therefore, the people may have proposed a condition which impairs the Sovereignty, and whenever the Prince may have promised to observe it, that proposal is an absurdity, that promise is null; and the Prince is not bound to maintain a Constitution which is in opposition to the Divine command, but is bound to maintain entire and intact the supreme power established by God, and by God conferred on him.

"*S.*—And why do you consider that the Prince is not bound to maintain the Constitution, when he finds it to be contrary to the interests of the State?

"*M.*—God has appointed the supreme power for the good of society. The first duty then, of the persons who may have been invested with it, is the duty of promoting the good of Society. If the fundamental law of the State be found adverse to the good of the State, and if the promise given by the Sovereign to observe that fundamental law would oblige him to promote what is detrimental to the State, that law becomes null, that promise void; because the general good is the object of all laws, and to promote that good is the main obligation of Sovereignty. Suppose a physician to have promised AND SWORN, to his patient, that he would bleed him; should he become aware that such letting blood would be fatal, he is bound to abstain from doing it: because, paramount to all promises and oaths, there is the obligation of the physician to labour for the cure of his patient. In like manner should the Sovereign find that the fundamental law is seriously hurtful to his people, he is bound to cancel it; because in spite of all promises and all constitution, the duty of the Sovereign is his people's weal. In a word, an OATH never can become an obligation to commit evil; and therefore cannot bind a Sovereign to do what is injurious to his subjects. Besides, the head of the Church has authority from God to release consciences from oaths, when he judges that there is suitable cause for it."

28. And now comes the keystone of the arch which makes the whole fabric consistent and complete, with all the consistency and the completeness that can belong to fraud, falsehood, injustice, and impiety:—

"*S.*—Whose business is it to decide when the Constitution impairs the right of Sovereignty, and is adverse to the welfare of the people?

"*M.*—It is the business of the Sovereign; because in him resides the high and paramount power, established by God in the State, with a view to its good order and felicity."

"*S.*—May there not be some danger, that the Sovereign may violate the Constitution without just cause, under the illusion of error, or the impulse of passion?

"*M.*—Errors and passions are the maladies of the human race; but the blessings of health ought not to be refused through the fear of sickness."

29. And so forth. I will not go through all the false, base, and demoralising doctrines, sometimes ludicrous, but oftener horrible, that I find studiously veiled under the phrases of religion in this abominable book: because I do not desire to produce merely a general stir and indignation in the mind, but with the indignation a clear and distinct, and, so far as may be, a dispassionate view, of that object which is its moving cause. I say, then, that here we have a complete systematised philosophy of perjury for monarchs, exactly adapted to the actual facts of Neapolitan history during the last three and a half years, published under the sanction, and inculcated by the authority, of a Government, which has indeed the best possible title to proclaim the precept, since it has shown itself a master in the practice.

30. This Catechism bears no name: but it is described to me as the work of an ecclesiastic whom I forbear to designate, since pointing him out is not necessary for my

purpose: suffice it to say, he is, or was, at the head of the Commission of Public Instruction. He dedicates his production "to the Sovereigns, the Bishops, the Magistracy, the teachers of youth, and all the well disposed." In this dedicatory Address, he announces that the Sovereign authority will enjoin, that the elements of civil and political philosophy be taught in all the schools: and be taught, too, from this one single book, lest the purity of the doctrine should otherwise be corrupted: that the teachers are to be closely watched, lest they should neglect this duty, and that none of them are to have the annual renewal of their office, except upon proof of having observed it, that so "this book may be multiplied in a thousand shapes, and may circulate in the hands of all, and the Catechism of the philosopher may become the personal accomplishment of all the young, and may invariably follow close upon the Catechism of the Christian."

31. Of course, peculiar care is to be taken that no one shall make his way into holy orders without having imbibed this necessary knowledge.

"The Bishops will find means to circulate it in their seminaries, to prescribe it to their clerks, to recommend it to the parish priests, to cause it to become the food of the people, and to fix that in all examinations men shall be questioned upon the doctrines of political philosophy, just as they are questioned upon those of Christian belief and conduct, inasmuch as no one without being a good citizen and a good subject can be a good Christian!"

There is daring if not grandeur in this conception. A broken oath; an argument spun from laborious brains to show that the oath ought to be broken; a resolution to preoccupy all minds, in the time of their tender and waxen youth, and before the capacity of thought, with this argument: no more cunning plot ever was devised, at least by

man, against the freedom, the happiness, the virtue, of mankind.

32. Here the author modestly ends with the declaration, "I have planted, Apollos watered, but God hath given the increase." And it is time for us to end also. We have thus seen Perjury, the daughter of Fraud, the mother of Cruelty and Violence, stalk abroad in a Christian kingdom under the sanction of its Government; and have heard her modestly make for herself a claim (which, as I am informed, has been fully allowed) that her laws shall be expounded in every school throughout the country, coincident in extension, and second only, if second, in dignity, to the Catechism of the Christian Faith. If we are to quote Scripture, here is my text—"Now for the comfortless troubles' sake of the needy, and because of the deep sighing of the poor, I will up, saith the Lord, and will help every one from him that swelleth against him, and will set him at rest." (Ps. xii. 5, 6.)

I have now done my best to supply the reader with the illustration and collateral evidence which seemed necessary in order to his forming a correct judgment upon the charges so harsh and strange in sound, which I have been compelled to make against the present policy of the Government of Naples in regard to State prosecutions.

33. For contradictions, again I say, I have to look; but to such contradictions as are not subject to be verified, cross-examined, or exposed, I must decline to attend. Confutation, I am now convinced, except in small details, is impossible, with respect to my statements of fact. Would to God that that unhappy Government—and any other, if indeed there be any other, like it—may be wise in time, before outraged humanity shall turn on the oppressor, and the cup of Divine retribution overflow.

And would to God, on the other hand, that, if there shall be shown a disposition to purge out abomination and temper excess, and steadily and honestly, though gradually, to bring about a better state of things, then, such a disposition may be met with forbearance and goodwill, with the chastening of too eager expectations, with full recollection of difficulties and allowance for them, and with an earnest readiness to forgive and to forget.

34. There are two possible inferences from what I have written, against which I must endeavour to guard. The first is this: some will say, all these abuses and disgraces are owing to the degradation of the people. I do not deny that there is some share of what we think degradation there; nor can it be wondered at, when we consider from what source the polluted waters of fraud and falsehood flow: but this I say, that the Neapolitans are over harshly judged in England. Even the populace of the capital is too severely estimated; the prevailing vices lie on the surface, and meet the eye of every one; but we scarcely give them the credit they deserve for their mildness, their simplicity, their trustfulness, their warm affection, their ready anxiety to oblige, their freedom from the grosser forms of crime. What will be said in England, when I mention, upon authority which ought to be decisive, that during four months of the Constitution, when the action of the police too was much paralysed, there was not a single case of any of the more serious crimes in Naples among four hundred thousand people?

We do a fresh injustice when we extend to the various classes of the community, and to the inhabitants of all the provinces, the estimate too hastily formed even of the populace of Naples. Perhaps the point in which they are most defective is that of practical energy and steady

perseverance in giving effect to the ideas, with which their high natural intelligence abundantly supplies them. But, while they seem to me most amiable for their gentleness of tone, and for their freedom from sullenness and pride, they are, I must say, admirable in their powers of patient endurance, and for the elasticity and buoyancy, with which in them the spirit lives under a weight that would crush minds of more masculine and tougher texture, but gifted with less power of reactive play.

35. One other word. I write at a moment when public feeling in this country is highly excited on the subject of the Roman Catholic Church, and I must not wilfully leave room for extreme inferences to the prejudice of her clergy in the kingdom of Naples, which I know or think to be unwarranted by the facts. That clergy, no doubt, regular and secular, is a body of mixed character, which I am not about to attempt describing; but it would in my opinion, be unjust to hold them, as a body, to be implicated in the proceedings of the Government. A portion of them, beyond all question, are so. I am convinced, from what has reached me, that a portion of the priests make disclosures from the confessional for the purposes of the Government, and I have known of cases of arrest immediately following interviews for confession, in such a manner that it is impossible not to connect them together.

36. But on the other hand, there are many of the clergy, and even of the monks, who are among the objects of the persecution I have endeavoured to describe. The most distinguished members of the celebrated Benedictine convent of Monte Cassino have for some time past been driven from the retreat, to which they had anew given the character of combined peace, piety, and learning. Several of them were in prison when I was at Naples; others not

in actual confinement, but trembling, as a hare trembles, at every whisper of the wind. One was in prison for liberal opinions; another for being the brother of a man of liberal opinions. There was no charge against these men, but the two brothers were confined because it was thought that through the first of them might possibly be learned something against some other suspected person or persons. Among the arrests in December last, there were, I believe, between twenty and thirty of the clerical order. It may indeed be, and perhaps is, true that the greater part of the whole body stand by and look on, without any sympathy, or at least any effective sympathy, for those on whom the edge of this sharp affliction falls; but this is perhaps not less true of the nobles, whose general tone I believe to be that of disapproval towards the proceedings of the Government, while they have a kind of armistice with it, and it is the class beneath them that bears the brunt of the struggle. The Church at Naples is presided over by a Cardinal Archbishop of high birth, simple manners, and entire devotion to the duties of his calling, who, I am certain, is entirely incapable of either participating in or conniving at any proceedings unworthy in their character. The Jesuits are the body who perhaps stand nearest to the Government; but they were ejected from their college during the time of the Constitution with flagrant illegality and some considerable harshness: and even their doctrines do not seem to satisfy those in power, for a periodical which they conduct, under the name of *La Civiltà Cattolica*, and which they used to print on their premises, has now been removed to Rome. That the clergy have a strong faction with the Government I do not doubt; so have the *lazzaroni:* but there is no proof of the complicity of the body, and clear proof of the opposition of a

part of it, however their professional tone and learning may, to a certain extent, innocently predispose them in favour of the authorities, especially under a monarch reputed to be most regular and strict in the offices of religion.

I remain, my dear Lord Aberdeen,

With much regard, sincerely yours,

W. E. GLADSTONE.

6 *Carlton Gardens,*
July 14, 1851.

III.

AN EXAMINATION OF THE OFFICIAL REPLY

OF THE

NEAPOLITAN GOVERNMENT.

1852.

Clarence. Relent, and save your souls.
1 *Murderer.* Relent! 'tis cowardly, and womanish.
Clarence. Not to relent, is beastly, savage, devilish.
RICHARD III., *Act* 1, *Scene* 4.

1. WHEN I addressed the Earl of Aberdeen in the month of July, with respect to the State Prosecutions of the Neapolitan Government, I did not expect to return to the subject. But neither did I then expect to be encountered in the field by a responsible antagonist. The appearance of the Neapolitan Government itself,* under the form of a

* 'Rassegna degli Errori e delle Fallacie publicate dal Sig. Gladstone, in due sue Lettere indiritte al Conte Aberdeen. Napoli, Stamperia del Fibreno. 1851.' A French version, announced as by authority, appears in the *Journal des Débats* of the 27th, 28th, and 30th of September. [Other replies were published without authority or official aid. M. Gondon, a spirited writer of the Ultramontane school, was reported to have boasted that his reply (which enjoyed an entire liberty of statement) was far superior to the official defence. The Letters had circulated very largely, and had been translated into various languages. The 'Examination,' published only six months later, which alone contains (if I may say so) the full establishment of the case, attracted little attention. On turning to the accounts supplied to me by my friend and publisher, Mr. Murray, I find the following item, June 30, 1852: "To deficiency on 'Examination of Reply,' 23*l.* 15*s.* 1*d.*" The sale of the tract was confined to a few hundreds.—W. E. G., 1878.]

publication carrying its authority, upon the arena, has altered my position. I have now thought it my duty to that Government, as well as to the public, to place its reply point by point in the scales, along with my accusation, and strictly take account of the result. And my first duty is an agreeable one: it is the duty of confessing that, whatever may have been the prudence of the decision to appear and plead in the cause, the course taken has at least been a manly and an open one: this openness, this manliness, lead to and justify the hope that that Government will not shrink from the logical, legitimate, and obvious consequences of the step it has thought fit so deliberately to adopt.

2. It may, indeed, seem strange that this reply, if published at Naples, where the accusation, of course, is not permitted to appear, and after being rendered by authority into French, for publication in a most respectable Parisian journal, should not, so far as I am able to learn, have been published at all in England, where the charge was originally advanced, and where it has attracted general attention among all classes. I can only ascribe it to the fact, that in this country there is but one opinion, so to speak, through all orders of the community upon the melancholy subject. I suppose it was felt that, eagerly as a confutation ought to have been hailed, a reply which is not only no confutation of my statements at all, but not even an attempt at one, would have been a waste of words in one of those countries, where it is a fixed and traditional practice to canvass with the utmost freedom all the acts of those in public authority, and where this liberty and habit of unrestrained discussion are prized as one of the very chiefest and most necessary bulwarks, alike to loyalty, to order, and to freedom.

3. I have termed the production before me a reply which is no confutation, nor even an attempt at one: and I must freely confess that my first quarrel is with its title. It is called 'A Review of the Errors and Misrepresentations published,' and so forth; but, if the object of a title be to give a correct description, it ought to have been denominated 'A Tacit Admission of the Accuracy of Nine-Tenth Parts of the Statements contained in Two Letters to the Earl of Aberdeen.' For those who do not enter into the case, it sounds very well when they are told that the errors and misrepresentations, or, as they have in some quarters been called, falsehoods and calumnies, of my letters have been answered; but I now assert, without fear even of challenge, that nine-tenths of my most startling assertions are passed by in total silence in the apology of the Neapolitan Government. And I suppose it is no extravagant assumption if I treat that silence, in an answer that made its appearance three or four months after the parties were made acquainted with the charges, as simply equivalent to an admission of the facts.

4. Before I enter on particulars, let me observe upon that which next after the title meets the eye in the pamphlet before me, its very significant and well-chosen motto; *errare, nescire, decipi, et malum et turpe ducimus.* I at once recognise both the general truth and the particular application. Notwithstanding the courteous and forbearing tone of the pamphlet, its writer (whether he be a single or a composite person I shall not stop to inquire) felt that he could not do justice to his case—if at least he imagines it to be a confutation of mine—without intimating that to be ill-informed, to blunder, to be duped, was nothing less than criminal and base on the part of

one who undertook to impeach, on grounds so high, and in language so unmeasured, the proceedings of a Government. I am certain the writer cannot feel this more strongly than I do. I re-echo the proposition. I subscribe to the doctrine as cordially, as I profoundly differ from some doctrines which he has broached. Launched on the twentieth year of public life, with my lot cast in a stirring country and a stirring time, I cannot plead the character of a novice in excuse or palliation of temerity.

5. Neither can I throw the smallest fraction of my responsibility for the measure of publication, at the time, and under the circumstances, when it took place, on any other person. The appeal to the world which I made in July last, although it came out in connection with the name of the Earl of Aberdeen, was my own act, and my own act alone. I very well knew that on the general truth of my charges I was staking my own character, which, though little in itself, is much to me. I am the first, not to admit only, but to urge that to have gathered such charges upon hearsay, to have made them my own with levity and haste, to have swerved one inch from strict impartiality through the hope of popular sympathy and applause, to have aimed blows at the cause of order and stability by exaggerating defects incidental to all governments, or to have claimed or exercised, upon any general grounds, the functions of a cosmopolite for the rectification of the affairs of a foreign country, and by such means to have bid for the favour of persons to whose political opinions I demur—this would, indeed, have been in me conduct criminal and base; so criminal and so base, that it would have deserved reprobation only one degree less in intensity than that which I invoked upon the

deeds, which it was my purpose to brand with infamy and shame.

6. But, indeed, all these charges of levity, of ignorance, of herding with republicans and malefactors, and the rest, are not worth discussing; for the whole matter comes to one single issue—Are the allegations true, or are they false? If they are false, I shall not be the man to quarrel with any severity of reproach that may be directed against me; but if they are true, then I am quite sure the Neapolitan Government will take no benefit by insinuating doubts whether sentiments like mine, even if well founded, ought to be made known,* or by taking any trivial and irrelevant objection to my personal conduct or qualifications.

7. One word, however, I must expend on a personal matter, because it is also a matter of courtesy and feeling. It is urged that, whereas I should have been received at Naples with kindness, not only by the Ministers, but by the King himself, and listened to with attention; yet, instead of profiting by such opportunities, I was careful (I am now quoting the French version) to see none of the Ministers, and no considerable person, and did not even manifest the usual wish to be presented to the Sovereign.

8. It is an entire error to suppose that I avoided the Ministers, or sought in preference the society of persons of any other political party. Through the kindness of Prince Castelcicala, then Neapolitan Minister in London, I was provided with a letter to the Head of the Administration, and this letter I delivered in the usual manner on the very day after I reached Naples. I thus took the only step in my power to turn it to account.

* 'Rassegna,' p. 5.

I likewise requested the British Minister, Sir W. Temple, to be kind enough to secure for me the opportunity of paying my humble respects to the Sovereign on the earliest occasion. But it so happened, that there was no occasion of the kind until many weeks after my arrival at Naples. During this interval, I had become gradually aware, in a considerable degree, of the state of things which I have endeavoured to describe; and, although I then had taken no positive resolution on the subject, yet I felt a deep anxiety that in some manner the political party, with whose foreign policy I had been associated, should be effectually disconnected from such proceedings. I must confess that arrests, which I saw going on around me, and with the particulars of which I was more or less acquainted, had shocked me to the very last degree; and I now look back on them with the same unmitigated horror. I was, in short, convinced of thus much,—first, that I could not with perfect ingenuousness appear in the circle of the Court, and remain silent upon these matters; secondly, that the malady was deep, and must be dealt with by influences—friendly, indeed, and considerate—but of a weight and authority far different from any that I could bring to bear by my merely personal representations.

9. For these reasons, when the time for holding a reception was about to arrive, I begged leave of Sir W. Temple to withdraw the request I had made to him; and I trust it will thus appear that, whether I judged correctly or otherwise, I was not prompted by a wanton disrespect for constituted authority, or for the Royal Person. I had no such sentiment either towards the person of the King, or towards his throne. My fervent desire was, and even yet is, that that throne may be established in truth and righteousness; and my deep

conviction of the revolutionary tendency of the proceedings against which I wrote, was with me one very strong reason for attempting their exposure.

10. I will now proceed to present the balance-sheet, which the Government of Naples and the public are alike entitled to demand of me. I shall state distinctly, how many and which of the allegations contained in my Two Letters to Lord Aberdeen I think it my duty to qualify; what and how many of them are seriously contested. It will readily be believed that the time, which has elapsed since my first publication, has not been barren of fresh information to me; but I feel so convinced both of the sufficiency in amount of the statements already before the world, and of the demonstrative confirmation they have now received, that I shall introduce no new heads of charge, and shall be very sparing of new illustrations of charges already made, except in the few cases where they have been questioned. One effective weapon I deliberately refrain from using, I mean the startling enumeration of my uncontested accusations; for feeling is already awake, and I do not wish, where I can help it, to cloud the serenity of the public judgment. Only to this proposition I must formally draw attention, and claim assent: what has not been contested is admitted; for the apologist distinctly declares, in his introduction and elsewhere, that he will deal with the entire case;* "will restore those facts which have been exaggerated to their correct proportions; will point out those that are wholly unfounded; and will expose those that are calumnious." Again, to all the calumnies which I have spread he will "do exact and ample justice." †

* 'Rassegna,' p. 5. † *Ibid.* p. 8.

11. As I do not intend gratuitously to enlarge the lamentable catalogue of my facts, so neither shall I needlessly reiterate my vehement and unqualified language. To gibbet infamy such as that of the President Navarro and the Minister Peccheneda, is a task which, like that of the executioner, somebody must perform for the benefit of society; and I have performed it. But no man should needlessly return to the loathsome details of such a business. In these pages, accordingly, I shall not insert a word except such as seems absolutely demanded by the course and aim of my argument. The strong language of my Letters I leave upon record; simply saying, that I wish any the least part of it could with propriety be either repented, qualified, or withdrawn.

12. Passing by, then, the statements which no attempt is made to dispute, I shall advert, firstly, to those which, being contradicted, are also proved to be erroneous, or which, upon the whole, I see reason to withdraw; secondly, to those which are indeed contradicted without my having found any cause to recede from them; thirdly, to those which are noticed with the apparent intention more or less of leaving an impression that they have been contradicted, but without any real contradiction at all. I must likewise notice cursorily a fourth and a singular class; that, namely, of contradictions which have been volunteered by zealous defenders of the Neapolitan Government, but which, instead of being taken up and adopted by its recognised and official advocate, are passed by in total and very significant silence.

13. (I.) Of the first of these classes I shall rapidly dispose.

a. I have learned nothing to confirm the statement, which I reported as probably though not certainly true,

that Settembrini has been tortured.* I therefore think it my duty to withdraw it, although it is not met by the Neapolitan Government with an explicit denial.

b. I have committed an error in saying he was condemned to double irons for life.† Double irons form no part of the sentence of the *ergastolo*, which was his commuted sentence.

c. I have stated that six Judges were dismissed at Reggio, upon presuming to acquit a batch of political prisoners.‡ This is an error. The statement should have been, that three were dismisssd, and three removed to other posts. This removal is not an uncommon, nor an ineffective, mode of punishment.

d. I have stated that seventeen invalids were massacred in the prison of Procidà on the occasion of the revolt. I believe this also to be an error.

e. I have stated that certain prisoners acquitted in the trial of the *Unità Italiana* were, when I last heard of them, still in prison. This is calculated to convey an impression that they were detained for some considerable time after acquittal, which is not correct. The 'Review' states, and I do not dispute it, that the acquitted prisoners were released after the lapse of only two days.

Such is the list of retractations I have to make.

14. I have been much criticised for constantly using the expressions "I believe," "I have heard," "It was stated to me," and the like, instead of pursuing the simple strain of assertion throughout: and it has been strangely inferred, that I raked together mere hearsay and rumour, and inculpated a Government on the strength of them.

I did endeavour with laborious care to appreciate, and,

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* First Letter, p. 187. † *Ibid.* p. 187. ‡ *Ibid.* p. 201.

by these phrases and otherwise, to give my readers the means of in some degree appreciating, the evidence, varying in amount, for each one of my allegations. The result now proves, that I have been successful beyond my utmost hopes. The words that I used most lightly, upon presumption rather than knowledge, were words of commendation with respect to an individual in high station.

Not one among the whole list of accusations rested upon hearsay. Every one of them had either demonstrative evidence or reasonable and probable evidence in its favour. It may now be seen, in these pages, how small and insignificant a fraction of error made its way into the Letters.

15. For, having given my retractations above, I must guard the reader against supposing either that those erroneous allegations imputed to the Neapolitan Government what was worse than many of my unquestioned and admitted statements, and thus heightened the general colouring of the picture, or that, in correcting my details, I am prepared to recede from the substance of any one of the charges.

Though Settembrini has not been tortured, it must not be assumed that torture is an instrument from which, when convenient, the police always shrink; or that my imputation of it is the first they have heard.* The assertion that corporal agony is inflicted, and that without judicial authority, by the Neapolitan police in the prisons, I now make with confidence. The fact that it is utterly illegal unhappily does not afford the very faintest presumption to the contrary.

16. Again, while stating that Settembrini is not in

* See, for example, the 'Protestation du Peuple des Deux Siciles,' translated by Ricciardi, Paris, 1848, p. 31.

double irons, I do not mean to mitigate the general idea I have given of his cruel and wicked punishment. He is confined, with eight more prisoners, at San Stefano, in a room sixteen palmi square, which they are never allowed to leave: one of them named Cajazzo, a man condemned for murder forty-nine years ago, who boasts of having at different times murdered thirty-five persons. Several of these exploits he has committed in the prison upon his companions; and I have been assured that the murders in this Ergastolo have exceeded fifty in a single year. What kind of protection, I want to know, is thus afforded to the life of Settembrini?

17. Again, as to the dismissal of Judges. I will not weary the reader of these pages with all the details of mean and shameful revenge which have been used to beat down the high spirit of the legal profession in the persons of the judges. But even the last few weeks have afforded a fresh instance. The political trial called that of the Pugnalatori has recently been concluded in Naples. Death was demanded on the part of the Government; but the sentences passed were principally to banishment. The capital was in amazement at the boldness of the Judges: and well it might. Since then two of them have been dismissed; what is to happen further time will show. But this was not all. The Government have actually appointed a commission of review to correct this lenient sentence! I add to this, that, on the occasion of another recent trial, an officer of the executive power was placed in the very chamber of the Judges, when they met together to consult upon their sentence.*

One word in regard to salaries of Judges. I mentioned the highest salary paid; but I may give a better idea of the general scale by stating

18. It has been said I spoke disrespectfully of the Neapolitan Judges.* Certainly, I endeavoured to do so of many of them. But those who blame me should recollect that I dare not praise. To be the object of my commendation, insignificant as it is, would be a burden, in Naples, which few except the very highest could bear.

I could have found there men, and classes of men, worthy to be praised with all the fervour of thought and language that the heart of man can prompt; but stern prudence has restrained me from offering to them the fatal gift.

19. And now for the massacre perpetrated at Procida by the *gendarmi*, and rewarded by the Government. I can perceive the source of the error into which I fell. For though invalids were not slain on that deplorable occasion, yet prisoners who took refuge and hid under beds were dragged forth, and shot in cold blood by the *gendarmi* after order had been restored. This was on the day of the riot or revolt. On the 26th and on the 28th of June, when it had long been quenched in blood, the work of slaughter was renewed. I believe I rather under than over stated the total loss of life: and two officers—not, as I said, one—received promotion or honours for this abominable enormity.

20. I ought to add that I never said the unfortunate victims were political prisoners. But I cannot quit the subject without noticing the surprising fact that the Neapolitan Government actually find fault with me in this

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that there is an hospital in Naples, where the annual charge, divided by the number of patients, yields a quotient larger than the salary very commonly paid to a Judge.

* 'Rass.' p. 56.

case for reviving the discussion of a superannuated and obsolete occurrence.* The massacre took place in June 1848; and, at the time when the apologist penned this strange criticism, his employers were trying some men, and detaining hundreds more untried in prison, on the plea or pretext of acts they had done in May of the same year! Thus, then, against mercy there is a statute of limitations; but vengeance must never die.

21. And now as to the detention of acquitted persons. Criminal laws, and Courts, are commonly founded on the principle that men are to be treated as innocent until they are found to be guilty; and, *à fortiori*, that they are to be treated as innocent when they have been found innocent. But in Naples the principle is, first, that men are to be treated as guilty until they are proved to be innocent; and, secondly, that they may still be treated as guilty when they have been found not guilty. For a verdict or sentence favourable to the accused can rarely amount to a positive establishment of his innocence. The issue raised is not, was he innocent? but, was he guilty? From the nature of the case, the failure to prove guilt will rarely involve proof of innocence: and at Naples, the most favourable reply he can hope from the Court amounts to this, that no sufficient proof of guilt has been laid before it; a lame, doubtful, floundering acquittal. But such proof of guilt may be forthcoming at a subsequent period; his having been tried now is no reason why he should not be tried again, but rather in the nature of a reason why he should. Taken at the best, a favourable judgment only replaces the subject of it in the position in which he stood before, of a person suspected by

* 'Rass.' p. 56: *un vieto fatto*, a stale or mouldy fact.

the police, and deemed by them capable either of political crime, or of knowing, or of being related to, or connected with, some one capable of it. An ample reason, surely, for detaining him in prison, on prudential grounds, and with a view to further investigations. Who could complain of so reasonable a discretion intrusted to the police, especially when it is considered, as the 'Review' informs us, that the members of that corps enjoy, except as to those in its inferior ranks, a degree of estimation with the public varying according to their merits! *

22. I shall now give a painful proof that this is a true picture of the practices at Naples; specifying that I might supply others more flagrant still.

In the month of November last (and I have heard of no change since that date, now two months back) there were in the prison of San Francesco, at Naples, seventeen priests, some of them holding ecclesiastical dignities and professorial chairs. I do not mean that there were no more than seventeen; but that of seventeen I am about to speak. Five of them had been tried; twelve were in the hands of the police without having been tried. One or two of these twelve only, I believe, had been even charged. One of the twelve, neither tried nor charged, was a chronic invalid of fourscore years old. I have the terms for which nine out of the twelve had been thus detained. Three of them were so short as eight months only; two had been thus detained for thirty and thirty-one months respectively.

23. But I must state the cases of the other five. One of them had been arrested on charges of which he was acquitted, but was serving a sentence of two years under

* Page 58.

fresh counts, laid in virtue of a decree which was passed five months after his arrest. A second had been tried, found guilty, suffered the whole of his sentence, and was still detained in prison by the police. The remaining three had been charged, tried, and acquitted by the Grand Criminal Court, but after acquittal they had still been kept in prison; the first I know not how long, the second for eight months, and the third for fifteen. This may sound strange, but there is no marvel in Naples without a sister to it. For a certain Raffaelle Valerio was charged in the cause of the Fifth September, though he had alleged in his first examination that he had been arrested two months before that date, and was in prison at the time of the alleged offence. No notice was taken of this statement. When the trial actually came on, but not till then, the allegation was inquired into and found true, and he was acquitted. In the meantime, he had spent thirty-three more months in prison.

24. I shall not give all the particulars of the condition of the priests to whom I have referred, but a few only. They are imprisoned, then, in defiance even of a rescript of the reactionary period, dated June 1850, against preventive arrests in the case of priests. They are confined in a prison chiefly used as an hospital; of course for the benefit of their health. They are allowed, for clothing and maintenance, the liberal sum of six grains, about twopence halfpenny, a day, and even this they have had a hard struggle to keep. They are still, however, as priests, spared from the floggings, which the police inflicted upon members of the other learned professions; but they have the affliction of living in a place where herds of young lads, taken up for petty offences, are kept for months and years, without care or discipline, and are

inured to the general practice of vices too horrible to name.

I have now, I think, made good the undertaking with which I entered on this class of statements.

25. (II.) The next portion of my task is to deal with the points in which the Neapolitan Government have controverted the substance of my inculpatory statements, but in which I find no cause to recede from, and more cause to heighten, them.

The material contradictions, then, of my letters, which fall into this class, are as follows:—

a. I have stated, that at the time when I left Naples "a trial was expected to come on immediately, in which the number charged was between four and five hundred;"* and the reply is that the "Act of Accusation," published on the 11th of last June, contained the precise number of thirty-seven.

I adhere to my statement as it stands; adding that all these men, charged for the events of May 1848, had already received an amnesty for those acts, solemnly published on the 24th of that month, but since declared null by Navarro and his colleagues.

I admit that forty-six only, not thirty-seven as the Review states, were formally indicted by the Government in Naples before the Court. But at the same time were instituted two similar trials for the same events in the provinces of Salerno and Terra di Lavoro respectively, the first of which included fifty-four persons, and the second forty-six. Thus then the number of thirty-seven is at once raised to one hundred and forty-six persons.

26. But this is far below my number. What then became

* Page 175.

of the residue? An hundred were, as we have seen, disposed of by processes in other provinces; and I have before me the '*Requisitorie ed Atti di Accusa*' in the cause, from which it appears that the number of persons whose names were included in the process by the Procurator-General was three hundred and twenty-six. Thus we have a total of four hundred and twenty-six, which seems pretty well to warrant my statement, that the number was "between four and five hundred." But even this was not the limit; for the words are judiciously added,* "together with others not yet well enough known!"

It is quite true, however, but in no way weakens my statement, that the trials of these three hundred and twenty-six were not at once proceeded with. For three of the whole number, and three only, the process was unanimously declared extinct, upon a ground, the sufficiency of which cannot well be doubted: they were dead.

27. I will now show how these three hundred and twenty-six were disposed of in the month of June last.

The papers against them amounted to 227 volumes; and it was doubtless found necessary to reduce the numbers who were to be included in one and the same trial. The Procurator-General, accordingly, demanded that the court should commence forthwith the trial in the cases of forty-six, and the process of judgment as in contumacy against fifty; should give warrants of arrest (which it will be remembered commonly *follow* arrest) against three; should direct further examination and prosecution of the cause against two groups, one of twenty-nine, and the other of fifty-seven; should suspend proceedings against two other groups, one of fifty-

* 'Requisitorie,' &c., p. 15.

nine, and the other of seventy-five; should remit two to the local judges; extinguish the process for three who were dead; and declare in respect of two that there was no ground for any proceeding against them.

28. These demands were voted by the Judges, with some trivial variations, and one more significant. It relates to the two living men, whom, with the three dead, it was proposed by the Government to let off. The language of the Procurator-General was strong. He declares there was no shadow of evidence against the first of them, while excellent reports of his political conduct had been received. His name was Leopoldo Tarantino. The other was named Giacomo Tofani; he had been arrested because he bore the same name with another person whom the police wanted to get hold of; and the manner in Naples is, if there is a suspicion against John Jones, but there are two John Joneses, and it is not known which may be the man, to take both. Thus it had happened that Giacomo Tofani had been arrested by mistake. On these tolerably sufficient grounds, then, the Procurator-General desired the release of these two. Will it be believed that there was a division among the judges upon the question of releasing them? It was carried, indeed; but the language of the judges in regard to these men was, that the proofs against them were vague, and preponderated for their innocence rather than their guilt.* What keenness of scent, what fidelity of instinct, what appetite for condemnation! The prosecutor declares one case to be a simple mistake; the other without a tittle of evidence; and the judges find by a majority that on the whole the evidence preponderates, forsooth, for innocence!

* 'Requisitorie,' &c., p. 68.

29. But I said, and I say again, every fresh investigation usually tends to heighten, and not extenuate, these proceedings. I admitted incautiously* that the Government had laid aside—meaning they had abandoned—the charge founded on the famous forgery, in the case of Poerio. I was wrong. That forgery is still alive. In this same cause of May 15 are the names of Poerio and Dragonetti; and it is expressly voted by the judges that the case of this prosecution (that is to say, upon the forged letter) is reserved for further investigation.† Dragonetti remains untried in prison all the while.

30. Lastly; such being the numbers, and such the facts, the Government has packed the court (the First Chamber) with a majority of judges who may be depended on for rigour. At their head is, as usual, the shameless forehead of Navarro. Radice, who could not be trusted, having in a previous trial voted for acquittal, was translated to the Second Chamber. His place is supplied by Nicola Morelli, on whom full reliance may be placed; and who, with Canofari, Cicero, and Vitale, all gathered round Navarro, will in due time do full justice to the cause of order, as it is understood by them. Nay more; to meet the possible case of an accidental vacancy, Mandarini is in readiness as a *Supplente*. He has just been made *Cavaliere;* and is supposed to know something of the authorship of the *Rassegna*, or Review of the Two Letters.

I have now done with the cause of the 15th of May; and I really must ask what fatuity it was that tempted the Neapolitan apologist to venture upon such a ground?

31. *b.* I have stated, and the point is one of importance,

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* First Letter, p. 190.

† 'Requisitorie,' p. 75.

that the accusation of Jervolino "formed the sole real basis of the trial and condemnation of Poerio." * This is contradicted by the Reply; † and an animated defence is offered on behalf of Jervolino. He, I have no doubt, is a worthy representative of the class to which he belongs; a class, occupying a high place in the working machinery of the Neapolitan Government; a class, whose character has been drawn once and for ever by Manzoni in those burning words, "*diventando infami, rimanevano oscuri.*" ‡ It is also observed, with an unconsciousness altogether worthy of notice, that, even although a portion of Jervolino's evidence should have been disproved by its own self-contradiction, it does not follow but that the rest of it might be true. The notion of public justice and morality involved in a remark like this is worth far more, than pages of argument or invective from an opponent, in revealing, and in realising to the minds of foreigners, the real spirit and character of the political system of Naples.

32. I have then to repeat my statement, that Poerio was condemned only on the evidence of the paid informer Jervolino. I add, that this took place though evidence was offered of his being paid; and though, by the law of Naples, the evidence of a paid informer cannot be received.

My assertion was supported by a reference to certain evidence of Romeo and Margherita, with reasons why it could not stand. There was, moreover, another piece of hearsay evidence, which I thought not worth mention; for it went merely to the point that a man called Cantone was making use of Poerio's name to recommend himself,

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* Page 192. † Page 41. ‡ In the 'Colonna Infame.'

without any proof or presumption that he had authority so to employ it. Now I do not really believe, that the mind of any judge was, or could be, influenced by testimony of such a nature, which at the most could only have been used as a clue to further inquiries.

33. *c.* I stated, that the fate of Poerio and his companions had been aggravated, since my departure from Naples, by their removal to Ischia.

The Official Reply assures us of various recent relaxations of some importance. I know from other sources, that Poerio was in the hospital during the autumn: according to the custom, he was not chained, while there, to another person; he, however, carried his own chain. At another time he was released from the double chain, and was himself chained to a ring in the centre of the floor, I believe called the *puntale*, instead.

I rejoice in any amelioration of such a lot; and the even partial escape from double chaining is the escape from a horror which, for a gentleman, cannot be exaggerated.

34. But I grieve to say that my statement was but too strictly true. Bad as was the condition of Poerio and his fellow-sufferers at Nisida, it was greatly, and, I fear, purposely, aggravated by the removal. One word, however, upon Nisida. It is denied * that the Bagni are under the care of his Royal Highness the Conte di Aquila, of whom I had said that, as Admiral, he had charge of the island. But it is not denied, that an order was sent by his Royal Highness to enforce at that time the use of double irons in the prison; and the fact, I believe, is, that I was inaccurate in stating the Prince had charge of

* 'Rassegna,' p. 50.

the *island* as admiral: he has, however, in that capacity, together with other "*Rami alieni della Real Marina*," charge of the *forzati* or convicts. It is admitted * that Palumbo visited the prison in the capacity of a subordinate officer to the King's brother. Thus my assertions are made completely good. But it is boasted, forsooth, that he did not deprive some of the prisoners, who were in the best circumstances, of the mattresses they had, by their own means, procured. I will add, while touching upon mattresses, another fact. Nisco was carried while ill to Nisida. On arriving there he was put into the bed, and made to use the bed-linen, of a patient who had just before died of consumption.

35. Upon arriving at Ischia, the prisoners removed thither were put into filthy dens, so contrived that a sentry had the power of seeing and hearing whatever passed in them. With this sentry was a companion, who was supplied with that mild recipe for preserving order, a stock of hand grenades. Though the prisoners had never been out of custody, they were subjected to a personal search, much more minute than decent. Their money, linen, and utensils were taken from them. The boast of permitted mattresses does not reach to Ischia; for three months they had to sleep upon the stones. For their meals, they were allowed neither seat, table, nor cup. Cups, it may be said, were hardly wanted; for their allowance of water was reduced to three Neapolitan pounds (36 ounces) per day, of bad quality. There, too, a navy surgeon was placed *in disponibilità*, something between suspension and dismissal with us, for having inconveniently certified the ill-health of a prisoner. To us it may sound less, than

* 'Rassegna,' p. 51.

it was felt by them to be, that in the hot month of June they, the political convicts, were (I believe, exclusively) ordered to wear their thick and heavy dress of coarse woollen and leather, both in and out of doors.

36. A woman of abandoned profligacy, whose name I forbear to mention, ruled the house of the commandant; insulted the prisoners, and the women of their families, when applying for admission to see them, at her will; and caused a serjeant to be sentenced to confinement for not having forced the wife of one of them to part with the infant at her breast, when she was entering to see her husband. And, omitting other particulars, I shall conclude with stating that these gentlemen were compelled to attend the floggings inflicted in this *bagno* for various offences on the vilest of the convicts, the refuse of the refuse of mankind. Such are the accounts that I have received through channels that command my belief. I will not, indeed, believe that those in authority at Naples are aware of all this. I will hope that, as to much of it, they are more grossly darkened than the most careless gatherer of hear-say rumours among the butterfly visitors of Naples; but I really must remind them of their appropriate motto, *errare, nescire, decipi, et malum et turpe ducimus.*

37. Of the effect upon the health of the prisoners that such treatment must produce, it is painful to make an estimate. And, were anything too strange to be woven into this melancholy tissue of fact that eclipses fiction, I should have received with incredulity the further statement, that Pironte, when suffering under a paralytic affection, was not suffered to enter the hospital; and that oral orders were given by General Palumbo that only three of the political convicts should at any time be allowed to be received there at once!

But I must not omit to call attention to the statistics of the results. They were, I believe, as follows, as early as September last. Seventeen persons had been condemned to irons in the preceding February. Three of them were by that time ill at Ischia; one at Piedigrotta; three at Pescara; while three more, Margherita, Vallo, and Vellucci, were dead. Surely, then, the gallows may well be spared!

38. (III.) Passing on from the contradictions thus offered me, I have next to deal with the cases in which the semblance of a contradiction to my statements is put forth, and I am, of course, found guilty of exaggeration or calumny; while any real contradiction, such as can be dragged forth to light and brought to account, is carefully avoided.

a. Thus there is a very long statement * made of the process prescribed or indicated by law for the treatment of offenders, which is meant to be taken as a reply to my charges on that head.

But the author has passed by the fact that my main charge against the Government is its utter lawlessness. I am obliged to repeat it: and I say there is no body of brigands in the country which breaks the laws of Naples with the same hardihood, or on the same scale, as does the Government by the hands of its agents.

The law of Naples, however, is not that which my Reviewer has stated it to be. The law of Naples is the Constitution of 1848. That is the law which is systematically, continually, and in all points broken by the Government. But even the older, and the newer, laws of the absolute Kings of Naples are broken also in the most

* 'Rassegna,' pp. 14–25.

flagrant manner. In some points, probably, they are not; namely, where they need no breaking; and where their character is already harsh and cruel, as I believe to be the case with the law of treason generally. Again, what need to break the law in a point like that where the author tells us * that in all State offences the police may arrest and detain prisoners *without being confined to any limit of time?*

39. I should, however, be abusing the patience of the reader, were I to discuss anew that part of the subject which relates to the arrest, prosecution, and trial of those who have been so unhappy as to become objects of the suspicion, malice, cupidity, or vindictiveness of the police. For it has already been sifted to the bottom, in a work prepared, indeed, and published without my privity, but which has fallen under my eye; it is entitled 'A detailed Exposure of the Apology put forth by the Neapolitan Government,'† and has evidently been drawn up with a carefulness and knowledge equal to the singular ability it displays. It is only lest the circumstance of its being anonymous should slacken the interest its title would create, that I have thought it my duty to make this reference.

40. *b.* Again, when I have stated, as an eye-witness, that prisoners in the Vicaria are brought upstairs to the doctors, instead of being visited by them, according to the rules, it is no answer to me to say that the physicians of Naples are highly respected, and discharge all their duties honourably. And as I am thus met, I will go further, and say, the medical men of Naples exercise their profession as regards State prisoners in fear and

* 'Rassegna,' p. 18.

† Longmans, 1852.

trembling, and that they are frequently compelled, by the fear of the displeasure of Government, and of the loss of their bread if they make an inconvenient report, to consider the wishes and purposes of the police, in stating their professional opinions, rather more than the health of the prisoners.

41. *c.* Again, I stated * that Pironte was confined for two months before his sentence in a cell at the Vicaria eight feet square, with two companions, lighted only by a grating at the top, out of which they could not see.

I am told in reply † that Pironte wrote his defence in this den, and that the present King shut up the dark subterranean dungeons. But I never said it was dark; never said it was subterranean: and I am met with mere sound and vapour, instead of plain answers to plain and pointed allegations. I must, however, observe on a strange proceeding. In this and several instances, my charges, in order that they may afford some matter for contradiction, are very grossly mistranslated,‡ and the answer given is given only to the sense thus put upon them.

42. Yet, although this pretended Reply does not contradict me, I must contradict it. I know not what refinements may enter into the strict definition of a *criminale;* but I say that the dungeons are *not* shut up. Porcari was in a dungeon last February, untried. He is there still. Here, again, I am met with a make-believe reply, and told that the name Maschio belongs to a promenade in the highest part of the Castle of Ischia, and that there are cells near it for such prisoners as have broken the rules of the Bagno. What have we to do with them? I stated §

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* Page 184.

† 'Rassegna,' pp. 28, 29.

‡ *Ibid.* pp. 25, 49, *et alibi.*

§ P. 185.

that Porcari was lying untried in a dark dungeon, twenty-four feet, or else palms, below the level of the sea: I believe I should have said of the ground. This statement is not denied. I will now enlarge it, by adding that, in this horrible condition, he is completing the third year of his imprisonment. Beyond the place in which he is immured, nothing can be known of him. The commonest prudence forbids communication about him with the only person allowed to visit him in that Stygian abyss—his wife. And we must recollect that, had he escaped, she might probably have been taken in his stead. For it is a practice of the chosen defenders of order and the public peace at Naples, if they are in search of a political suspect, and conceive he has absconded, to arrest and detain indefinitely any of his relations they please; for is it not possible that they *may* know whither he is gone?

43. I do not speak at random. About one year ago, a Neapolitan named Morice made his escape from his country. In June last his household, *consisting exclusively of women,* was subjected to one of those nocturnal visits from the police which I have elsewhere described. They carried off one of his two sisters, and an aged domestic servant; they moreover apprehended a male relative, who was the stay and adviser of the family. The second and only remaining sister they humanely left, to enjoy her freedom as she might. Nay, such was the excess of leniency, that the old servant, accused of nothing, was released after two months' confinement. The male relative and the arrested sister were still, in November last, expiating the crime of their relationship. The treatment of these women by the gendarmes was such, that one of that body, under the orders of a foreign soldier not dead to the spirit of his profession, received a severe flogging for it.

Indeed, I have been informed that, for two months, the sister thus arrested was confined in a cell along with two common prostitutes. I could add other instances of confinement in *criminali* or dungeons, by which I understand the Apologist to mean cells commonly underground, and wholly or almost without light. But it is needless. For his assertion on this head, although made to carry half a page * of eulogy and adulation, seems to be cautiously restricted at the close to this, that there are now no unlighted cells below the level of the earth in the particular prison of the Vicaria, which amounts to but little, and was scarcely worth his while to state.

44. *d.* I come next to the most important of these cases, namely, the question of the number of political prisoners in the kingdom of the Two Sicilies, which has been made the great rallying point for the defenders of the Neapolitan Government, and the main source and stay of invective against me. Let us now come to the facts.

The substance of my own statement † on this point is as follows: 1. That "the general belief is, that the prisoners for political offences in the kingdom of the Two Sicilies are between fifteen or twenty and thirty thousand." 2. That, for myself, "I do believe that twenty thousand is no unreasonable estimate." 3. That "there can be no certainty on the point," as all "means of accurate information" are withheld. 4. That my statement had "been met by an assertion purporting to be founded on returns, that instead of twenty thousand there were about two thousand." ‡ "Let the Neapolitan Government," I added, "have the full benefit of the con-

* 'Rassegna,' p. 28.

† First Letter, p. 174. ‡ Second Letter, p. 217.

tradiction I have mentioned;" upon which I, however, suspended my own judgment.

45. Upon reviewing these passages, the only fault I have to find with them, strange to say, is this, that they admit too much in favour of the Neapolitan Government. When I wrote the passages last quoted, I had seen a dispatch from Naples, which alluded to certain Returns of the number of prisoners, as a contradiction of my statement; but I had not seen the Returns themselves; and hence, not doubting that they were what they were described to be, I adopted that description, and too eagerly and promptly announced that the Neapolitan Government reduced the twenty thousand to two thousand, and this upon the strength, as alleged, of official Returns.

46. But, the moment that these Returns met my eye, I could not fail to observe that, though carefully paraded as a contradiction to my allegation, they were even without the smallest impeachment of their *bona fides*, no contradiction at all; and they left the question exactly where they found it, yet subject to the general rule, as I think, that what is not contradicted in an official Answer is really confessed.

I say, without the smallest impeachment of their *bona fides*. I shall raise no question about Cav. Pasqualoni or Signor Bartolomucci, by whom they are attested, although I ought to state that this has been done publicly by others as to the second of these functionaries;* but in justice to my subject, I must observe, that among ourselves, in a contested matter, any Returns incapable of verification would be received as so much waste-paper. On grounds the most broad and general, they can only

* Massari, p. 173.

deserve credit with the nation when the nation has some control over them; some means of inquiring whether they are correct, of exposing where they are wrong, of punishing where they are corrupt.

47. The responsibility of public functionaries, and a free press for the detection of fraud or error, are the essential conditions of credibility in such documents. Of neither of these is there the faintest shadow in Naples. Even in the point of mere good faith, *whose* good faith is it on which we are to rely? Not the good faith of Bartolomucci and Pasqualoni, who sit peaceably in their official rooms in Naples, but the good faith of somebody in Bari, in Reggio, in Teramo, in Cosenza, and so forth; somebody who, unless he be a happy exception to general rules in those latitudes, is ready at any moment to break, for a piastre, any rule under which he is charged to act; somebody who sends up his schedule, say from Bari, when the public there have no knowledge that he is framing it, just as when it is published they will have no means of testing it; indeed, if they attempted to question it, they would promptly rank as enemies of order, and be added to the number of those who are the unfortunate subjects of the Return.

48. But now I will analyse the headings of these Returns, and will show that I am strictly accurate in declaring that they leave the matter precisely where they found it: just as much so as if A should say, There were thirty thousand English at Waterloo, and B should reply, No, for I will show you by Returns from the Horse Guards, that the Scots Greys did not number eight hundred.

My estimate then refers to the number of "political prisoners in the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies."

We are presented in reply with a "*Stato Numerico degli imputati politici presenti in giudizio in carcere, o con*

modo di custodia esteriore, presso le Grandi Corti Speciali dei Dominii Continentali del Regno delle Due Sicilie;" and a "*Stato Nominativo degli individui che trovansi in carcere a disposizione della polizia per reati politici nelle diverse provincie dei Dominii Continentali del Regno delle Due Sicilie.*" These Returns give a gross total of 2024 in prison, and of 79 out of prison but under restraint.

Their titles may be rendered into English as follows :—

No. 1. "Number of persons charged on political grounds and under judicial process (being either prisoners, or under custody out of doors) before the Grand Special Courts of the Continental Dominions of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies." And No. 2. "Return of the names of persons in prison, under the authority of the police, for political offences in the several Provinces of the Continental Dominions of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies."

49. It shall now be shown that almost every word of these titles is a separate, clear, and important curtailment and limitation of the account of prisoners, cutting off from the Return one large class after another, so that at last the numbers returned have no more to do with my estimate than the number of the Scots Greys with the total number of English at Waterloo. For,—

First. No. 1 is a Return of "*imputati*," persons under charge: whereas a main portion of my accusation is, that persons are arrested, and that not by way of rare exception, but habitually and in multitudes, without any charge at all, "per ordine superiore," as the portentous phrase is, it being "the essential aim of the system to *create* a charge," not to discover a crime.*

50. Secondly. The Return does not profess to be a

* Page 12.

Return even of all prisoners who have been charged: it is of prisoners who, having been charged, are under judicial process. Here then lies, I must say, a great mystery of iniquity; and, whatever be the deficiency in knowledge of Neapolitan law which the defender charges upon me, I am thankful to have just enough for its detection. Be it known then, that before there is any *giudizio*, properly so called, or process before the tribunals, which commences either with the *requisitoria*, or with the *atto d' accusa* or indictment, there is an *istruzione* or preparatory process which may and does cover a great length of time, between the period when the prisoner had a charge lodged against him, and thus became an *imputato*, and the time when his trial before the Court commences with the *requisitoria* or the *atto d' accusa;* during which indefinite time his case is in the hands of the Police Department, sometimes in a state of growth, sometimes at a standstill, sometimes in entire abeyance and oblivion, as I say deliberately, and with given cases in my mind.* But we have by no means done yet. For—

51. Thirdly; this is not a Return even of the political prisoners who have been both charged and put on trial, but of those who have been so put on trial before the Special Courts. I have already adverted in general terms to the meaning of this exceptional form of criminal judicature.* Now, there are large classes of political prisoners, who do not come before these special tribunals. For example, soldiers, or civilians who are accused of tampering with the soldiers, are brought, under particular laws, before *consigli di guerra*, or military courts.

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* Two Letters, p. 197. See 'Exposure,' p. 22, for a fuller and more precise statement.

Offences, again, committed through the press, if punishable "criminally" at all, belong to the ordinary jurisdiction of the criminal Courts, under laws of 1821, 1848, and 1849. And lastly, there are large classes of offences only punishable "correctionally," not "criminally," such as suspicious meetings, suspicious words, suspicious writings, suspicious proceedings generally, which are punishable before the local judges, or *giudici circondariali*. None of these can be included in the Return before us.

Now I believe that this constitutes a very heavy addition indeed to the list. For there are, in the mainland dominions of Naples, no less than five hundred and thirty prisons in connection with these local Courts, and the number of them without political prisoners is comparatively small.

For legal authority in support of these statements, I refer to the work of Signor Massari, entitled, 'Il Sig. Gladstone ed il Governo Napolitano, Torino, 1851,' pages 168–172, and page 177. The writer of this work has been aided by the Cavalier Mancini, an exiled Neapolitan lawyer, who has received at the hands of the Government of Piedmont the appointment of Professor of International Law.

Besides all these, there are yet two other most gross and palpable omissions, in the Return No. 1, to be pointed out.

52. Fourthly. It takes no notice whatever of those who *have* been tried and sentenced, that is, of the whole class of political convicts: nor, according to its terms, does it include persons acquitted, but still in prison; nor persons who after conviction have suffered their entire sentences, but are not released. Now what are the numbers of the

class of political convicts? For the whole kingdom I have not the means of answering the question; but in the province of Teramo, with 203,000 inhabitants, there were, some months ago, two hundred and forty-seven political convicts. If Teramo represents an average of the whole country, the total number of this class will amount to between nine and ten thousand.

53. Fifthly. It takes no notice either of prisoners or convicts in Sicily, though I expressly spoke of the prisoners in the "kingdom of the Two Sicilies,"* and afterwards distinguished from it the kingdom of Naples, or the main-land dominions, to which all my subsequent statements were to refer.†

54. I have still a few words to say on Return No. 2. It is without date! It is entitled a return of names, and it does not give so much as one name! It is a return confined to persons in prison under the police, "for political offences," *per reati politici;* but *reati* is a technical word, and implies that they have been under process. It is stated by the authorities to whom I have referred, and with every likelihood of accuracy, that it must mainly respect persons who, having been imprisoned, charged, and tried, and having had the rare good fortune to be acquitted, are, nevertheless, still detained in prison at the discretion of the police; a case not visionary, as I have already had occasion to show. Thus it may supply the void I have just now pointed out. Nor have we yet altogether done. Return No. 1 represents the numbers under process in each province: and adds (see also p. 24 of the 'Rassegna') "from this number are deducted the persons included in the Sovereign Graces of April 30 and 19 May, 1851,

* Page 174. † Page 176.

according to the table No. 3." Now table No. 3 informs us that, in the Provinces of Principato Ultra, Abruzzo Citra, and Terra d'Otranto, taken together, thirty-five persons were thus released from process. But No. 1 informs us that, in those three provinces, the whole number under process, from which the thirty-five were to be deducted, amounted to eighteen!

55. I consider that I have now fully redeemed my engagement to demonstrate that these two Returns, produced as if they were a contradiction of my estimate of the number of political prisoners, are no contradiction of it at all; but that they artfully and fraudulently, by the use of technical terms and in other ways, shirk the whole point at issue, and leave my statement quite untouched.

I must further observe, that thus leaving it untouched, they are in reality among the strongest confirmations it could possibly have received. My language was clear: it related to the sum total of political prisoners. When it was determined to make an Official Reply, and when months were employed in its preparation, why did the Government omit from its Returns the prisoners not yet charged; the prisoners charged, but not yet under trial before the tribunals; the prisoners not falling within the cognsiance of the Grand Courts Special at all; the prisoners acquitted and still detained in prison; the prisoners of all descriptions whatsoever in the island of Sicily?

56. The matter standing thus, it may be almost superfluous to think of adducing any confirmatory evidence of an estimate, which never pretended to be more than an estimate, and which, having been so long before the world, has been thus elaborately evaded, and thus practically corroborated, by those who, had it been untrue, as they had the

strongest motives, so likewise had the very best means to supply a real and not a pretended contradiction.

57. In one of the London Journals, the *Daily News*, there has appeared, subsequently to the Neapolitan reply, a classified statement of the persons who have been in custody, on political grounds, in the kingdom of the Two Sicilies since the events of 1848. This statement appears to carry the aggregate number somewhat beyond mine; and it is one which I believe to be written both with perfect good faith, and with considerable means of information. Even the 30,000 which I mentioned, not as my own, but as an estimate not uncommon, is far from being the maximum of those which I have seen made in published works by men of character and station. Choosing, however, to rely mainly on what I think the very strong evidence afforded by the total absence of any serious effort at contradiction, I shall simply mention a single illustrative fact, necessarily limited in its range because it belongs to a particular class and spot; but one full of meaning, and one which may be thoroughly believed. I have had means of access to a list, avowedly drawn from memory and so far incomplete, of the names, particular designations, and residences of *two hundred and eighty-six priests, confined for political causes in the prison of San Francesco, at Naples, between* 1849 *and* 1851. To what sort of computations this fact would reasonably lead as to the totals of all classes, in all prisons, of the whole Neapolitan and Sicilian dominions, I need not explain.

58. (IV.) I must now proceed to notice certain denials of my statements, which were put forward before the appearance of the Neapolitan defence, by advocates of that Government, whose zeal outran alike their information and their prudence. I shall not think it necessary to argue upon

the merits of allegations, which the principals have not thought proper to adopt; but it is right they should be set out as a caution to the world, and as a needful portion of this summary report upon the condition in which the accusation has been left, after the battering process to which it has been subjected.

59. I have stated that "as I hear," * confiscation or sequestration often takes place upon arrest. Mr. Charles Macfarlane † boldly declares in reply, that "not a fragment of property of any kind has been touched." But the Official Reply does not impugn the statement which I made.

The same gentleman, and likewise M. Gondon, the editor of the *Univers*, have published a romantic account of Poerio's career, ‡ his connection with Mazzini at Paris; his contributions to the *Giovine Italia*; and the like. He never knew Mazzini, never was at Paris, never wrote a line in the *Giovine Italia*. Not one syllable of all this tirade is directly adopted in the official defence; but I am sorry to add, it is quoted in a note as the testimony of "another Englishman."

"No political offender," § it is stated, "has been kept above twenty-fours without being examined." The Official Reply does not echo the assertion; but, on the contrary, ‖ points out the fact in its own defence, that in cases of political crime the police may detain persons in its own disposal, for more than the twenty-four hours specified by law as the term within which they must be examined.

60. The same rather officious writer alleges that poli-

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* Page 176. † Macfarlane, p. 21. ‡ *Ibid.* p. 18.
§ *Ibid.* p. 30. ‖ 'Rassegna,' p. 18.

tical offenders * are kept quite separate from common felons. I might refer to my own ocular testimony; but it is enough to say that here, again, the Government are silent.

M. Gondon, the editor of the *Univers*, has, perhaps, been the most forward champion of the Neapolitan policy; and his zeal has so clouded his perceptions that he cannot even state with accuracy the value of a ducat in French money.† He informs me ‡ that the Neapolitan judges are irremovable; a gross error, of which the Official Reply of course keeps clear.

He alleges that my statement of the slaughter § in the prison at Procida exaggerates tenfold the number of the victims. The Official Reply does not assert that there was the slightest exaggeration. ‖

He alleges ¶ that I charge the Government with taking care to chain the prisoners to the men who have denounced them, and says Poerio was chained to a gentleman of his own profession. This last allegation is true; but I had stated it before him. I had not stated that it was the general practice to chain prisoners to the informers against them; but I mentioned a particular case, that of Margherita; ** and the Government does not deny it.

61. I shall sum up this very singular list by referring to the version which Messrs. Gondon and Macfarlane have given, to much the same effect, of the case of the Deputy Carducci and his murderer, the priest Peluso.

My statement respecting Carducci was,†† that he was "assassinated by a priest named Peluso, well known in

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* Macfarlane, p. 32.
† 'La Terreur dans le Royaume de Naples,' p. 37.
‡ *Ibid.* pp. 37 and 173. § *Ibid.* p. 42. ‖ 'Rassegna,' p. 55.
¶ *Ibid.* pp. 48 and 174. ** Page 192. †† Page 177.

the streets of Naples, never questioned for the act, and said to receive a pension from the Government."

This statement is judiciously let alone by the official Apologist, while it is contradicted with the utmost hardihood by the volunteers.

But it so happens, that the facts in this case became the subject of mention in the short-lived Parliamentary Chambers of the Neapolitan Constitution; and I take the following notices of them from the publication of a well-known member of those Chambers, corroborated in many points by other accounts in my possession.

62. Carducci was in 1848 named a Deputy for his own province, that of Salerno, and also a Colonel of the National Guard. He was treated by the Sovereign with every sign of confidence and kindness. Alarmed for his personal safety after the 15th of May, he took refuge on board a vessel of the French squadron. He afterwards took a passage, with nine companions, from Malta to Calabria, intending to make his way to Naples, and to exert himself for the maintenance of the Constitution. They were wholly unarmed. They were compelled by bad weather to land at Acqua Fredda, in Basilicata, and near the province of Salerno. That any reward had been set upon the head of Carducci, or any proclamation issued against him, is totally untrue. Peluso, the priest, living near, received and entertained him. The party were waiting for the settlement of the weather to re-embark, when they saw their host approaching with a body of armed men. Three of them were wounded by a discharge of musketry, of whom Carducci was one; and the effects of the party were rifled, while the wounded were made prisoners. Carducci was carried off by Peluso, and his body was found some days afterwards lying un-

buried, with the head cut off. I will now quote the words of D'Arlincourt, not so much an admirer as a worshipper of the Neapolitan Government. *La tête du fameux insurgé fut mise dans un pot de sel, et ironiquement envoyée à ses coréligionnaires de Naples.**

63. The magistracy, which had not then been corrupted by intimidation as at present, bestirred itself. Pinto, Judge of the *Circondario*, began the *istruzione*, or process. He was dismissed, and Gaetano Cammarota was sent in his stead, to manage the affair. He, too, proceeded in it with fidelity; and he, too, was recalled. But a third Judge, De Clemente, had been joined with him by the Procurator-General, on account of the importance of the cause. He likewise valiantly persevered in the investigation; and the Procurator-General, Scura, honourably and manfully sustained him. The Procurator-General was dismissed, and is now in exile. De Clemente, in appearance only more fortunate, was promoted to be *giudice regio* at Potenza; but was after one month deprived.

A petition was presented to the Chamber of Deputies; and the Chamber unanimously referred it to the Ministry with a strong recommendation for the prosecution of the inquiry. Upon a second motion, the recommendation was unanimously renewed. Those members of the Chamber, who were of the Ministerial party, concurred in both these demands.

64. And here I close the history of the murdered Deputy Carducci and the Priest Peluso his murderer: and with it my reference to the daring but futile efforts of the writers I have named to procure belief for fictions, which a sense of prudence and decency, or a regard for truth, or

* 'L'Italie Rouge,' p. 255.

both combined, have kept the Neapolitan Government itself from attempting to palm upon the world.

65. I come now to the *Catechismo Filosofico*. This I am told I have wrongly interpreted; and the defender, describing it as the work of a pious ecclesiastic, does not breathe one syllable of disapproval against the doctrines it contains. It was first published, he states, in 1837; and republished in 1850 as a private speculation without the authorisation of Government, and before the law for the preventive censorship of the press was in existence.

66. I had no knowledge of the date of the original publication of this miserable book, and no intention of conveying the impression that I had such knowledge. I do not doubt the allegation, that it was published in or before 1837; but unfortunately this has little tendency to mend the case, since it only carries us back to one or more earlier crises of Neapolitan history to which the doctrines of the Catechism are nearly, if not quite, as applicable as to that of 1848. The defender does not in the least deny, that the present circulation of it proves the approval by the Government of the maxims it recommends. Nor does he, although he says the Government did not authorise the diffusion of the reprint of 1850, deny that it is used in the public schools under the authority of the Government. And, since the publication of my Letters, I have received assurances from one on whom I can fully rely, that he is personally acquainted with the mayor of a Neapolitan town, who has himself received from Government an official order to place this Catechism in the hands of all teachers of schools.

67. I may properly choose this place to offer an explanation of the observations, in my Second Letter, with respect to the conduct of the clergy. It has been said

that I have here unduly extenuated the responsibility of the Church of Rome at the expense of the civil authorities. My answer is that I have said nothing whatever about the responsibility of the Church of Rome, either for the doctrines of the Catechism, or for the practices of the Government. We might find a very interesting subject for a dispassionate discussion, in the relation between the moral teaching of the Church of Rome (or any other Church), and its development in the practice of her members where she has full and undivided sway. But nothing could have been more impertinent and improper, than for me to have introduced the slightest tittle of such matter into a statement, which I believed to rest on grounds common to all who recognise the obligations of revealed, nay more, of natural, religion, or of common humanity. What I did mean was, to prevent an exaggerated estimate (particularly in England during the year 1851) of the share taken by the clergy as a body in giving countenance to these proceedings. In this point of view I do not think I have done them more than justice; and I trust the reader will recollect what appalling numbers even of that favoured class have swelled the masses of the imprisoned. Indeed, I have done them rather less than justice, in saying I was convinced from information that "a portion of them" * made disclosures from the confessional for political purposes; for the particular cases connected with the confessional which reached me, in a form to command my credence, were not more than two.

68. Such, then, upon the whole matter, is my *compte rendu*. I am sure it will prove that, in obtaining that

* Page 236.

general attestation to my personal veracity and trustworthiness, which, and which alone, the permission to address Lord Aberdeen implied, I made no abusive appeal to the sentiment of humanity throughout Christendom, which has replied to me with even more energy than I had ventured to anticipate. I believe that, for my own vindication, I might without any new publication have relied in perfect safety upon the verdict already given by the public opinion, and announced by the press, of Europe. The arrow has shot deep into the mark; and cannot be dislodged. But I have sought, in once more entering the field, not only to sum up the state of the facts in the manner nearest to exactitude, but likewise to close the case as I began it, presenting it from first to last in the light of a matter which is not primarily or mainly political; which is better kept apart from parliamentary discussion; which has no connection whatever with any peculiar idea or separate object or interest of England; but which appertains to the sphere of humanity at large. Well, then, does it deserve the consideration of every man who feels a concern for the well-being of his race, in its bearings on that well-being; on the elementary demands of individual and domestic happiness; on the permanent maintenance of public order; on the stability of Thrones; on the solution of that great problem which, day and night, in its innumerable forms, must haunt the reflections of every statesman both here and elsewhere, how to harmonise the old with the new conditions of society, and to mitigate the increasing stress of time and change upon what remains of the ancient and venerable fabric of the traditional civilisation of Europe.

69. On every account I hope that the matter is not to end here. If it should, it will be another heavy addition

to that catalogue of all offences committed by Governments against liberty or justice, which the spirit of revolution, stalking through the world, combines, and exaggerates, and brings unitedly to bear against each in turn; and which, apart from the Spirit of Revolution, wounded and bleeding humanity cannot but in these glaring instances record.

70. But I think that the very words, traced by the pen of the Neapolitan Apologist, afford us the *auspicium melioris ævi*. Could any human being, he asks,* imagine that a Government, ever so little careful of its dignity, could be induced to change its policy because some individual or other has by lying accusations held it up to the hatred of mankind? I answer, no. This did not enter into my imagination. But I reply to his question by another: Could any human being have supposed that, on the challenge of a mere individual, the Government of Naples would plead, as it has now pleaded, before the tribunal of general opinion, and would thereby admit, as it has now admitted, the jurisdiction of that tribunal? That Government, far from insignificant as estimated by the numbers and qualities of the people whom it rules, and far from weak in material force, has, nevertheless, descended from its eminence, and been content to stand upon the level of equal controversy, in the face and under the judgment of the world.

71. Now, I say, that to answer the statements of a private accuser is a proceeding no less remarkable and significant, than to alter or modify a course of measures in consequence of those statements. The public and formal endeavour to prove them false implies, by the most inex-

* 'Rassegna,' p. 7.

orable continuity and cogency of logic, that, if they be true, they deserve attention, and should lead to practical results. The endeavour to disprove them by an argument addressed to the European public, is a transparent admission that the European public is to judge, whether or not the endeavour is successful, whether or not the original accusation stands. If the general sentiment be, that the disproof has failed, and that the charge remains, then I say that, by the fact of this answer, the Neapolitan Government stands bound in honour as well as in consistency to recognise that sentiment, and to allow it to act upon its own future policy and administration, in the direction to which it points. As to the question of fact, what the general opinion at this moment really is, I think that not even the Neapolitan Government itself, no, nor its advocates, can be in doubt; if accustomed to consult those barometers of opinion, upon which its influences play with freedom.

72. But it would not be in such case to the individual, that homage would be done. The cheer of a vast assemblage is a sound majestic and imposing; the voice of the person appointed to give the signal for it is one of the most insignificant order. My function has been no higher than his; I have only pointed out, and delineated; it is the public sentiment, and the public sentiment of no one country in particular, that has judged. It was to that public sentiment that the Neapolitan Government was paying deference, when it resolved on the manly course of an Official Reply; it will be to that public sentiment that further deference will, I would fain hope, and I for one care not how silently, be paid, in the searching reform of its departments, and in the whole future management of its affairs.

73. When I framed my first representation, I strove to avoid direct reference to Neapolitan or other politics. The principle on which I proceeded was, that from such conduct as that which I described, all Governments, all authorities, all political parties, and especially those which desired to act in the interest of public order and of the monarchical principle, ought to separate themselves, to disown connection with it, and to say, "It is none of ours." Such, however, I must own, has not proved to be the case. Partly from religious jealousies, partly from the strange and startling nature of the facts, partly from an instinct which seems to suggest, under certain circumstances, that at a period like this a man can only choose in the gross between those who possess power on the one hand and those who are labouring to subvert it on the other, there has been more or less of the disposition shown, although not in England yet elsewhere, to treat a statement such as that I have made as a sin against one political creed, or as an indication of leaning to another, or of a desire to dally with party and to reap its favours without sharing its responsibilities.

74. Such an indication imposes on me the duty of saying that, as I cannot claim one jot or tittle of credit with liberalism or Republicanism, or with liberal or Republican politicians as such, for the witness I have borne, so neither can I accept any portion of whatever censures may be awarded to me as an offender against the principles called conservative, or as having acted in a manner to weaken the hands of any of their champions. The principle of conservation and the principle of progress are both sound in themselves; they have ever existed and must ever exist together in European society, in qualified opposition, but in vital harmony and concurrence;

and for each of those principles it is a matter of deep and essential concern, that iniquities committed under the shelter of its name should be stripped of that shelter. Most of all is this the case where iniquity, towering on high, usurps the name and authority of that Heaven to which it lifts its head, and wears the double mask of Order and of Religion. Nor has it ever fallen to my lot to perform an office so truly conservative, as in the endeavour I have made to shut and mark off from the sacred cause of Government in general, a system which I believed was bringing the name and idea of Government into shame and hatred, and converting the thing from a necessity and a blessing into a sheer curse to human kind.

75. For I am weak enough to entertain the idea that, if these things be true—if justice be prostituted, personal liberty and domestic peace undermined, law, where it cannot be used as an engine of oppression, ignominiously thrust aside, and Government, the minister and type of the Divinity, invested with the characteristics of an opposite origin,—it is not for the interests of order and conservation, even if truth and freedom had no separate claims, that the practical and effective encouragement of silent connivance should be given either to the acts or to the agents. This policy, in the extravagant development of it which I have stated, is a policy which, when noiseless attempts at a remedy have failed, ought, on the ground of its mere destructiveness, to be stripped, beneath the public gaze; and this, too, before the strain it lays upon human nature shall have forced it into some violent explosion.

76. Certainly, there is a philosophy according to which all this is simplicity, childishness, and folly; a philosophy which teaches, or proceeds as if it taught, that everything should be passed by *aversis oculis*, rather

than give encouragement to revolution. And its oracles forget that there are more ways than one of encouraging revolution, as there are of encouraging reaction. Revolution, like reaction, is sometimes promoted by seconding the efforts of its friends, sometimes by opening full scope, or, as it is said, giving rope enough, to the excesses and frenzy of its enemies. Such at least is the doctrine which, in common with my countrymen of all parties, I have learned; and among us the simplicity, the childishness, and the folly would be thought to lie in propounding any other. Yet I grant, that matters of this kind take their forms, at particular times and places, from the human will. Such as we will have them to be, such they are. If any friends to the principle of order contend, that these exposures ought not to be made, that they weaken the hands of authority in a day when it has no strength to spare, and that they inflame the cupidity and rage of the enemies of constituted power, I am not prepared to deny that, to the extent and in the sphere within which such doctrines are propounded and bear sway, those lamentable results are really produced. I cannot deny that, if the conservative principle required us to wink at every crime purporting to be committed in its defence, it would be damaged by the revelation; but in such case it would be high time that it *should* be damaged too. As it is, I admit and lament the fact of evil done; I find the cause, not in the disclosures, but in the reception which has occasionally been given to them. The responsibility for the evil must lie with the authors of that reception.

77. It may, however, be incumbent upon me, now that a political colour has been adventitiously affixed by some persons to my publication, to say a few words upon the view

I take of the political position of the Throne of the Two Sicilies, in reference to its dominions on the mainland.

While, then, my opinion of the obligations of the Sovereign, in regard to the Constitution of 1848, and of the manner in which they have been dealt with, may be clearly gathered from the second of my Letters in particular, I think justice demands from me the admission that, even apart from the great embarrassments of the Sicilian question, the King of Naples had real and serious difficulties to encounter in the establishment of representative institutions. The dramatic, or, to speak more rudely, the theatrical principle has acquired a place in the management of political affairs in Italy in a degree greater than can recommend itself to our colder temperament.* Cruditics are taken up hastily and in large quantity: the liveliness of imagination and sentiment outstrips the lagging pace of the more practical faculties, and the formation of fixed mental habits: the spire of Nationality must be carried up to heaven, before the foundation-stone of local liberties is laid.

78. From considering the history of the Neapolitan innovations in 1848, and of the reaction which succeeded them, I do not doubt that, although perhaps all Europe does not contain a people more gentle, more susceptible of attachment, more easy of control, the King would have had some difficulties to encounter in working the machine

* [This description was, I think, true at the time. I always felt that the treachery here described was greatly stimulated by the well-meant but unwise proceedings of Pius IX. at the commencement of his Pontificate. Italy accepted the lessons of experience. In 1859 and 1860, she was far from being open to the imputation conveyed in the text. I must also confess that those were right who believed that, in the actual circumstances, the establishment of National unity was the true and only way to "local liberties."—W. E. G., 1878.]

of constitutional Government. Among the members returned to his Parliament, there were a section, though a small section, of decided Republicans. The agitation for a change in the composition of the House of Peers, or in some cases for its abolition, before a representative body had met, and for an extension of the electoral franchise before it had been once used, were circumstances that showed the necessity for a resolute will, and a strong guiding hand.

79. But surely it must in fairness be admitted that there was some apology for this restlessness of mind, and for the "blank misgivings" which were its main cause. For 1848 was not the first year, when a Constitution had been heard of in Naples. I will not rake up the embers of the past for the purposes of crimination; but it undoubtedly ought to have been remembered for those of considerate indulgence. When a people have on signal occasions seen solemn boons retracted, and solemn sanctions, on whatever plea of State necessity, set aside, who can wonder at, who can blame, their entertaining a vague suspicion of evil, their uneasy searching for new and extended guarantees? And how is this misgiving to be cured? Only in one way; by steady, persevering good faith: by the experimental assurance, that the things which have been are not to be again. It is idle to urge the difficulties in the way of working the constitutional machine as reasons for the violation of pledges, when those very difficulties arose out of a mistrust, of which former breaches of promise had been the origin. The only way to cure mistrust is by showing that trust, if given, would not be misplaced, would not be betrayed. By its own nature it is spontaneous, and not subject to brute force; in order to be enjoyed, it must be soothed, and won.

80. Now the proceedings of the Neapolitan Parliament, taken as a whole, distinctly prove that, whether wise or not in every step, it was loyal in its intentions to the monarchy. When the question is asked in future times, whether it ventured far enough, and assumed an attitude sufficiently firm in defending the solemnly-established franchises, posterity may, perhaps, return a less favourable reply. But this want of masculine daring is at any rate not an accusation to be pressed against it by the friends of the reaction. As against the Throne, the hands of that Parliament seem to have been clean, its intentions frank and upright. When I say that it had within it some portion of intractable material, I only say that which is necessarily true of every representative assembly in the world. Suppose it granted, that through timidity and misgivings it might have been betrayed into encroachments, and might have applied more to organic and less to administrative measures than prudence would have recommended. Sincerity and straightforwardness of purpose were the fitting and appropriate medicine; they would soon have disarmed its impetuosity, and given its real loyalty fair play. There was the country, too, at large. Surely that was not republican; that docile and kindly people, so ready to trust and love, asking so little and believing so much. Why was no trust reposed in them? Why was not the constitutional battle fairly fought? Why was not the regular business of the state allowed to proceed in the forms of the constitution, even to the close of one session? Why was the Parliament dishonoured and spurned, in regard even to its primary and most essential function, that of the imposition of taxes? Why were its Addresses repelled?

81. Upon the very lowest ground (one far too low), why

were not both the Chamber and the constituency fairly tried before they were cashiered, and how can it be pretended that they had a fair trial when the Government never submitted to them a policy, upon which to try them by its acceptance or rejection, and by the nature of the substitutes that might be proposed? It would not allow these bodies to show what they really were, or meant to be, and proceeded from the first as though it meant to break the royal oath, and to catch, or if it could not catch, actually create, an opportunity for overthrowing the liberties of the country? Had the King, in 1848, been advised to encounter his difficulties with those "small stones from the brook," frankness, steadiness, and singleness of purpose, his very defeats, if he had met them, would have been the surest pledge of ultimate triumph; he would have rested not upon the stark and rigid support of a military force, utterly overgrown in comparison with the population and resources of the country, but upon that confidence and intelligent affection, which we see now working out the constitutional problem in Piedmont, notwithstanding the cruel burdens entailed by the recent war, with every prospect of success. It was for factious opposition to the administration, that the Parliament of Naples was extinguished; and I should wish to know what constitution or parliament on earth would have an existence worth a month's purchase, if upon such a plea it might be overthrown with impunity.

82. It is grievous to witness in the Official Reply from Naples, as well as in the works of the volunteers, the coarse reproduction of that unmitigated cant or slang, which alike among all parties forms the staple of political controversy, when their champions write in the sense and for the purposes of party only, without ever casting a

glance upwards to the eternal forms of humanity and truth. The people do not complain; therefore they are the contented and happy witnesses to the admirable conduct of the Government. Or they do complain; therefore they are a few scoundrels, enemies of social order, and apostates from religion. The Catechism told us, that all Liberals were bound for the kingdom of darkness; and the same strain of undistinguishing denunciation pervades these works. Yet every man, who has personal knowledge of the Italians, every man who has ever looked into the political literature of the country, must know that those who are thus, with incurable infatuation, lumped together as Liberals, and denounced as unbelievers, are an aggregate of individuals presenting every variety of sentiment. Some of them in religion are as ardent Roman Catholics as any Cardinal in the College. Their range also of political opinion includes every imaginable shade; from those who simply disapprove of the baseness and cruelty of the reaction, down to republicanism goaded into frenzy. There is the less excuse for thus confounding persons and sentiments essentially different, because those who are in Naples and elsewhere, reviled under a common name, are not really in combination among themselves, but on the contrary dispute sharply, even under defeat, upon the matters in controversy between them; a proof at least that, if they are ill supplied with worldly wisdom, they are not without frankness and honesty of purpose.

83. It is true, that as we follow the course of history, we find that unwise concession has been the parent of many evils. But unwise resistance is answerable for many more; nay, is too frequently the primary source of the mischief ostensibly arising from the opposite policy, because it is commonly unwise resistance which so dams

up the stream and accumulates the waters that, when the day of their bursting comes, they are absolutely ungovernable. A little modicum of time, indeed, may thus be realised by gigantic labours in repression, during which not even the slightest ripple shall be audible. And within that little time statesmen, dressed in their brief authority, may claim credit with the world for the peremptory assertion of power; and for having crushed, as the phrase goes at Naples, the hydra of revolution. But every hour of that time is not bought, it is borrowed, and borrowed at a rate of interest, with which the annals of usury itself have nothing to compare. The hydra of revolution is not really to be crushed by the attempt to crush, or even by momentary success in crushing, under the name of revolution, a mixed and heterogeneous mass of influences, feelings, and opinions, bound together absolutely by nothing except repugnance to the prevailing rigours and corruptions. Viewed as mere matter of policy, this is simply to undertake the service of enlistment for the army of the foe. It is a certain proposition that, when a Government thus treats enmity to abuse as identical with purposes of subversion, it, according to the laws of our mixed nature, partially amalgamates the two, and fulfils at length its own miserable predictions in its own more miserable ruin.

84. Surely, however, there is another mode of procedure. It is to examine the elements of which the aggregate force apparently hostile to a government is composed, and carefully to appreciate their differences; to meet, or, at least, to give an earnest of honest intention to meet, the objections of the moderate and just, by the removal of what causes them; to have some tenderness even for the scruples of the weak, to take human nature on its better side instead

of perpetually galling its wounds and sores, to remember that violence itself has its moments of remission and its *mollia fandi tempora*, its opportunities of honourable access; and thus to draw out from the opposite array a large part of its numbers and its energy, a far larger of its virtue, its truth, and all the elements of permanent vitality. It may then be found that no other means are left; but it may also then be found that the compass of the evil is so reduced by the preliminary processes, that it is wiser and better to carry it in patience, than to irritate the system by a sharp excision. If unhappily the risk must at last be run, and anti-social crime visited with the punishment which is its due, at least the what and the why will then be plain, and we shall talk something better than pestilent imposture when we proclaim the intention to crush the hydra of revolution, or vaunt of having crushed it. Nor is this a parade of humanity; it is surely rather the practical rule of government, which common sense dictates, and the experience of the world sustains.

85. But there is another maxim yet more momentous. I fear that in Italy it is growing gradually into an article of faith with the country, that the evasion and the breach of the most solemn engagements are looked upon, by some of the Governments, as among their natural and normal means of defence. I shall not enter into the older grounds of this opinion. Suffice it to say, that it does unhappily receive countenance from recent events. In the very pamphlet before me I read of * the unhappy constitution of 1848, and of "the warm, accordant, spontaneous, and unanimous desire of the people, expressed in a thousand

* 'Rassegna,' p. 9.

forms and a thousand times repeated, for the abolition of the Constitution, and for a return to pure Monarchy." Now I say it is by language of this kind, used with the countenance of authority, that authority and monarchy are undermined; undermined in their original groundwork, the principle of trust and confidence between man and man. It is impossible for human audacity to go further, than in these self-damning assertions. The pamphleteer tells us now, that the Constitution was obtained "by agitators alone";* but the King of Naples told the world, on the 10th of February 1848, that he granted it to "the unanimous desire of Our most beloved subjects." Was he then undeceived by the conflict of May 15? No, for on May 24 he declared that Constitution to be "the sacrosanct altar upon which must rest the destinies of Our most beloved people and of our Crown," and invoked, in terms the most solemn, the trust of his people.

86. It is now, however, thought decent and politic to say its abolition was sought by the spontaneous and unanimous wish of that people. Their unanimous wish! But that Constitution had created a large electoral body; and scarcely the smallest fraction of members were returned on either of the two several elections, who were not heart and soul in favour of the Constitution as against "pure monarchy." Their spontaneous wish! When, as I here and now assert, persons holding office under the Government of Naples were requested and required by that Government to sign petitions for the abolition of the Constitution (which, however, it has not yet been thought proper to abolish, and which is still the law therefore of

* Page 9.

the land, only habitually and in all points broken) under penalty of dismissal if they should not comply.

87. The history of one country may afford useful lessons to the authorities of another; and I heartily wish that the annals of the reign of Charles I. of England were read and studied in the Council Chamber of Naples. We have there an instance of an ancient throne occupied by a monarch of rare personal endowments. He was devout, chaste, affectionate, humane, generous, refined, a patron of letters and of art, without the slightest tinge of cruelty, though his ideas were those of "pure monarchy"; frank and sincere, too, in his personal character, but unhappily believing that, under the pressure of State necessity such as he might judge it, his pledges to his people need not be kept. That king, upon whose refined figure and lineaments, more happily immortalised for us by Vandyke than those of any other of our sovereigns, to this day few Englishmen can look without emotion, saw his cause ruined, in despite of a loyalty and enthusiasm sustaining him, such as now is a pure vision of the past. It was not ruined by the strength of the anti-monarchical or puritanical factions, nor even by his predilections for absolutism; but by that one sad and miserable feature of insincerity, which prevented the general rally of his well-disposed and sober-minded subjects round him, till the time had passed, the commonwealth had been launched down the slide of revolution, and those violent and reckless fanatics had gained the upper hand, who left the foul stain of his blood on the good name of England.

88. And why should I not advert to another lesson, which the last few weeks have ripened to our hand? King Ernest of Hanover is gathered to his fathers. When he went from England in 1837 to assume his German crown,

he was the butt and byword of liberalism in all its grades; and among the professors of the Conservative opinions, which he maintained in their sharpest forms, few, indeed, were those hardy enough to own that prince as politically their kin; while Hanover, misled as it afterwards appeared by the freedoms of English criticism, received him with more dread than affection. Fourteen years elapse. He passes unshaken through the tempest of a revolution, that rocks or shatters loftier thrones than his. He dies amidst the universal respect, and the general confidence and attachment, of his subjects. He leaves to his son a well-established Government and an honoured name; and, in England itself, the very organs of democratic feeling and opinion are seen strewing the flowers of their honest panegyric on his tomb. And why? The answer is brief but emphatic; because he said what he meant, and did what he said. Doubtless his political education had been better than men thought, and had left deeper traces upon him; but his unostentatious sincerity was his treasure; it was "the barrel of meal that wasted not, the cruse of oil that did not fail."

89. And now, in drawing towards a conclusion of this Examination, and with it of this controversy, let me acknowledge with sincerity and warmth the moderation of temper and courtesy of tone, as towards myself, that mark the Neapolitan Defence. The author of it has indeed characterised by strong terms the language which I myself had used. But he could not help it. Language of an extreme severity could not have been described intelligibly by feeble epithets. My apology is the old one—

"Be Kent unmannerly, when Lear is mad."

My description was intended to suit itself to the subject-matter. I did not seek to fall short of it; I did not feel able to go beyond it. The language of compliment and finesse, from me to the authors and agents of the proceedings I have touched upon, could have given them no comfort, and would have been on my part a piece of nauseous affectation. I have made no approach towards it, either in the former Letters, or in these pages. There is one way only in which I can, partially at least, reciprocate the courtesy. It is by pointing out that, except in two instances, where I knew the charge was fairly driven home upon individuals in high station at Naples, I have denounced (what I think) guilt in the mass, and have not attempted to father it on this man or that. My reason for this course has been that I do not know, and I believe no man can know fully, how the responsibility should be divided. When a Government is not bound to render any account of its own acts, its own servants claim and practise as against it, the immunity which it claims and practises as against the nation. Each class of functionaries, as we descend the scale, is apt to have a sphere of licence all its own, and dimly known, or totally unknown, to its more remote superiors. The corruption of each one is multiplied into the fresh corruption of those that follow, and hideous indeed is the compound by the time we get down to the most numerous class of public servants, those in immediate and general contact with the people. This class, in the Police, I observe that the Neapolitan advocate himself consigns to reprobation.

90. I believe that, in the Cabinet of Naples, there are men of strictly religious lives, men of known personal and public honour. It is some comfort to believe that they

are themselves the victims and the dupes of the system, of which they are also the instruments. Still more is it a duty and a satisfaction to presume similarly of the Sovereign. There are indeed acts which have been done by him and by his predecessors, in regard to the revocation of constitutional rights once granted under the most solemn sanctions, upon which I cannot enter. They point back to modes of training, and formation of the moral sense, so widely different from ours, that while they are most deeply repugnant to our feelings we can hardly be correct judges of the degree or kind of defect, demerit, or whatsoever it be, in the individual so trained. But as to the cruel sufferings that are lawlessly inflicted and endured beneath his sway, I think we should do great injustice to the Sovereign of Naples, were we not to believe that a thick veil intervenes between his eye, mental as well as bodily, and these sad scenes. I am confirmed in this belief in part by circumstances to which I have referred in my former letters; in part by finding, in various quarters, that persons sincere and fervent as the case demands in their sentiments about the facts, are persuaded that he has been the victim of deception, of the kind which is so deeply engrained in every system that is at once irresponsible, and administered by the hands of men necessarily fallible in judgment, limited in knowledge, and open to temptation. I, for one, should not think well of the modesty or the good sense of any one, who imagines that he himself could become part of a system of that nature, and not partake in its abuses.

91. But these considerations must not divert us from the facts themselves. These I hold it a duty to denounce in plain language according to their real character, without any effeminate or affected squeamishness; the degenerate

and bastard germ of that mildness, which cannot be carried too far when we are dealing with persons, nor too soon got rid of when we are examining acts; acts, which have no flesh, blood, or nerves, but which are done upon human beings that have them.

92. But the supposed policy and purposes of England have been dragged into this discussion. And having been so dragged, they require a brief notice at my hands. Upon the one hand, even the official advocate appears to make himself responsible for the charges of an excessive rigour against the government of Sir Henry Ward in the Ionian Islands and of Lord Torrington in Ceylon; and he states that the treatment of many Irish political prisoners had been denounced as inhuman in the British House of Commons. On the other hand it has been intimated, though not in this pamphlet, that my letters are but a part of a covert scheme cherished by England for obtaining territorial acquisitions in the Mediterranean at the expense of the Two Sicilies.

93. As to the first of these imputations, I have already stated that mere rigour on the part of the Neapolitan Government* would not have induced me to break silence. As to the cases which are quoted by way of retaliation, the difference between England and Naples is not that mischiefs and abuses are never found here, and always there. We do not claim infallibility for our Government at home; much less for some forty or fifty Colonial Governors scattered over the world. The difference is this: that when a public officer in the British dominions is suspected of abusing authority, any person

* *Sup.* p. 5.

who sets himself to expose such misconduct may proceed in his task without hindrance and without fear; without being dogged by the police, without being treated as an enemy to the Throne and to public order, without being at a loss to find channels through which to bring the facts before the community at large, or means of full, rigid, and impartial inquiry; without being told what no public officer high or low would dare, even if he were unhappily so inclined, to say—that things like these, even if true, ought not to be made known. On the contrary, he who tracks the misconduct of public men into its hiding places, and holds it up to the general view, is looked upon in this country by the community at large, without the slightest distinction of party, Tory, Whig, or Radical, not as its disturber, but as its benefactor.

94. Now, although I am tempted to show by detailed remarks how inappropriate would be any attempt at comparison between the cases cited against England and my allegations against the Government of Naples, I feel that I ought not to encumber and prolong this controversy with matter belonging to a separate inquiry. I shall only therefore observe that I think the writer has mixed together cases of very different merits and bearings. One of them I shall not attempt to criticise, as proceedings may, it is said, take place upon it at an early date, while another must tell directly against him, since the nobleman to whom he imputes misconduct has actually been removed from office, and the third, as I believe, is wholly frivolous. Finally, accidental instances of rigour, especially at the remoter points of a diversified and extended empire, constitute a delinquency very different indeed from that which I have imputed to the Government of Naples, and a reference to them, however import-

ant in itself, must not be allowed to draw us off from the question under consideration. Whatever these cases be, there are in England the means of free exposure, full public consideration, and fair trial; will the Apologist afford us those means in Naples?

95. Again, as to the imputation of territorial aims in the Mediterranean, any man who has a knowledge of English feeling and opinion must be aware that they now really run in a diametrically opposite direction. The prevalent, and the increasingly prevalent, disposition of this country is against territorial aggrandisement.* We can take no credit for this disposition, which I hope to see widened, deepened, and confirmed from year to year; for we have smarted before, and are smarting bitterly at this moment, for having omitted to take more effectual securities against those tendencies to an extension of frontier, which are almost certain to operate if unchecked, where a civilised Power and an expansive race are brought into contact with an aboriginal population. The policy of England does not allow her to derive one farthing from her colonial dependencies. Many of them, those in the Mediterranean particularly, maintained for objects not properly colonial, put her to heavy charge; and nothing is so unlikely as that she should be seized with a passion for adding to their number. That course and tendency of opinion to which I have referred is indeed founded upon motives much higher than those of mere parsimony or thrift, and is allied to influences which among us are of very deep and powerful operation. We begin to learn

* [This salutary disposition was, in no small degree, perhaps, due to the steady policy and action of all the various Administrations between the peace of 1815, and the date of this Tract.—W. E. G., 1878.]

and feel, that mere territorial possession is not the secret of wealth and power; that colonisation, which at no time has been more in favour among us, has other and nobler aims; that the desire to build national greatness on enlarged range of dominion has been a fertile source of war, dissension, bloodshed, and of consequent weakness and poverty to nations.

96. We have entered upon a new career; that of free and unrestricted exchange, so far as lies in our power to promote it, with all the nations of the world. For the ancient strife of territorial acquisition we are labouring, I trust and believe, to substitute another, a peaceful and a fraternal strife among nations, the honest and the noble race of industry and art. For the contention which desolated the face of the world, in which whatever one party gained the other must needs lose, and which commonly was attended for both alike with mischiefs during the struggle that exceeded the whole value of the prize, England now hopes and labours to substitute another rivalry, in which the gains of one are not the losses of another, in which every competitor may be a conqueror, in which every success achieved in one country implies and requires more or less of corresponding triumphs in another, and which, in lieu of desolating the surface of the earth, makes it smile with the wealth and glory of nature and of art, and teem with every gift that a bountiful Creator has ordained for the comfort or the use of man. Such, if I know anything of them, are the views and machinations, such the labours and the hopes of England. I trust we shall never be drawn aside from them by any eloquence, however seductive, by any scheme, however plausible, that would send us forth into the world as armed evangelists of freedom: and this from

the deep conviction, that no heavier blow than our compliance with such projects could be inflicted on that sacred cause. And if it be true that, at periods now long past, England has had her full share of influence in stimulating by her example the martial struggles of the world, may she likewise be forward, now and hereafter, to show that she has profited by the heavy lessons of experience, and to be—if, indeed, in the designs of Providence, she is elected to that office—the standard-bearer of the nations upon the fruitful paths of peace, industry, and commerce.

97. To sum up all. The execrable practices carried on by members and agents of the Neapolitan Government, if they were before unknown to its heads, are now at least brought to their knowledge, and they themselves must have some idea with what feelings the statement of them has been received in Europe.

98. The case has come to this point: that either the Neapolitan Government should separate from these hideous iniquities, or else the question would arise, Is it just or wise to give countenance and warrant to the doctrine of those who teach that kings and their governments are the natural enemies of man, the tyrants over his body, and the contaminators of his soul? And if we thought not, then every state in Europe, every public man, no matter what his party or his colour, every member of the great family of Christendom whose heart beats for its welfare, should, by declaring his sentiments on every fitting occasion, separate himself from such a government, and decline to recognise the smallest moral partnership or kin with it, until the huge mountain of crime, which it has reared, shall have been levelled with the dust.

99. If the change can be wrought by the influence of

opinion, it is well. But wrought it must and will be, and the sooner the more easily. As time flows on, and new sores form upon a suffering community, necessity will but grow more urgent, and opportunity more narrow; the pain of the process sharper, and its profit less secure.

100. And now I have done; have uttered, as I hope, my closing word. These pages have been written without any of those opportunities of personal communication with Neapolitans, which, twelve months ago, I might have enjoyed. They have been written in the hope that, by thus making through the press, rather than in another mode, that rejoinder to the Neapolitan reply which was doubtless due from me, I might still, as far as depended on me, keep the question on its true ground, as one not of politics but of morality, and not of England but of Christendom and of mankind. Again I express the hope that this may be my closing word. I express the hope that it may not become a hard necessity to keep this controversy alive, until it reaches its one only possible issue, which no power of man can permanently intercept. I express the hope, that while there is time, while there is quiet, while dignity may yet be saved in showing mercy, and in the blessed work of restoring Justice to her seat, the Government of Naples may set its hand in earnest to the work of real and searching, however quiet and unostentatious, reform; that it may not become unavoidable to reiterate these appeals from the hand of power to the one common heart of mankind; to produce those painful documents, those harrowing descriptions, which might be supplied in rank abundance, of which I have scarcely given the faintest idea or sketch, and which, if they were laid from time to time before the world, would bear down like a deluge every effort at apology or palliation, and

would cause all that has recently been made known to be forgotten and eclipsed in deeper horrors yet; lest the strength of offended and indignant humanity should rise up as a giant refreshed with wine, and, while sweeping away these abominations from the eye of Heaven, should sweep away along with them things pure and honest, ancient, venerable, salutary to mankind, crowned with the glories of the past, and still capable of bearing future fruit.

6 *Carlton Gardens, London,*
Jan. 29, 1852.

IV.

FARINI'S 'STATO ROMANO.'*

1852.

1. We are not aware that Mesmerism, in any of its successive developments, has as yet undertaken to foreshadow great political contingencies. It is a task so difficult, and so far transcending the ordinary range of human judgment, that the higher and the lower classes of minds seem almost to run equal chances when they approach it. The multitude of disturbing circumstances that cannot be foreseen, and their play, alike powerful and capricious, commonly derange the best calculations which the care and wit of man can devise; and a knack of lucky conjecture, an order of faculties resembling that which solves conundrums, often seems to be more successful in its hits than comprehensive mental grasp or the closest logical continuity.

Yet, although the forms which are to emerge out of a crisis are thus difficult to predict, such cases have often happened as satisfy the common understanding of the world, that the crisis itself must shortly come. One of

* [Reprinted from the *Edinburgh Review* for April 1852. Art. III. 1. 'Lo Stato Romano dall' Anno 1815 al 1850.' Per Luigi Carlo Farini. Vols. I. and II. Torino: 1850. Vol. III., 1851.—2. 'The Roman State from 1815 to 1850.' By Luigi Carlo Farini. Translated by the Right Hon. W. E. Gladstone, M.P. Vols. I. and II. London: 1851. And other works.—W. E. G., 1878.]

these, for all who have given their minds to it, is, unless we are much mistaken, the present case of the Roman or Papal States. As, when we see a ship about to be launched, with the downward slope before her, and the props or stays about her, we need no prophet to acquaint us that, so soon as these hindrances are knocked away, the mass must move, and that pretty briskly; in like manner the slide lies prepared, down which the temporal power of the Popes is rapidly, and perhaps precipitously, to descend, so soon as its artificial and purely mechanical supports shall be withdrawn. Nor is it less plain in this case than in the former, that the effect will follow upon its cause, when once the cause is permitted to operate with freedom. But the ship descends to ride proudly on the waters: that vessel of state, with which we are comparing it, will sink like lead into their unfathomable abyss.

2. A course of historical traditions in a conservative sense, derived from the period of the last war, has imbued us Britons with predispositions so favourable to the temporal power of the Popes, as to counterbalance, *pro tanto*, the strong Anti-papal sentiment of the country. The downfall of this power is linked in our recollections with the sanguinary propagandism of the great French Revolution: its restoration, with the triumphs of British arms and the return of general peace. Ugly tales, indeed, reached us, though piecemeal, during the reign of Gregory XVI. But in politics the English are a forgiving people: their wrath rises slowly, and, when risen, it is easily turned away by any indication of a desire to amend. In this point of view it is pleasant, in another it is almost ludicrous, to look back upon the reception which was generally given in this country to the reforming measures of Pius IX. Warning voices might, indeed, be heard:

the voices of those who perceived, in the measures of the Pontiff, by far too much of what the Greeks called τὸ φορτικόν; a resolution, or a tendency equivalent to a resolution, to have a maximum of credit for a minimum of performance, a maximum of show, with a minimum of substance: and at the same time either an utter ignorance, or a very culpable recklessness, as to the consequences likely to attend upon ostentatious and theatrical, not to say charlatan and mountebank, politics; as to the dangers of that unsettling process, which they generate in the common mind, and the reacting dangers of the refluent tide of angry disappointment.

3. To few, however, either here or elsewhere, was given the discerning eye; and Pius IX. was speedily invested, not only with every virtue, but with every talent, under heaven. The first two years of his reign present to us a continuous and brilliant political romance. The events of that time in the Roman States already seem wholly stripped of any matter-of-fact or historical character. Colour, form, and motion are all borrowed from the ideal. Ariosto or Boiardo could hardly match or paint them. There was before us a benignant visage, a majestic head, a throne looking towards both worlds, and claiming to be the link between them, the sweet yet sonorous music of a voice which blends in one the highest assumptions of religion and the plain palpable dictates of humanity and justice, the rapid succession of its utterances, each one seeming to rise higher than before, a nation dissolved in joy even to tears, grown men thrown back upon the wildness of childhood by the vehemence and height of their exultation. All this, too, was not inconveniently near, so that the curious eye should separate between the tinsel and the gold, the diamond and the paste, but at the exact-

est distance, not too much for interest, ample and abundant for illusion, and for that mellowing tone which conceals while it harmonises and enchants. Such was the picture, as we viewed it in our simplicity, of those halcyon days; like a myth brought down from fable into fact, or like the opening of some new Apocalypse; an anticipation, in this vale of tears, of the better and higher land, into which neither cruelty nor defilement, neither fraud nor force, can enter.

> "The earth and every common sight
> To me did seem
> Apparelled in celestial light,
> The glory and the freshness of a dream."*

We may turn over the pages of the world's history in vain to find a parallel to that extraordinary time; not, however, for glory; not for power developed; not for progress achieved and realised; but for the unhappy issuing of the best intentions into wholesale harlequinade; for brilliancy of mere glitter in the scene, and impenetrability of dense delusion in the spectators.

4. Such was the first act of the disastrous piece, which opened out, as it proceeded, into the Year of Revolutions for Europe, and for Rome into the foul murder of Rossi, the flight or truancy of the Pope, and the joint invasion and occupation of the country by France, Austria, Spain, and Naples. And we English have looked on with a kind of stupid and bewildered wonderment; conscious that something has gone very wrong, but not knowing exactly what; partly befooled by mendacious "correspondents"; partly unwilling to suspect French generals and statesmen of deliberate and continued falsehood, told in the face of

* Wordsworth's 'Ode on the Recollections of Childhood.'

the world and for the purposes of despotism; partly haunted by the traces of certain dreams that we had a little while ago, about a pope, the quintessence of wisdom as well as benevolence, who, with a wave of his sceptre, had called back the golden age; partly possessed with a dim notion, that only Roman Catholic Powers have an interest in the Roman State; partly hugging, with impenetrable contentment, our own exemption from the revolutionary scourge, and satisfied, on the whole, to let the world wag.

5. All these considerations we summarily thrust aside; so far, at least, as to open a way for our pressing upon the public mind a serious consideration of the case of the Roman States. England, which vibrates to every shock that society anywhere receives, must not exempt herself from the law of sympathy and brotherhood, only because the firm tone of her system enables her to endure the pulsation under which a poorer fibre would give way. The people of the Roman States are made of bone and sinew, and nerve, and flesh and blood, like other men: and it is an absurdity, not worth argumentative confutation, to hold, that the civil and social relations and political rights, which appertain to them as men, are to be handled only by the adherents of those who stand in a particular connection with the Head of their government as Roman Catholics. In France, indeed, we have been told, with very sufficient distinctness,* that the Roman subjects are elected to a perpetual martyrdom for the good of the Papal Church. All the honours of that mar-

* [The reference in the text was to a declaration of opinion by the distinguished and lamented Count Montalembert, who treated the Roman States as an exception to the rules prompted by the general liberality of his mind.—W. E. G., 1878.]

tyrdom they are to enjoy, together with their traditions, and the gains arising from the resort of travellers to the capital: but martyrs they are to be; politically dead, shut out from those principles of government which are the vital conditions of society, according to the modern idea. Other nations may claim liberty of conscience; but this would too rudely jostle the tender susceptibilities of a Supreme Pontiff. Other nations may vote their own taxes, but the Romans are to be purely passive in that matter. Other nations are to delimit for themselves the possessions and *status* of the clergy, but the process is to be precisely inverted for some three millions of people in central Italy, because a temporal power, conferred upon the Church by events, and harmonising with the state and exigencies of society when it was acquired, is now to be maintained in defiance of all those exigencies, under the palpably manufactured pretext, that it has grown into and become inseparable from the spiritual supremacy of the Pope.

6. The Pope is the great political beggar of the world. He would be deposed to-morrow by ninety-nine votes out of every hundred in a free assembly of his lay subjects. He depends from day to day upon the breath of foreign authorities, yet he is not content, forsooth, to hold his temporal power upon any titles, or subject to any condition, so precarious as that to which his protectors themselves submit, and which he himself recognises in their cases; the consent, namely, of the governed. Let us examine the composition of the diplomatic body at the court of Pius in 1848. There are the representatives of Portugal and Spain, accredited from Sovereigns themselves symbols of the popular principle, and substitutes for the rival claimants under the principle of absolute heredit-

ary right. There is the ambassador of the French Republic, erected upon the ruins of Kingship, but on the instant acknowledged by the Pope. It is true, indeed, that the royalty now prostrate in the dust was itself of revolutionary origin; but, from the very hour of its birth, that too had the recognition of the Court of Rome. There is the envoy of Sicily, which has broken the duress of Naples for a moment, although it is presently to be reduced; reduced, however, not by foreign but by domestic arms. There is the minister of Belgium, a country owing its political existence to its own exertions, which emancipated it from Holland. There is Castellani, the minister of Venice: of Venice assured to Austria by the Treaty of Vienna, under which the Papal throne itself subsists; of Venice, which exists in independence solely by the right, and amidst the convulsive struggles, of revolution; of Venice, pressed at the very moment by the Austrian arms, and consoled under that pressure by the following address, in autograph, from the Pontiff:—"God give His blessing to Venice, and DELIVER HER FROM THE CALAMITIES SHE APPREHENDS, in such manner as, in the infinite resources of His Providence, shall please Him for the purpose. 27 June, 1848. PIUS, PP. IX."

7. Very good: here is a Lamennais-Ventura Pope, the beau-ideal of theocratic revolution. He owns no allegiance to things as they are. He draws no lines of division between the processes of bit-by-bit, and root-and-branch. He consecrates, at every point of the compass, in the most varied and authentic forms, the principle, that every nation may settle for itself who shall be its governors, and may take down the old and setting up the new at its discretion; and that none shall on that account suffer any detriment in its religious rights and privileges,

or lose caste in its relations to the Head and centre of the Roman Church. Nay, even in the mood of reaction, what was the language of the Pontiff: "I cannot mingle in this war; you are all alike my children." That is to say, nations and communities of men are not to be called to account by spiritual, any more than by temporal, power, for the changes they may choose to make in their laws or in their rulers.

8. But now let the same principle, which had handled, remodelled, overthrown, the ancient Monarchies of Europe, not so much on account of gross outrage, or of ludicrous failure to attain the purposes of government, as on account of inadequacy to make a full reply to the demands of modern civilisation, proceed to try the same processes upon that hierocracy, which in theory is the scandal and the laughing stock of Europe, the grand *lusus naturæ* of the political creation, and which in practice is too rotten to bear the rummaging of effective reform. And how strange is now the metamorphosis of the Pontifical visage! Sauce for the gander is not, it seems, to be sauce for the goose. The sanctity of the ecclesiastical power infects all it touches: and the mundane, earthy, instruments of taxation, police, soldiery, courts, gaols, and the like which it employs, must not be subjected to the rude touch of human hands. When the Romans do that very thing which so many other nations have done with the Pope's sanction,—that is to say, get rid of their old government and choose a new one,—then we find we are in a new element altogether, and the very same exercise of discretion, which to others is allowed, for them is visited by excommunication, or exclusion from the kingdom of God. These things are worth looking into.

9. Now, let us at the outset disclaim all intention of

assailing that spiritual supremacy. The question before us is a question of social and political justice. It is, in our view, impossible to say whether the papal supremacy will, upon the whole, be more strengthened, or weakened, by the withdrawal of the temporal power. But let us, above and before all things, have fair play; and do not let us conceal religious or sectarian objects under the plea of that natural and general justice, which is anterior to and independent of them. Let us inquire frankly whether the Papal power upon these last-named grounds ought to stand or to fall. Any covert purpose, giving a colour to our ideas, and a bias to our arguments, apart from the true bearings of the question, would at once be detected, and would raise a counter influence of the same illegitimate kind, and quite as effective. England said Aye to the restoration of the Pope a generation back on the grounds of justice, without fear of being told that she Romanised by so doing; in like manner let her say No to his continuance in his sovereignty now, without fear of sinister imputations, if she is convinced that justice asks it; but only with, and on condition of, that conviction. And let it by no means be objected, that language like this ought not to be used with regard to a foreign Power. It ought not to be used of a foreign Power, but it may and ought to be used of a foreign puppet. He that consents to hold a throne in virtue of the military occupation of his country by foreign armies, without any rational expectation that such a state of things is to terminate and give place to one more natural, is not an independent sovereign at all. He has given over his sovereignty to anybody and everybody; and has conferred upon mankind at large a right to discuss the question of its continuance, with as little reserve as if every one of Adam's

children had to give a separate and authoritative vote upon it.

10. We are not of those who proceed upon the abstract objection to clerical government, strong as it undoubtedly is. We are of those who object to uprooting anything until after it has been well considered what is to succeed, and made reasonably certain that the contemplated change will be an improvement. We understand, and sympathise with, the feelings of persons who, without much positive admiration of the Papal Government, have, nevertheless, been so keenly alive to the great risks, both political and religious, which might follow upon its dissolution, that they have clung, beyond hope and against hope, to the desire that, in some way or other, some tolerable terms of composition between the Papal throne, with the sacerdotal apparatus about it on the one hand, and the civilisation of our time, with its political accompaniments on the other, might be devised. But the resistless teaching of experience has brought us to the conclusion that no such terms can be found. Monarchy has shown itself in many countries, and, we trust, will show itself in more, capable of such adaptation to the times, that it has, as it were, started with renovated youth upon the path of a new, yet honourable and useful existence. Such it is in England: such, as we trust, to name no more, in Belgium and Sardinia. But our belief is, first that the Papal Government has experimentally demonstrated its incapability of receiving these adaptations; and, secondly, that, on account of that incapability, it must very speedily cease and determine. After establishing these propositions, we shall proceed to press the importance of full discussion, or, in the popular phrase, ventilation of two questions, so momentous for Italy, for Europe, and for Christendom. What is and

what ought to follow, when that antique shadowy projection upon the scene of Time, that gift (so called) of Constantine,

". . . quella dote
Che da te preso il primo ricco padre,"*

together with all its real historical accretions, shall have come to be numbered simply with the things that were.

11. We ask then,—

1. Can the Temporal Government of the Popes accommodate itself to Constitutional forms?

2. If not, can it or ought it to endure?

3. If not, then in what manner should the political void be filled, and the See of Rome provided for, with a view to the interests of the Roman subjects, the disappointment of revolutionary speculations in Italy, or elsewhere, and the just claims of the See itself as the ecclesiastical centre of the largest among Christian Communions?

12. The first question, then, to be examined is this; Can the Papal Government accommodate itself to Constitutional forms? Or, to illustrate the question by a needful paraphrase, we ask, not only whether it might in the abstract bear this accommodation; not only whether it be demonstrable, or not, that no such thing can take place; but rather, and chiefly, is it within the circle, however liberally drawn, of reasonable probability,—is it within the moral conditions of the times and men, that any such adaptation should be brought about?

13. In searching for an answer to this question, we may proceed, either by the light of abstract argument, or by that of experience.

* 'Inferno,' xix. 116.

When we look at the abstract question, we are met at once by this insuperable difficulty. Rare in Pagan times, the collisions of the Church with the State have, ever since the promulgation of the Gospel, made up a large and essential part of the history of the world. This marked difference has followed naturally upon the enormous change, which Christianity brought about in the religious element of society. Before its promulgation, both civil and religious affairs were reducible simply to the standard of human will and choice; all things, therefore, in the last resort were Cæsar's; but now we have a new Canon, "Render unto Cæsar the things that be Cæsar's, and unto God the things that be God's." Of the breadth and range of this latter category we are not now to treat. Without doubt, it has been widened enormously, at different times, from the operation of motives more or less corrupt. But, suffice it to say, that it exists. Wherever there is Christianity, there is a system professing to influence vitally the opinions and actions of men, by motives, machinery, and sanctions, originally independent of the State; an *imperium in imperio* by birth.

14. The next question that arises is, whether collision can possibly be avoided between this spiritual authority and the civil power? Our kinsmen of the United States promise to solve this problem for us. Along with reaping-machines, yachts to sail with railway speed, Hobbs's locks, and Colt's revolvers, we are to owe to them a recipe for a system of perfect and equal religious freedom, free alike from connexion, and collision, with the State. But this echo from America is no answer for an old European country. Beyond the Atlantic it really appears, that things civil and things spiritual move in their separate spheres, without any need for an arbiter between them;

although, if one were required, there can be little doubt within which of the two he would be found. But it is not so in Scotland, or in England; much less is it so in any other European country. With European ideas, habits, and institutions, it is not too much to say, that the points of contact and of intersection in the respective orbits and of Churches and States are numerous and sharp, absolutely demand the presence of an umpire, or else the recognition of a power and competency in one of these to overrule, in case of conflict, the volitions of the other.

15. Now in every country of Europe, except one, this necessity is recognised and met in a particular manner. In every country of Europe, except one, when excusable collision arises between the civil and the religious power, it must be in the external forum. There alone it can arise, because there alone does the former claim, or can it enforce, dominion. So arising, it is settled in one way. The civil power, as the earthly judge and measure of its own responsibilities, overrules in the last resort; and the ecclesiastical power submits. The universal sense of Christendom seems to recognise this, and this only, as the proper method of solution in the formidable and disastrous cases where such conflicts of authority occur. No doubt this power, like every other however lawfully owned, may be abused; it may be pushed to injustice; it may be betrayed by cowardly or fraudulent surrender. Neither of these is the point: enough for the present argument, that it is a power owned by the State, and lawfully so owned.

16. We say the universal sense of Christendom. For not only do all countries outside the Roman border, whether absolute, constitutional, or republican in their form of government, bear direct witness to this principle,

but, indirectly, and in a strange and monstrous form, the States of the Church themselves bear similar testimony. Even there we do not see the intolerable anomaly of a State obeying in the civil sphere the dictates of the Church. The dilemma is effectually avoided in another way. There is no State at all. There are communes, municipalities, provinces, with their executive officers and their Board-legislation in matters of Lilliputian scale; there is a Senator of Rome to boot, the pale and thin spectre of an august idea; all these are the alphabet or *disjuncta membra* of a State. But State there is none; no living central authority, combining, summing up, animating, and governing the whole; no organ of the common life; no one legitimate depository of those ideas, traditions, and affections, which make a man feel that a large part of his own existence is inseparably welded with the life of what he calls his country. If our sober-minded fellow-countrymen lament the wildness with which the Italians, and the Roman Italians most of all, pursued, in 1848, the vision of national independence, yet let us reflect, in their excuse, that the space, filled in our minds with all manner of things glorious, is, of necessity, an aching void in theirs. For, unless we plunge into an intolerably distant past, where is the Roman of noble and ardent soul to find that food for his social nature, and his public affections, which is supplied to every one of us from boyhood, in large redundance, by the long and shining annals of our fatherland? Rome has had no State at all, no hierarchy of political offices, transmitted from man to man through schools of statesmen, and gathered up into a whole. All the functions of civil government were performed, we say not how abominably ill, but in isolation one from another; in the lower grades they were per-

formed by laymen; as the scale rose from these to higher duties, everything passed into the hands of ecclesiastics, of prelates, of monsignori, of cardinals, and terminated in the Consistory and the Pope; so that all the higher functions of the State life became simply an incidental and secondary part of the organisation of the Latin Church.

17. It may be said, and we do not deny but maintain it, that this was for our day an absurdity. It was and is so; yet, as tried by the weights and measures of a practical man, even an absurdity is better than an impossibility. For at any rate it leaves the subject in the world of actual existences, and while there is life there is hope. Our fear, our painful conviction is, that the attempts which have been made to substitute constitutional government for despotism in the Roman States have been, and have been shown by experiment to be, attempts to remove indeed an absurdity, but to substitute for it an impossibility. For, under a constitutional system, the State, which has heretofore been nothing in the world except an accidental and subordinate department of the working of a great ecclesiastical organisation, leaps into real, palpable existence, and must and will have all those vital functions, which belong to an organ of civil government. It must take into its own hands the protection of person and property against violence, the adjustment of all civil rights as between individuals and classes, the determination of the conditions on which property may be held, the division of civil powers between all the constitutional bodies of the State, the absolute and exclusive control of the levying of taxes and the expenditure of the public money, the maintenance of public order, the right of making war and making peace, the grand debate of liberty of conscience; and yet one thing more, the most vital of them all, the

sole prerogative of determining the limits of its own province of action.

18. In England we do not speak of this or that power as belonging to the Legislature, but we tell out boldly the principle of our Constitution, under the name of the omnipotence of Parliament, or more properly of the Legislature. A phrase which, among us, is for practical purposes well understood, and, being so understood, is invaluable. No specification of legislative powers could exhaust the list. Besides, it is the very essence of good government that it provides a definite issue for all questions which may arise. The difficulty of human fallibility must still encumber it; but the question of jurisdiction it universally and absolutely solves. To admit, however, of the safe profession and safe use of such a doctrine as this, is the felicity of inherited as opposed to manufactured liberties. We do not assert it for a State in the Roman provinces, which, as we see, is a thing yet to be created. What we do contend is, that no State endowed with less than the powers we have enumerated above, no State which does not possess them, either absolutely or subject only to known, limited, and secondary exceptions, answers fully to its name; and that no State is a constitutional State which does not, whether directly or mediately, give an effective control over all of them to the governed.

19. Now, how could this be in Rome? In the first place, the head of the State is a Pluralist. He has another function, infinitely grander and more important than his fourth-rate sovereignty. He is in incessant contact with a train of higher interests. There is nothing to secure, nothing even to render likely, an uniformity of movement between that train of religious and ecclesiastical

interests, and the series of particular and local concerns, appertaining to the inhabitants of the Roman State. They must, therefore, often or sometimes clash. When they do, the Pope must, as in duty bound, follow the more powerful attraction. If he did not, Gallicanism would soon come afresh into fashion, and means would be found of getting rid of him. This will do after a sort, while there is no State at all. But a real State must, as such, be supreme in its own sphere; whereas a Roman State must at all times be prepared, and at many times required, to see what it deems its own interests postponed to those of something and somebody else.

20. It does not mend the matter to say, Yes, but the interests postponed are civil, while the interests preferred are spiritual. The Roman will justly ask, Where is it written, or when was it believed or avowed, that it is agreeable to God that the civil interests of one people shall be permanently marred, on the plea of promoting the spiritual interests of another? And the sure upshot of such a doctrine will be this; not that he will sacrifice what touches himself, his parents, his children, his wife, his friends, his country, to such a chimera; but that he will say, the beneficent purposes of God the common Father, in endowing us with social instincts and capacities, are themselves a law written in the heart of man, anterior to the donation of Matilda or the descent of Charlemagne from the Alps, and, to say the least, quite as clearly referable to a celestial origin. His conclusion from the premises scarcely needs to be clothed in words of ours. It is as certain as the recurrence of the sunrise; and we think every devout Roman Catholic should consider well, while yet there is time, that if we tell the Roman subject, that the Papal religion requires his per-

manent exclusion from political freedom, he will purchase the freedom, and will pay the price for it.

21. But this personal incapacity of the Sovereign to discharge the essential duties of the head of a constitutional State, or indeed of a State at all, is but a narrow form of a much larger question. The old controversy of centuries stands before us; how are the ecclesiastical and civil powers to agree? that is, in the only sense in which they have agreed heretofore: how are they to arrange for the settlement of their differences? And now there is no doubt that we are dealing with real, not speculative difficulties. For, first of all, here is a caste, which has been in possession for eight hundred or a thousand years; and has during that time pretty well feathered its nest in laws, in privileges and exemptions, in possessions, and in usages. Numerically strong, for they are some scores of thousands, they are morally stronger from their political advantages, from the public veneration for their function and faith in its efficacy, from the good deeds and pious offices of many among them, especially the parochial clergy, and from close association of interest and community of feeling with the same class, which may be counted almost by millions, throughout the wide extent of the Roman Catholic communion. Consider the huge properties possessed by this class in the Roman States. Consider the legal immunities, the privileged inequality of social *status*, which they enjoy. Consider that in the Roman States, alone of all the Italian mainland, the huge broom of the French Revolution, and its career of conquest, failed to sweep away for good the previously existing system of jurisprudence: that the Canon Law bodily, and in its widest amplitude of sense, is the supreme law of the country. The Government must be in whole or in

part ecclesiastical; and ecclesiastical persons must not be responsible to lay tribunals. Liberty of conscience, the sure attendant upon free institutions in their second stage if not in their first, cannot stand with the Papal Crown. The doctrine that the Church has no temporal power, has just been denounced from Rome; and this when taught, not in Rome itself, but at Turin.

22. How, in the name of common sense, is a Constitutional system to work under these conditions? Are the Roman Deputies to be restrained, for example, from passing any Bill that will affect Church property under any circumstances? Well, but if they do pass it, they will incur the penalty of excommunication; which it will be the duty of the Pope himself to fulminate against them. Are their secular hands to remodel the Canon Law? or, are they only to pass such measures as may be consistent with it; that is, are they to be nothing more than an overgrown municipal corporation for enacting bye-laws, to run through the whole Roman State, where no higher authority prevents them? Nay, it will be replied, but the Pope is supreme even over the Canon Law, and when he gives his sanction to a Bill, its authority will become absolute and supreme. The Pope! he is the great Canon Law manufacturer. Off his own bat, or with the aid only of the Cardinals, who are appointed by the Papal chair, he is continually adding to the *corpus* of this Canon Law. His Parliament then is to send Bills up to him, which he is to throw back again, as Munchausen, when he was fired upon, caught the balls and flung them back like pellets; he is to say, "Gentlemen, I am very sorry for it, but this is against the Canon Law." "Nay, *Santità*, but we think not; surely the matter is one of property, one of police, one of finance, one of civil right," as the case may be.

"That, gentlemen, is your opinion, but not mine; so you will please go about your business."

"Solventur risu tabulæ; tu missus abibis."

23. Here we impinge upon a dilemma hard as adamant. If a Roman Parliament be content to acknowledge that it has no authority to touch a system of law, whose meshes cover almost every concern of every class in the country, and that an ecclesiastical person is finally to judge on each occasion whether the conflict of jurisdiction has arisen, it would itself be no better than a machinery for maintaining and propagating systematic imposture. But if, on the other hand, it were animated with the spirit of liberty, and determined upon exercising all the essential functions ascribed to the civil power by the law and practice of Christendom, then no Constitution could stand for twelve months the shocks and convulsions to which such a distribution of power would give rise. A war of elements, fiercer than ever shook the firm-walled cave of Æolus, would rend to tatters every leaf of such a Constitution, almost before its ink was dry.

24. Even were the proposition admitted by the Roman Church, that she ought not to meddle in secular affairs, and that they ought to be left to the exclusive discretion of the civil power, we well know, even without going further than the history of the last ten years in Scotland, what great difficulties are to be encountered in settling the mere question of fact, and applying an uncontested principle to circumstances read by different parties each in their own sense. But the Roman Church makes no such admission. She never has withdrawn or qualified the most extreme of her former declarations on the subject of her general authority so to interfere. And, as to

the Roman States, she has reasserted it in the most frightful form, only three years ago, by launching an excommunication at her temporal subjects for their strictly temporal act of electing a Constituent Assembly.

We cannot, therefore, look for the introduction of a *bonâ fide* Constitutional system into the Roman States; because of those impediments to its free action, inherent in the nature of the Papal power, which appear, in the abstract at least, to be insurmountable.

25. Can we, however, as often happens in human affairs, fly for consolation from stubborn philosophy to accommodating practice? Does the actual history of the Roman States encourage us to hope that these impediments, if not surmounted, may be circumvented, and that the good sense of ministers and Sovereigns, the moderation of the people, with the friendly urgency of Foreign Powers, and a stiff pressure in the shape of political and financial difficulties attendant on the working of the present system, may amalgamate all in some middle term which, however remote from the ideal, may serve the purposes of every-day wear and tear?

26. Unfortunately, in passing from the sphere of argument to that of history, we do but go from bad to worse. Thirty-six years have now revolved since the restoration of Pius VII. We have had within (though not throughout) that time, good sense in the ministers and the Sovereign, and moderation in the people, and the friendly urgency of Foreign Powers, and all the pressure imaginable from financial and political embarrassment; but no real Constitutional system, and no real approach whatever to the solution of the difficulties attending the operation of one.

27. In the matter of good sense, we shall have to wait

long before we see a Pope and a Minister jointly possessed of so considerable a stock of *it* as Pius VII. and Consalvi. Yet that reign witnessed the adoption of a measure far more adverse to constitutional liberty than any simple enunciation of the doctrines of despotism would have been; the re-establishment of the order of Jesuits: not only on account of what that order is in itself, but of what it indicates, symbolises, and sums up: the covetous, domineering, implacable policy represented in the term Ultramontanism, the winding up higher and higher, tighter and tighter, of the hierarchical spirit, in total disregard of those elements by which it ought to be checked and balanced, and an unceasing, covert, smouldering war against human freedom, even in the most modest and retiring forms of private life and of the individual conscience.

28. As to the moderation of the Roman people, we must say there has, on the whole, been little ground for complaint. Upon this subject, let any dispassionate man read the manifesto of the Rimini insurrection in 1845, which will be found in the ninth chapter of the first book of Farini's History. Bearing in mind the fulness of its statement of grievances, and the severity of their character, we cannot find words strong enough to praise the temperance of disposition, which was evinced in framing the list of their demands. Even the people of Rome itself, we must say, considering the inordinate doses of political alcohol which Pius IX. himself incessantly administered to them from July 1846 to May 1848, are not, upon the whole, to be censured in respect of moderation. Castellani, the republican Envoy of Venice, so late as the middle of December 1848, when the convocation of a Constituent Assembly had been proclaimed, wrote to

his Government, that there was no popular enthusiasm for such an object, no hatred to the Pontiff.* If the Romans acquiesced in the proclamation of a Republic, they did so at a time when their Sovereign was notoriously intriguing with the Powers most adverse to their liberties; when he obstinately discouraged, or of set purpose evaded, all attempts, and all measures, necessary to bring about his restoration on the Constitutional basis; and when he had solemnly excommunicated every man who had in any manner whatever† "*molested*, infringed, or usurped" his temporal authority. But the population of the Roman States are not represented by Rome. Bologna, and the northern Provinces, think for themselves. More remote from the immediate influence of Papal and clerical sway, they are more intelligent, more wealthy, less impulsive, more moderate. Separated by distance, and by mountains, from the capital, they are more widely separated still in social and political respects; they think for themselves; and they appear to be as fit for free institutions, as the people of any portion even of Northern Italy.

29. Neither has there been wanting the friendly urgency of Foreign Powers. The celebrated Note of May 1831, which will rise up in judgment many long years hence, not only against the Papacy, but against most of those who signed it, recommended two fundamental changes: first, the giving the higher civil offices to laymen; secondly, the creation, by indirect election, of a body to vote the taxes, and control their expenditure. It was presented on behalf of the five great Powers of Europe: and it must be supposed that, at the time, they were acting

* Farini, B. iv. ch. viii.

† *Monitorio* of Jan. 1, 1849. Farini, B. iv. ch. vi.

with sincerity. But it obtained from the mulish Government of Gregory XVI. absolutely nothing worth having. England alone, to the great honour of her Foreign Minister and Government, on retiring from the Conferences in September 1832, protested, by the mouth of Sir George Seymour, against the non-fulfilment of the recommendations contained in the memorandum. The other Powers deplorably receded from their purpose and their pledge. And so the door closed, for ever as we fear, on any hope of relief for the Roman people in the shape of gradual reform, by the agency of the Papal Government, and under the countenance of the great Powers of Europe.

30. In most cases, however, it must be admitted that, as good diet is the immediate occasion of dyspepsia, so it is the stiff or rough and disagreeable working of the political machine which leads to the reform of abuses. Of this incentive, this kind of aid to virtue, the Papal Government has, in all conscience, had enough. Four rebellions marked the fifteen years of the reign of Gregory. Not one of them was put down by the Government. It was a matter of course, when the people rose, for the indigenous troops either to join them, or to look on. No reliance could be placed but upon Austrians and Swiss. It is sad to see the track of the Head of one half of Christendom marked glaringly in blood: it is yet more melancholy to look back upon the abominable cruelties, and shameless prostitution of the so-called judicial proceedings, by which the balance of account with the insurgents used subsequently to be settled. Meanwhile, there was another very legible little bit of handwriting on the wall: it was simply DEBT. Now debt is bad enough in England, where it has grown with growing industry, wealth, and

empire; but what is it in a State where it is the only thing in a state of progress?

31. Farini has given us details respecting the debt of Rome down to 1846. In 1801 it was 74,000,000 crowns: pretty well for a country which during some two centuries had played no part in European warfare. But the Gallic sponge was employed with great effect in 1811, and the Exchequer made a new start: so that the Papal Government, at its restoration, set out with an actual balance at its credit.*

For about eleven years the finances were kept straight, and the stock of money in the coffers of the State would appear to have increased.† But from the accession of Gregory, debt began to be created at a fearful rate; and in 1846 it amounted to thirty-nine millions of crowns, or nearly eight and a half millions sterling. Now this was in a country with a net revenue of less than seven million crowns, or not 1,500,000*l.* To appreciate, therefore, the capacity of a clerical government for the management of finance, we should observe that in fifteen years they created national debt to the amount of nearly six years' income. The case would be parallel in this country, if, since 1837, we had added 300,000,000*l.* to our national debt. The annual charge of the debt considerably exceeded five per cent. on the capital. Now these facts are in themselves a *reductio ad absurdum* of the sacerdotal government. Much of the war and debt of Europe (as, for instance, where conquest has been sought with a view to commercial aggrandisement), have been nearly related to those sources of energy, which make it possible to bear the

* Farini, B. i. ch. xi. (Transl. vol. i. p. 144.)
† Farini, B. iii. ch. iii. (Transl. vol. ii. p. 54.)

dreadful incubus. But the case of the Roman Government is that of a sheer and pure spendthrift, who cannot, for the life of him, make both ends meet; and of whom it is mathematically certain, that though he is unable to correct himself, yet insolvency both can, and will, put an end to his career.

32. The space at our command renders it impossible to pass in review the events of the earlier or theatrical stage of the reign of Pius IX. This history has been written by Farini with great clearness and sagacity; with a perfect appreciation, and a masterly, though an over favourable, description of the character of that Pontiff; and at the same time, with a tenderness for him which belongs to the natural feelings of a gentleman, mindful of close relations with, and kindly treatment from, a benevolent personage of exalted and venerable station. We must give a part, at least, of the picture which he draws.

"Pius IX. had applied himself to political reform, not so much for the reason that his conscience as an honourable man and a most pious Sovereign enjoined it, as because his high view of the Papal office prompted him to employ the temporal power for the benefit of his spiritual authority. A meek man and a benevolent Prince, Pius IX. was, as a Pontiff, lofty even to sternness. With a soul not only devout, but mystical, he referred everything to God, and respected and venerated his own person as standing in God's place. He thought it his duty to guard with jealousy the temporal sovereignty of the Church, because he thought it essential to the safe keeping and the apostleship of the Faith. Aware of the numerous vices of that temporal Government, and hostile to all vice and all its agents, he had sought, on mounting the throne, to effect those reforms, which justice, public opinion, and the times required. He hoped to give lustre to the Papacy by their means, and so to extend and to consolidate the Faith. He hoped to acquire for the clergy that credit, which is a great part of the decorum of religion, and an efficient cause of reverence and devotion in the people. His first efforts were successful in such a degree that no Pontiff ever got

greater praise. By this he was greatly stimulated and encouraged; and perhaps he gave in to the seduction of applause and the temptations of popularity, more than is fitting for a man of decision, or for a prudent prince. But when, after a little, Europe was shaken by universal revolution, the work he had commenced was in his view marred; he then retired within himself, and took alarm. In his heart, the pontiff always came before the prince, the priest before the citizen: in the secret struggles of his mind, the pontifical and priestly conscience always outweighed the conscience of the prince and citizen. And, as his conscience was a very timid one, it followed that his inward conflicts were frequent, that hesitation was a matter of course, and that he often took resolutions even about temporal affairs more from religious intuition or impulse, than from his judgment as a man. Add that his health was weak and susceptible of nervous excitement, the dregs of his old complaint. From this he suffered most when his mind was most troubled and uneasy; another cause of wavering and changefulness." *

33. From this account will be drawn a just general idea of the spirit in which the Pope set about his business. He had the humanity of a man, or rather a certain feminine susceptibility: but this, and an ardent longing to see the Church float buoyantly upon the very crest of the wave, were in truth his whole stock-in-trade as a reformatory prince. It is only fair to him to say, that he got almost maniacal applause, and, indeed, perfect deification, even from such men as Gioberti. The shout was taken up, and echoed throughout the world, by that public opinion of the moment, which is so bad and delusive a barometer of the ripe and settled sentiment of the European mind. This applause put him past himself, helped or rather forced him to be a great impostor, and even led him to commit some of the grossest political *bêtises* on record. Such, for example, was the incredible Letter which he

* Farini, B. iii. ch. iii. (Transl. vol. ii. pp. 68–9.)

wrote to the Emperor of Austria * in the character (*sic*) of the "Prince of Peace," to recommend his surrendering his Italian dominions, at the very moment while the Papal troops under Durando and Ferrari were in the field against Nugent, and Corboli Bussi had been sent to the camp of Charles Albert to place them formally under his orders as Commander-in-Chief.

34. Summarily, however, and without details, we shall give some few reasons for asserting that the attempt to reconcile the papal monarchy with constitutional freedom, was a total, and even an ignominious, failure. It was such, because the two supreme wills united in the Pope's person made it impossible for him to be upon terms of real confidence with his ministers.* On the 29th of April 1848 he published the Allocution, which indicated the change in his politics, and was the true turning point of his career. By this Allocution he receded, upon hierarchical grounds, from the general policy on which he had unquestionably entered, as well as from the anti-Austrian policy which he had no less certainly, though to himself it seems, alone of all men alive, not evidently, embraced. How, we may ask with curiosity, did he get over this enormous difficulty with his ministers? He disposed of it just as, at the outset, we said that the Roman Government gets over the difficulties of the conflict of jurisdiction between Church and State; that is by abolishing, by ignoring the State altogether. Not one word of this measure did he mention to his ministers. They first saw in print, with the rest of the world, that which simply turned their position *topsy turvy*. Even Antonelli, though a Cardinal, yet, because he was then a minister, was kept in the same

* Farini, B. iii. ch. vii. (Transl. vol. ii. p. 136.)

state of ignorance. The death-struggle was indeed prolonged for a time, but this was the death-blow: the death-blow to a Constitution dated on the 14th of March, was dealt no more than six weeks later, namely, on the 29th of April.

35. Indeed this Allocution brought to issue, in the clearest manner, the principal difficulties we have been discussing. The Roman subjects thought it for the interest of their country to join with heart and hand in the war of national independence; and the Pope had given them no ground to anticipate that he would oppose their wishes. But Austria met him with the threat of a schism if he persevered; and with the promise or prospect, since realised, that she would surrender a large part of the ecclesiastical liberties, established by Joseph II., if he would draw back and throw himself into the cause of reaction. We will not say the bargain was struck; but the barter certainly was effected. To avert an ecclesiastical peril, and to gain an ecclesiastical advantage, the Pope conscientiously sold what his subjects thought the most vital of all their civil interests.

It is vain to ask whether the Roman people were right in the view they took. For in the first place, Pius had gone much too far already, in what he, almost facetiously, termed sending his troops to defend the confines, at a time when the army of Austria was in full retreat even from her own dominions. And, in the second place, the principle of constitutional government means that a people is to manage its own concerns, not that it will never make a mistake in the management.

36. Now the 14th of March 1848, be it observed, was the real date of the Roman Constitution. It sprang not into being until Naples, Tuscany, and Sardinia had

anticipated the gift, and stripped it of its grace. For nearly two years, indeed, Europe had been almost pestered with the news of the Pope's civil miracles; and he had contrived greatly to quicken, in all the countries of the Continent, the revolutionary pulse. But the history of that period is, as to solid constitutional privilege, summed up in the proverb, "much noise, little wool." By the amnesty, which was a wholesale liberation of all the persons condemned under judicial sentence during the last fifteen years for four separate rebellions, the Pope pronounced, however little he may have thought about it, the bitterest and most emphatic sentence of condemnation upon record against the whole political system of his predecessors. When he did this, he ought to have seen that he broke his bridge and burned his ships; that he had cut off his retreat, and could no longer be entitled to turn back and shelter himself under the condemned traditions of the Papal Government. By the foundation of the National Guard, with a strange inversion of natural no less than of logical order, he placed the effective control of the State by means of force in the hands of the people, before he had recognised their rights through the institution of any Legislative Chamber, and even while the ministers were still a train of Cardinals and Monsignori. By Commissions upon every imaginable subject of inquiry, he had stirred up warrantable expectations, which common sense should have taught him he must in great part fail to gratify. So he lived systematically on credit; and he spent each day a treasure of popularity which he had not earned, but which was to be earned by some future and as yet wholly unshaped and unimagined performance. To say all in one word; the sum total of the political privileges and franchises conferred by this Pope Thaumaturgus

during the season of idolatry, was less than had been recommended in 1831 to Gregory XVI. as essential to the tranquillity of the Roman States, not only by the constitutional governments of England and France, but by the despotic rulers of Russia, Prussia, and Austria. Nay, this very circumstance he himself pleads for his own justification as towards Austria, in the Allocution of the 29th of April 1848.*

37. The Constitution, which came at last by compulsion, and which was so soon to die, could not, we may be too well assured, have lived and worked even in smoother times. Under its provisions the Parliament could pass no bill contrary to any part of the Canon Law,† no bill touching matters ecclesiastical; none touching matters mixed; in a country where the department of mixed matter has a width such as we can ill conceive. But besides these preliminary incapacities, every Bill was to pass from the Parliament, popular, responsible, and acting in public, to the Consistory of Cardinals. This opaque body was to stand between the Parliament and the Throne, as a third legislative Chamber, only with no popular element, no responsibility, no publicity, and a large portion of its members foreigners and non-residents. And this body, be it observed, was to deal as it pleased even with bills affecting no spiritual and no mixed matter, but such as were to touch exclusively temporal concerns.

38. The question when such a structure, as the Constitution granted by Pius IX. in March 1848, was to tumble, was one of hours, days, or weeks; one of years it could not be. Nor let us say this question might be tried over

* Trans. Farini, vol. ii. p. 107.
† Art. XXXVI. Transl. of Farini, vol. i. p. 378.

again. Such is not the law of the life of States. In politics, no experiment is ever tried over again. The shifting of circumstances always makes each problem virtually a new one. But especially these large, comprehensive, and vital questions, when once brought to issue, must abide the consequences. It was not in the power of man to erect anew the monarchy of Charles I. or of Louis XVI., and see whether, by avoiding this error and that, a different result for the process could be obtained. Nor can it be done for Pius IX. No wave on the great ocean of Time, when once it has floated past us, can be recalled. All we can do is to watch the new form and motion of the next, and launch upon it to try, in the manner our best judgment may suggest, our strength and skill.

39. It was not, however, in Rome, as it has often been in countries under the process of revolution, that, when once the movement has got the upper hand, the violent party swallows up all the more moderate sections, and things rush furiously to extremes. Nothing to us is more remarkable in Italian politics, than the broad distinction and sharp dissensions between Constitutionalist and Republican, even in this the day of their common prostration and distress, much more, then, when they were at the summit of Fortune's rapid wheel. When the Pope had left Rome, without having made an effort to perform his duty or vindicate his dignity as head of the government after Rossi's abominable murder, the Constitutionalists stubbornly adhered to their own ideal of a limited monarchy, and never abandoned it until the French forces had set foot on their shores, and the main issue had passed wholly beyond their reach. They are naturally, and not unreasonably, charged from the liberal point of view with

having divided the forces and weakened the vigour of the cause; but at any rate they deserved better treatment than they got at the Pontiff's hands. On what principle is it possible to justify or to view, without indignation, his refusal to receive the delegates sent to him by his own Legislative Chamber and the municipality of Rome to entreat him to resume the functions of his sovereignty? These bodies were guilty of no offence against him. The plea or reason of his quitting Rome was the insecurity of his person through mob rule in the city. But that, if discreditable to the Legislative Chambers, was far more so to the Executive, and to himself as its undoubted head. He made no effort for the maintenance of order, no effort to avenge the death of Rossi, a martyr to his cause: and his conduct raised the presumption that he was waiting for the occasion to break with his people, and disposed to create, rather than to avert, the crisis.

40. Why, during the months of intrigue that followed, did he either refuse or evade concurrence in every plan proposed by France (for her rulers did not all at once lose the sense of shame), by Piedmont, and by the Constitutional party in his own States, for his restoration on the basis of a limited monarchy? When the people of Florence effected with their own hands a restoration of that kind for Tuscany, why did not the Court of Gaeta, which by means of the Pope's excommunication had got hold of the timorous conscience of the Grand Duke, encourage him to close heartily with that restoration, and use the opportunity it afforded for promoting an accommodation of the same kind in Rome? It was certainly owing to that Court itself, that Pius IX. did not return to Rome with the free choice of his subjects. And why was it that he, or those who thought, examined, and

judged, who were eyes, ears, and hands for him, would have no return except upon the footing of a perfect despotism? Because they saw what we now argue, that the Pope's temporal power and civil liberty could not stand together; and because they felt that it had grown too late to pretend that they could. Their duty, indeed, would have been better discharged if in good faith they could have given to the constitutional system a fairer trial; the experiment should have been played out. Still, in blaming them, let us be careful what it is we blame. They are not to be censured because they did not resort to that game of duplicity, which seems to be the great *arcanum* of government itself in most of the Italian States. But they are to be tried and judged as men engaged in the deliberate and wilful oppression of three millions of their fellow-Christians for the glory, honour, and welfare of the Christian Church!

41. The temporal power, then, of the Pope cannot, as reasoning and history alike assure us, accommodate itself to the constitutional system of government, or accede, in good faith, to its main conditions.

The case standing so, can or ought that power to endure?

If it does remain, then, in the first place, it is plain that it condemns the inhabitants of the Roman States to a perpetual condition of political serfdom. This particular people is, it seems, elected to an everlasting as well as an involuntary martyrdom, for the behoof of the Roman Catholic world. The compensation is found, forsooth, in the wonderful glory which attaches to the subjects of the Pope as such, in their dignity as placed at the headquarters of Roman Catholic ceremonial, in the resort of strangers to Rome, and in the share of that interest

and veneration for the place, which may be supposed to be reflected on the people. The ingenuity of certain French orators has not shrunk from grappling with the paradox, and erecting it into a principle, a philosophy, an essential part, though not the whole, of a religion. An essential part: for we are now gravely told, that the temporal power of the Pope is indispensable to the safety and vitality of the Roman Catholic Church, inasmuch as without that temporal power, the Pope cannot be independent. Such is the case made for the perpetuation of this gross and oppressive, this corrupt and corrupting anomaly. Now many extravagant constructions have been given to the words of our Lord, "My kingdom is not of this world." But, after all, they must have some meaning or other. And we defy the wit of man to give them one which will consist with the position that a civil autocracy over three millions of men is indispensable for the security of the Christian religion; unless, indeed, they were to say that the Pope's government is a kingdom not of this world, because it is a very great deal too bad for this world.

42. Well, then, we are told it is no hardship to the Roman subjects to be debarred from the political liberties which they intensely and all but unanimously desire, which they are undoubtedly able (if only left to themselves) to obtain, and for which no other people is entitled to pronounce them unfit; and likewise to be liable, on civil and political grounds, to be visited with exclusion from the Sacraments and Church of Christ. All this because of the dignity, and so forth, which they get in return. Now, were this argument good, its application must be limited to Rome and to those happy individuals who keep post-horses on the roads leading to it. Five or

ten per cent. of the Pope's subjects may, in some sense or other, partake of this feast of the Barmecides: but what is that to Bologna, to Ferrara, to Ancona, in fact, to the other ninety or ninety-five per cent. of the people of the Ecclesiastical States? In what imaginable way do they profit by the splendour of the Roman see? All they know of it is, that it subjects them to the dominion of nearly the most corrupt, and altogether the weakest and least respectable, government in Christendom.

43. But it is needless to dwell at any length upon this ludicrous doctrine of compensation. The sacrifice of things seen for things unseen is, indeed, not only reasonable, but the highest reason. Still it must be both an individual, and a voluntary, sacrifice. It cannot be done wholesale. It cannot be imposed upon the agent by a third party, without the instant evaporation of all its savour. It then becomes an act of oppression, only differing from other acts of oppression in this, that it begets in the mind of the sufferer a certain and powerful revulsion, not against the doer of the wrong only, but against religion, which has been its cloak and plea.

44. That, however, which renders the continuance of the Papal throne for ever so short a time possible, that to which its existence at this moment is owing, is not this silly doctrine of compensation, but an opinion, widely spread through Europe, that the temporal power of the Pope is necessary to his independence as the head of the Roman Church. This is not only an opinion of Roman Catholics; it is also the opinion of some politicians not Roman Catholic. But it is a sentiment which has wholly outlived the state of facts, to which it properly belonged.

45. It may, in some sense, be admitted that for many

generations the temporal power of the Pope did contribute to his spiritual independence, more than it derogated therefrom. Perhaps the broader and truer form of the statement would be this: whatever the evils and scandals of his temporal power, his ecclesiastical headship, such as events had moulded it, could hardly have been maintained without this stout material buttress. The Eastern Patriarchs have, indeed, held their position. But it has been one of comparative inaction within spheres far narrower, and in contact with moral elements far more quiescent. It may even be, that the indirect influence of such a fact, as the existence of the Popedom in its mediæval and regal form, may have operated in their aid, as the great tree shelters and supports the smaller ones in its neighbourhood.

46. But then the regality of the Popes in the middle ages was not the sickly and consumptive plant, which so many nurses are now laboriously tending under glass. It was rude, hardy, manful, like the rest of the European monarchies; it came down into the arena, and claimed its fair share in the rough game of politics. Impotence and anarchy may indeed have been its characteristics as an instrument of civil government, when its internal condition was examined; but in the days of its Gregorys and Innocents, its Alexander VI. and its Julius II., it stood as a reality in the face of Europe. It was no political pauper, dependent upon alms. It went freely into the scuffle, and took its chance, sometimes undermost, as when a Gregory died in exile, or a Clement heard the clank of the gaoler's keys; but sometimes uppermost too. The Pope of those times was a real and and a powerful integer among the various factors of the great European commonwealth. But he has now formally taken his place (we

speak of him in the capacity of a temporal ruler), as the great Incurable of the world. And as there is no poor-law, under which nations can be rated in proportion to their means, for the sustentation of the impotent, the Papal monarchy is the great mendicant, as well as the great incurable, of Christendom. And only by the alchemy, if such there be, which can convert positives into negatives, and make contradictions equivalent to each other, can it be shown that this fixed doom of beggary contributes to the Pope's independence. In fact the condition of a monarch who cannot sustain his own monarchy, is just the one condition on God's earth which must of necessity be one both of dependence, and, what is far worse, of miserable and shameful dependence. The recluse is independent, from his poverty; the pauper, from the provision the law has made for him; but a monarchy sustained by foreign armies, smitten with the curse of social barrenness, unable to strike root downward, or bear fruit upward, the sun, the air, the rain soliciting in vain its sapless and rotten boughs,—such a monarchy, even were it not a monarchy of priests, and tenfold more because it is one, stands out a foul blot upon the face of creation, an offence to Christendom and to mankind.

47. We were told by the Pope, when the Roman Republic fell, that he was restored to his throne by a "glorious triumph of Catholic arms." He, who so estimates glory, must have lost the power of estimating anything at all. Four Powers, France, Austria, Spain, and Naples, ruling jointly near a hundred millions of people, or about one-ninth of the whole human race, combined to reduce to subjection by their united efforts a country inhabited by three millions of men, and totally unused to war: only however by the aid of gross and systematic

falsehood in the principal agents. To this great iniquity England, we thank God, was not an assenting party. Something tells us that, should an attempt be made at its repetition, she will make a further advance in the line of dissent. Some newspapers have not long ago reported that Spain has proposed a league of Roman Catholic Powers for permanently preventing, by force, the Roman people from altering their Government. But such things ought not to be believed, until they are known. For the present we treat the rumour as the casual offspring of malignity or folly. But though the restoration has been effected, though the horse has been brought to the water, he cannot be induced to drink. The prisons are bursting with the multitude of their inmates. Overwhelming foreign garrisons secure the terrible supremacy of what is in Italy called "order." But the annual expenditure cannot be covered. A military force cannot be raised. And, as the arm of the country cannot be hired, so neither can its mind and spirit be overcome. In the Roman States, outside the limits of the clerical host, all who think, and all who feel, are opposed to the Papal rule. The Constitutionalists who stood out for it to the last, nay even Mamiani, who took a seat in the Constituent Assembly to defend it, and retired when it was renounced, himself in a recent publication has abandoned it.

48. The able writer of the paper headed 'All' Europa,' * would fain plead for the retention of the naked sovereignty in the person of the Pope, but with a complete separation of the powers, and a total extinction of the clerical empire in all other points. According to him, the Pope should

* Printed privately and without a name in 1851.

govern the State constitutionally, while, as is plain, he governs the Church absolutely. Now if this plan could be made to work, it would have an immense political advantage; it would dispense with the necessity of devising wholly new political arrangements for the Roman States. We greatly doubt, however, not only whether any such project could have been durable heretofore, but whether, at the pass to which matters have now come with the Papal monarchy, it could even be attempted. That monarchy is morally and socially weaker now, than at any former period; and its weakness grows from day to day. Its supports are wholly artificial and mechanical; wholly of material force, and that, too, external material force. It is the mere corpse of what was once a government, set up and kept up, by the hands of foreign invaders, on a detested and crumbling throne. Such occupancy may last for an uncertain, but cannot last for a very long time. Yet let us not suppose that, while it lasts, it is simply neutral. Exhibiting religion to the people in conjunction with all that is most odious to them, and plainly apprising them that this load of injury and insult is cast upon them for the sake of religious interests, it is eating away their faith, and more and more isolating Christianity from those temporal and human interests of all classes of society, with which, in the merciful purposes of its Founder and Head, it was designed effectually to blend.

49. And let it not be supposed, that because the Papal Government survived for more than thirty years one restoration, it will, therefore, have as long a lease after another. The difference between the two cases is broad and marked. During the period of the dethronement and exile of Pius VII., the Papal monarchy still retained

the affection, at least of the people of Rome. Here is the account given by Cardinal Pacca, of the excommunication of Napoleon :—

"On the 10th of June 1809, Napoleon published in Rome his decree for the deposition of the Pope. This the Pontiff met by a bull of excommunication. His agents posted this bull against the walls in broad daylight, at all the usual and most public places. At the three Basilicas of St. Peter, St. John Lateran, and Sta. Maria Maggiore, it was done when vespers were going forward and the congregations gathering. Though these emissaries were seen by very many people, not one was discovered or arrested, either on the same day or afterwards; notwithstanding that the so-called *Consulta straordinaria* was aroused to a pitch of frenzy, and made the most searching and inquisitorial inquiries. When the news came to be generally promulgated in Rome, it occasioned, I will not content myself to say, universal satisfaction, but a perfect state of enthusiasm. . . .

"Neither did the people restrict themselves merely to the applauding the act of fulmination of the bull, but from that moment the entire population adopted the unanimous resolution to comply most scrupulously with its provisions; and accordingly, on the Monday commencing the first week after its publication, almost the entire mass of inhabitants of the great city manifested, by common consent as it were, their opinion; and every individual, high and low, who happened to be employed in the French service, either gave up at once his office and made up his mind to sacrifice his salary, rather than incur the censure of serving the new Government; or applied at the *Quirinale* for instructions, as to whether he ought or ought not to retain his employment. Even the porters at the custom-house, and the very sweepers of the streets, absented themselves from their posts on that Monday, and would do no work."*

50. The assertion will hardly be questioned, that this is not so now. Even in 1849, the proofs of the alienation of the population of the Roman States from the clerical

* Pacca's Memoirs (Translation), vol. i. pp. 145–147.

government were overwhelming; although, upon the other hand, the great bulk of them only accepted the republic from what they thought necessity. Of those proofs we will mention only a few. The municipal bodies were elected by the citizens of all orders, without the democratic excitement that attended upon a movement directed from the Capital, and were generally composed of men of the moderate party. But they all declared themselves in strong terms on two points, namely, against the clerical government, and against foreign intervention. Again, when with four foreign armies in the country, no effectual demonstration could be got up by the people in their favour, it is idle to go further into evidence upon the question, whether the mass of the population were even at that time favourable to the Papal cause. The most important movement in that sense, which clerical and Neapolitan agency combined could produce, was at Ascoli, near the Neapolitan frontier. But even this was finally put down by the inhabitants themselves.* Lastly, on the 16th of May 1849, the whole of the troops in Rome moved upon Velletri. Then did the guns on the ramparts want even a sentinel. Then was the French army close under the walls. And yet there was no rising among the people.†

51. To the foregoing historical extract from Cardinal Pacca, we will add one, in which he states his view of the possible abolition of the temporal sovereignty now attaching to St. Peter's Chair. He speaks to us with authority. He had considered the question calmly, during the years of exile and even of imprisonment, and under the lights of experience. No favourable experience

* Torre, p. 183. † Mazzini, p. 14.

certainly: yet, notwithstanding, he anticipates the coming of a great monarchy, which might "render it possible that the Pope might, even *though he were himself a subject*, rule over and govern, without any serious detriment, the entire flock of the faithful."

He continues thus:—

"I was further confirmed in the above supposition, by imagining it possible, that even from the melancholy event of the cessation of the sovereignty of the Pope, the Lord might produce other and not slight advantages for his Church, and that the loss of the temporal dominion, and the greater part of the ecclesiastical property, would ultimately prove to be the means of removing, or at any rate of weakening, the degree of jealousy and bad feeling that universally exist against the Court of Rome and her clergy.

"I considered that the Pope, relieved of the weighty charge of temporal principality, that certainly obliges him to sacrifice too large a portion of his precious time to secular affairs, would be enabled to direct his entire thoughts and attention to the spiritual government of the Church; which, though thereby deprived of lustre, pomp, dignity, and the attraction of her temporal benefits, on the other hand, would have the advantage of numbering those exclusively, who are zealous in the sacred cause, among her ministers; those, who so long as they '*desire the office of a bishop, desire a good work.*' (1 Tim. iii. 1.) The Pope, also, would in future have less regard, in the choice of his ministers and councillors, to the splendour of birth, the solicitation of influential persons, and the recommendation of sovereigns, of whose Roman promotions it may frequently be observed: 'Thou hast multiplied the nation, and not increased the joy: they joy before thee according to the joy in harvest, and as men rejoice when they divide the spoil.' (Isaiah ix. 3.)

"Finally, in our councils on ecclesiastical affairs, the fear of losing the temporal benefits of preferment would cease to be regarded as a motive, which, so long as it has a place in the scale, is liable to turn the balance, and influence the rejection or the adoption of a resolution by pusillanimous condescension."*

* Vol. i. Introd. Letter.

52. Now if it were possible that this might happen under one great Monarchy, reigning over Europe without check or rival, surely the difficulty and danger to the Church must be far less when the peace of Europe at large, and when, especially, the independence of all its minor principalities, is maintained by the common interest of all the great Powers in watching and repressing every tendency to encroachment, most of all, if exhibited on the part of any one among themselves.

53. We do not undervalue the importance of what is called the independence of the chief of the Roman Church. His subserviency to any one or more Powers in particular, and as contra-distinguished from others, is a great evil; and we heartily desire that every precaution should be taken against it. It is for this reason, among others, that we wish the day which is coming were come, and that he had ceased to be Monarch of the Roman States. With a self-subsisting monarchy, if that were possible, he might be independent, like Belgium, or Sardinia, or Portugal. With no monarchy at all, he might be independent, if his position were so wisely determined, that he should require nothing but that fair protection against encroachment or intrigue, which, as we have said, it is the common interest, and the joint practice, of the great Powers of Europe to confer. What makes him really dependent is, the monarchy on crutches, of which he is now the tenant, and which obliges him to be a petitioner for costly aid, such as is not and cannot be administered upon any legitimate principle of intelligible and equal application.

54. How is the independence of Sardinia secured, except by the reciprocal watchfulness and rivalry of interest between France and Austria in particular? How is the independence of Greece secured, against the possible

intrigues of any one of the three guaranteeing Powers, except by the natural and unfailing vigilance and the preventive measures which they would immediately produce from the other two? The case of Belgium as against France, the case of Denmark as against Prussia, the case of Turkey as against Russia, the case of Egypt as against Turkey, are all so many successive applications of one and the same argument.

55. Once place the Pope in a condition, in which he will not, for his own purposes, have to ask from particular Powers boons that will place him, as he now is placed, in an attitude of subserviency, and he will be independent enough, perhaps more than enough, through the action of the same motives upon powerful States, as are found sufficient for the protection of others. It matters not that in given circumstances France, say, or Austria, or even Russia, or England, might have strong reason to wish for a special influence over him. The stronger those reasons, the stronger will be the play of that natural and sufficient corrective, the jealous vigilance of other Powers. Nay, if the Pope now has, and indeed he has, some degree of spiritual independence, to what is it owing? Not to his monarchy, but simply to this, that the dependence in which his temporal power has placed him, is partially cured by the mutual rivalry of France and Austria, neither of whom will readily use their power over him by retiring, lest the vacant place should be occupied by the other. The Pope's real security, therefore, at this moment, though very partial and essentially short-lived, is in that play and counterplay of rivalry among States, of which, if wholly disencumbered of his political functions, he would enjoy the benefits far more fully, and far more securely.

Since then the Papal throne could only be maintained by dooming the country to permanent helotism and since the reason assigned for upholding it, besides being insufficient, has the further vice of being untrue, we conclude that such a throne must and ought to fall.

56. The only real argument for its maintenance is, the difficulty of finding anything with which to replace it We do not disguise the greatness of that difficulty. On the contrary, we are desirous to bring into the fullest view this undeniable fact, that it is such a difficulty as must grow from day to day with the growth of those democratic principles, which the present system is forcing with stove-heat to maturity. If we must purchase the Sybil's books at last, and if the longer we wait the dearer they will be, then the earlier we buy, the better our economy.

57. Into the great question of the religious effects of such a change, we do not presume to enter further than to say, that if the present system be radically immoral and unjust, it is little short of presumption and profaneness to raise the question, whether the interests of religion require its maintenance. The mere politician may, on the other hand, have his misgivings about liberating the Pope from the restraints which his pseudo-regal position entails on him, and snapping a link which, whatever else it is or does, unquestionably binds down to earth and its motions a vast hierarchical organisation even now not always found too manageable. At all events, we disclaim the intention of aiming a covert blow at the Church of Rome and we distinctly fall back on the authority of one of the greatest among all her sons, of Dante, who has told us—

"Che la Chiesa di Roma,
Per confondere in se duo reggimenti,
Cade nel fango, e se brutta, e la soma." *

58. The one main and essential condition, which we regard as alone affording a hope of any sound and stable settlement of Roman affairs, after the fall of the Papal Monarchy is this; that they shall be adjusted by Europe at large, and as an European question, so far as relates to the grand difficulty of all, the relation between the Bishop of Rome and the future State, and people, of the Roman territories. Firmly believing that the present miserable policy is laying up the materials of future convulsion, we look only for that solution of the existing problem, which shall be most conducive to the peace and well-being of Europe. We therefore say frankly that, when the claim of justice on the part of the people shall have been satisfied, we must proceed to consider what is for the true interests of the Church of Rome.

59. We assume, then, that the Bishop of Rome must still reside at his see. The precedent of Avignon warns, and does not invite: we cannot even have an Elban Pope. We assume that, resident in Rome, he would have his palaces and basilicas, with a large and handsome endowment, especially for the purpose of maintaining his ecclesiastical suite and council. Upon this endowment, and its conditions, hangs much of what pertains to his future security and dignity. It might be provided by the Roman State, by the Ecclesiastical corporations, or by European subsidy. But the last arrangement would open a source of future intrigue and undue influence. The present property of the Roman

* Purg. xvi.

Government, and some portion of that of the religious corporations, might probably be found sufficient, without any dependence on the taxes of the Roman State, which although we do not anticipate a reluctance on the part of the people to contribute, had better be avoided. But whatever the source of the provision, the one thing to be kept mainly in view is, that its payment should be guaranteed, either jointly or in given proportions, by the Powers of Europe, parties to the treaty of Vienna.* This guarantee would, of course, include a power of recovery against the Roman State; and might be so arranged that, though the responsibility as towards the Pope should fall first upon some one State, it should, if not taken up by that State, devolve upon the rest. The more complete the provisions for enforcing the liability against the secularised Roman Government, the more improbable would be the occurrence of a case requiring their enforcement. Upon the basis of this endowment, the Pope and his ecclesiastical advisers would be able, as within a separate precinct, to arrange and conduct their proper affairs. It is possible, that, from the complicated state of things which has grown up during many centuries, other matters affecting the clerical order and its *status* might be too difficult for local settlement, and might require more or less to be taken up by the Protecting Powers. But while, inside the guarantee, the Pope would be free, outside it the Roman State would be free also, and would handle any question touching the Pope or clergy with just as entire a discretion as though they were a foreign Government now negotiating with that of Rome.

* [It will be observed that this paragraph does not anticipate the formation of a kingdom uniting all Italy.—W. E. G., 1878.]

60. As to any secular matters of the Roman State requiring foreign aid, they would be chiefly the questions of territory, and the form of Government. Now the Roman dominions have neither so palpable a political unity as to make it clear that the existing delimitation should be preserved, nor so manifest a want of it as to make already evident the necessity of a change. Unless in the event of the manifestation of some strong desire in the Legations for an alteration, it would probably be found expedient to keep the geographical limits as they are. As to the form of Government, it is plain that the establishment of a democratic Republic would, considering the strong mutual sympathies that run through the whole Italian people, be almost equivalent to a direct assault upon the monarchical Governments of the rest of the Peninsula. Probably there should be an attempt to found either something like the Sardinian or the Belgian monarchy, or a republic associating strong aristocratic and conservative elements with the dominant principle of election. This, at any rate, ought to be borne in mind: that in the Roman States the law of primogeniture and of entail is still in force, and the division of property, therefore, is cast in a manner favourable to mixture in the composition of the Government; while the nobility are in actual existence, and, as we judge from the history of the Roman Revolution, might well, if they showed themselves morally competent, vindicate for themselves a high place in point of political as well as social influence.

61. But there are two great difficulties, the existence of which we must not overlook, over and above those lying within the four corners of the question itself. First, that all or nearly all those Italians who would concur in the abolition of the Pope's temporal power, insist upon

regarding and treating Italy as what she is not, namely, a political integer, and therefore object to foreign intervention in the affairs of an Italian State. Secondly, that they likewise insist upon mixing up with every question of reform in their local institutions of Government, or rather, indeed, they place at the very head of the list, what is called the independence of Italy: that is to say, the ejectment of Austria from her Italian territories, not by the efforts of her subjects to vindicate their own freedom, but by a holy war (so Farini, usually a most sober-minded writer, ever calls it), waged against her on the part of all the States of Italy. In other words, as we fear, they are determined, for this is the practical upshot of it, that they will have no good government for themselves in Tuscany, Rome, or Naples, without the preliminary of an European war.

We are not now about to enter upon any examination of these opinions; a deeply interesting subject, which would demand a separate discussion. Suffice it to say that they run through all shades and sections of recognised Italian liberalism, from Farini and Gualterio at one end, to Mazzini at the other: much as the Tories, Whigs, and Democrats of Birmingham are united in holding the exclusive orthodoxy of a paper currency.

62. All that we would say is this; that, although these opinions would probably govern any proceedings taken by the Italians themselves, they need not, and probably would not, lead them to resist the united will of the great Powers of Europe, acting together in a sense obviously favourable to regulated freedom as well as to the general peace. They are opinions, we fear, nearly universal in Sardinia; but they do not prevent the people of that State from setting an excellent example of loyalty and

order, combined with freedom, to their neighbours. Besides, it is plain that the intervention of Foreign Powers to secure the Pope's spiritual independence in his relations with the Roman State, rests upon grounds separate and indisputable. It is only when we come to touch on the form of government and the territorial limits of that State, that we strike upon the difficulty. Why then encounter that difficulty at all? Simply, our answer is, because this mode of proceeding gives the only hope of a rational arrangement. So long as the Roman people are left to settle for themselves by revolution (the only way allowed to them) the question of the Pope's temporal power, they will settle it, in one way, by a dethronement and a republic, and some one or more European Powers will find it their separate interest to settle it the other way by a restoration. It is in truth by far too large and weighty for merely local adjustment; and the only form of adjustment not local which can be honourable, impartial, and secure, is, that it should be dealt with by the Powers parties to the treaty of Vienna, as what it really is, namely, a matter of strictly European concern in regard to the position of the Pope, and of high necessity and utility, and true practical justice, in regard to the fundamental conditions of existence for the country.

63. Let us now examine the assertion, that the settlement of Roman affairs is the concern solely of the Roman Catholic Powers. In 1849 the meaning of this doctrine was, that the decision should lie with France and Austria, Spain and Naples. Now it should be considered who are excluded and who are included by this principle. It excludes at a stroke three of the five great Powers of Europe: England, Russia, and Prussia: of those powers by whom, and by whom alone, European questions pro-

perly so called have of late years * usually been weighed. It includes, on the other hand, Spain and Naples, neither of which can without qualification be called even independent Powers: the latter of them vibrating, not only to every shock, but to every rumour, to every whisper, of change, in whatever part of Europe, at the beck of Austrian and Russian influence even for the purposes of internal government; and depending on their armed strength in the last resort for the maintenance of what must be called, however abusively, her institutions. England, Russia, Prussia shut out: Spain and Naples taken in: the first is foolish, the latter ludicrous. States never dreamt of in the settlement of ordinary European questions have but a feeble claim indeed to intermeddle with that which is the most delicate and difficult of them all, requiring at once the finest finger and the strongest arm. But if Naples and Spain are thus to interfere, where are Belgium and Sardinia? Do not, at any rate, allow the Roman question to become the game of those whose only title, as compared with others, to a share in it, must be the wish to intermeddle, to intrigue, to promote covert purposes, under the mask of such as can more easily be avowed. If Belgium and Sardinia be inferior in population to Spain and Naples, they are not so much inferior in strength, as they are certainly superior in intelligence and independence.

64. It is not in the dynastic sense, that the phrase Roman Catholic Powers can here be construed. Were it so, the excision of France from the partnership must at once follow. Nor is it in the sense that they are States which, as such, profess and support the religion of the

* [*I.e.* since 1848.—W. E. G., 1878.]

Church of Rome: because, again, from the trammels of all State religion France has professedly broken loose. The legitimate meaning can only be, that these are the States of which all or nearly all the subjects are in communion with the Pope. But why are the millions of Roman Catholics subject to England, to Prussia, and to Russia, to have nothing to say, through the medium of their Governments, to the Roman question, if it be a religious one, while they have the religious qualification, simply on the ground that they form minorities respectively in the civil relation to their rulers? This inquiry, however, opens up and detects the master fallacy. It is no religious question at all, whether the Roman people are or are not to enjoy ordinary civil and political rights, or whether they are to be condemned to perpetual helotism. That is a question of general justice, upon which every Christian and European State is entitled to have a voice. The special interest of the Roman Catholic as such, and therefore of Roman Catholic States in as far as they are tinged by his feelings, is rather in the nature of a drawback than a qualification for the settlement of this portion of the subject; the very first portion that meets us, one that must be settled, and one, moreover, that must be settled in the main on its own merits.

65. Was it, forsooth, that the pure and holy task of restoring Pius to his throne was fit for no other hands than those of the faithful, that this unworldly operation must be performed with unworldly motives by men who could and would lay it as a devout offering upon the altar of God? No fiction more gross could be palmed upon mankind. Austria was not at her old game of restoring order, or what in Italy is so called; but she could not bear a Republic bordering on her dominions, and she had

a special and vital interest in preventing the Pope from any relapse into that pseudo-liberalism, which had already cost her so much. Naples was stirred in its two deep and tender passions: the love of absolutism, and the love of superstition; the former, we presume, for the sake of its intrinsic beauty; the latter, as a convenient instrument for stimulating the reaction, and rallying the lower orders of the people around a throne which they had ceased to revere. France and Spain were expiating their church-plunderings, and re-establishing their orthodox characters, at the cheap sacrifice of the freedom of the Romans. All this may be very well for those who like it: but no expedition ever was undertaken, in which the preponderance of the visible over the invisible world was more marked and glaring, more unqualified and gross. Indeed, we know of no more lamentable instance of political profligacy than that committed by the President of France, who, just before his election, declared, in a public letter, that he would not agree even to the intervention projected by General Cavaignac, and who, four months afterwards, was the man to give effect to the Oudinot expedition.

66. The Roman people themselves, it is obvious, seem to have no share in the anxiety that the settlement of their affairs should be in the hands of the so-called Roman Catholic States exclusively; for after the Pope's flight from Rome, in November 1848, Mamiani, as minister, sent an envoy, Canuti, to invoke the mediation of England together with France between the sovereign and his subjects. And again, after the Republic had been proclaimed, the Constituent Assembly, on the 17th of April, addressed a solemn remonstrance on the subject of the Roman form of government and the threatened interference, to the Government and Parliament of England, along with those of

France. In truth, the plea is one trumped up for the occasion, and does not even deserve a hearing. Neither Prussia nor Russia abstained from endeavouring to influence the proceedings at Gaeta. The infelicitous originality of Prussia was paraded on that field also; and she had a view of her own, which she urged, but in vain.* Russia, as usual more to the point, sent an effective message that it must not be supposed she felt less interest than the Roman Catholic Powers in the restoration of the Papal Throne.†

67. If England did not directly interfere, she has not forfeited her right to do so; and we trust that no settlement of this great question will take place in which her voice shall not be heard; assured, as we are, that, though this country is no more free than any other from the influence of mixed and secondary motives when she acts apart, yet her presence, to see fair play among Powers so much more accustomed to pursue purposes of their own in Italy, will be invaluable. She possesses, in a very high degree, the love as well as the respect of that affectionate people. Unlike the German, the Frenchman, and the Spaniard, she has never enriched herself at Italy's expense. Italy has known her chiefly as the enemy of the oppressor, and the champion of the fallen. Between her and us there are no accounts to settle, no wrongs to redress or to avenge. The separate entrance of England into Italian politics we are far from urging: but we utterly protest against an opinion which would reject the precedents of the Treaty of Vienna and of the Memorandum of 1831, in order to exclude her. If the instincts of tyranny or narrow-mindedness have prompted that

* Farini, B. v. ch. x. † *Ibid.*

opinion on the one hand, we do not believe that the people of Italy, on the other, would accept any award as the award of Europe respecting Rome, unless at its foot appeared a signature on behalf of that State which alone, in 1832, by refusing to acquiesce in the scandalous policy of Gregory XVI., proved at once her fidelity and her foresight.

68. We have thus endeavoured, with great rapidity, to traverse, or skim, an almost boundless field. Many of its tracts, which we have barely touched, such as the details of the Pian reforms, the policy of France in 1849, the actual condition of the Roman States, and the enormous difficulties in which the friends of the popular cause in Italy entangle themselves by their views of the question of national independence, demand, and would well repay, the pains of a separate discussion. But we must close, with a recommendation to the reader to avail himself of the lights thrown upon Italian history and politics by the recent literature of the country. We do not refer only to well-known names, such as those of Balbo, Gioberti, and D'Azeglio; but to some yet more recent works. Gualterio is of the Constitutional party, like Farini: his work abounds in valuable documents, and is, we believe, trustworthy, but it is too bulky for our common literature. Farini is admirable both for general ability and moral tone, and for the indulgent fairness with which he states the case of the Popedom and the Pope. In other matters, especially, for instance, when he deals with the more advanced shades of Liberalism, he can lay about him with considerable vigour; but, upon the whole, we believe that his History has quite enough of the judicial tone to secure to it the place of a high permanent authority in Italian questions. The 'Memorie Storiche' of Torre,

are the production of a writer about half way between Farini and Mazzini in opinion. They are written with a lively clearness, and with every appearance of sincere intention; they likewise contain important military details. Ricciardi's 'Histoire de la Révolution d'Italie en 1848,' is the production of an intelligent, straightforward, and thorough-going Republican; and may be consulted with advantage, in order to obtain the prospect of the whole subject from his point of view. As a Neapolitan, he deals most copiously with that portion of the case which is well handled, in the Constitutional sense, by Massari, in the 'Casi di Napoli.' As to the literature of the late struggle on the reactionary side, we know not where to look for it. The 'Ultimi 69 Giorni della Republica in Romana' has absolutely nothing but extravagant party spirit to recommend it. But all genuine historical memoirs of Roman affairs well deserve a peculiar attention from English readers; for their importance extends far beyond the range of mere local interest; they belong to a chapter of human history only now beginning to be opened, but full of results of deep and as yet uncertain moment to every country in Christendom.*

*[At the date of this article, most of those in England who were most friendly to the Italian cause, contended only for local freedom and reforms in the several States. The Italians themselves (*vide* § 61) had already learned to see what was hid from our eyes. I remember that, as late as 1854, Manin came to this country, and could not persuade even Lord Palmerston that the unity of Italy was the true basis for reform. In truth the change effected has been a gigantic change: and it will hereafter, I believe, be regarded in retrospect as among the greatest marvels of our time.—W. E. G., 1878.]

V.

GERMANY, FRANCE, AND ENGLAND.*

1. The unclouded skies of a glorious July seemed, at the commencement of that month, only to reflect an equally cloudless tranquillity on the face of Europe. Danger indeed there was, from long-continued military preparations; not made without the intent of turning them to account. But we lived on in fearlessness, as men live, by custom, under some impending cliff, or the huge toppling mass of a ruined castle; that, which has quietly hung over them so long, may leave them in peace yet longer. The strain of high expectation cannot be indefinitely maintained; man must have repose. So the resolute attitude of Prussia did not alarm us, and we were lulled into confidence by the fair assurances of France. But, before one week of the month had passed, the storm burst upon the world. First came diplomatic mutterings, for which a few days only were allowed. Then followed the ring of weapons making ready for the encounter, and the tramp of armed men. On the 2nd of August, in the insignificant affair of Saarbrück, the Emperor of the French assumed a feeble offensive. On the 4th, the Prussians

* Reprinted from the *Edinburgh Review* for October 1870. Art. IX. 1. La Prusse et l'Autriche depuis Sadowa. Par Émile de Laveleye. Deux Tomes. Paris, 1870.—2. 'Correspondence respecting the Negotiations preliminary to the War.' Presented to Parliament by Command. 1870.

replied energetically at Wissemburg. And then, what a torrent, what a deluge of events! In twenty-eight days, ten battles were fought. Three hundred thousand men were sent to the hospitals, to captivity, or to the grave. The German enemy had penetrated into the interior of France over a distance of 150 miles of territory, and had stretched forth everywhere as he went the strong hand of possession. The Emperor was a prisoner, and had been deposed with general consent; his family wanderers, none knew where; the embryo at least of a Republic, born of the hour, had risen on the ruins of the Empire, while proud and gorgeous Paris was awaiting, with divided mind, the approach of the conquering monarch and his countless host.

2. This might seem to be enough; for rarely indeed has the womb of Time added so much, within so brief a space, to the roll of history. But all which has been mentioned was upon the surface. That which lay, and yet lies, beneath, only the future can adequately explore. Some part of it, however, is visible even to us. These events have unset, as it were, every joint of the compacted fabric of Continental Europe. There is not one considerable State, whose position and prospects were not fundamentally modified between the 5th of August and the 5th of September. Of some States, indeed, they were more than modified. France had lost, at the latter date, the military primacy which she had borne at the former, and which she had loftily carried for two hundred and fifty years. She had registered a vehement, and may we hope a final, protest, not so much against Napoleon, as against what we may term Napoleonism; and she had once more set out from the shore, weary and desponding, to traverse the boundless main in search of a Constitution. Belgium,

by her own manly and sagacious conduct, and by what Mr. Disraeli, honourably to himself, called the "wise and vigorous" support of England, had, amid the shocks of the political earthquake, acquired a deeper and more solid standing-ground than she had enjoyed at any former period since the kingdom was called into existence. Another yet smaller State, but of greater, indeed of world-wide, interest, has been affected in a very different manner. France, as was natural, found it needful, on the outbreak of the war, to withdraw her troops from Rome; the decrepit structure of the Pope's civil Government, on the removal of its prop, immediately began to totter. We may now pronounce it level with the ground; there seems to be scarcely a hope or a fear of its restoration, and possibly the day may come when it may be generally believed that the downfall of the temporal power of the Popedom has, in its ulterior results, been the greatest and most fruitful, among all the great and fruitful consequences of the war.

3. If we turn to the greater Powers, we find that they have all instinctively perceived the importance of the crisis to themselves. Russia, the Colossus of the East, asks herself with anxiety what will be the policy of a powerful Germany with respect to the Turkish Empire, to the designs for the union of the great Sclavonic family, to her own German Provinces, and, above all, to the administration of Poland. Austria, if less directly interested in the first question, is also vitally concerned in the second, the third, and the fourth. Even Italy is sensitive and alarmed; lest, at the head of the great German race, her ally of 1866 should revive the schemes which had shortly before been promoted by Austria, under her latest access of vigorous ambition, when Prince

Schwarzenberg was the official head of her government, and the moving spirit of her affairs. But besides the alterations thus brought into view in the direct bearings of North Germany on her neighbours, all feel that they have passed, as if by magic, under the action of a subtler and deeper change. Their relations to each of the two States engaged in the war are modified, and, with these, their relations to one another. The dominant force of the European system has travelled from one point to another; the centre of gravity has shifted. We alone, from our island home, are comparatively beyond the range of attractive and repulsive power in their new directions; and are, or ought to be, capable of calmly estimating, as well as circumstances so stirring will allow, the present and the prospective interests involved in the gigantic fray.

4. Now, it unfortunately happens that the means of passing judgment on these great events are not in proportion to their magnitude. Not only are they so near the eye as to render accurate vision almost impossible, but they make such powerful appeals to passion and emotion, as greatly to compromise the action of the judicial faculty. Most welcome therefore should be the aid of thoughtful writers, who divert us from an exclusive attention to phenomena, by bringing into view their causes and consequences. Nothing can be more timely, when regarded in such a light, than the work of M. Emile de Laveleye on the positions held by Prussia and Austria respectively since the short but pregnant war, of which the issue was determined by the battle of Sadowa. The name of this diligent and able writer has hitherto been chiefly known among us in connexion with the comparatively narrow, though most important, discussion on the effects produced by the minute subdivision of land. But, in the volumes

before us, as also in his Essays, he has shown an ample capacity for dealing with the widest range of questions affecting the constitution and well-being of society. It is in authors of his stamp that we may find the true sense of the term "publicist," much used on the Continent, but little understood among us. The publicist is one, if we rightly comprehend the phrase, who treats of public events and interests, not as isolated facts, but according to the principles they involve, and the sources from which they spring, their true place in history, and their office and share in working out the greater problems of the destiny of our race.

5. Two-thirds of the work before us are given to Austria. They contain an instructive, as well as a minute and elaborate, picture of the dangers through which that empire has been passing, and of the difficulties with which she has still to contend. These difficulties are so formidable that we could scarcely hope for her extrication from them, but for the encouragement derived from the manner in which she has already effected so many hairbreadth escapes. Her motto may well be

"O passi graviora; dabit Deus his quoque finem."

Of these difficulties, the foremost is that which is presented by the endless varieties of race within her borders, summed up in three or four great bodies, which have by no means as yet arrived at any permanent adjustment of their reciprocal relations. The most powerful of her nationalities, represented by Hungary, has indeed obtained in a virtually separate and independent Government the object of her desires, and has attracted to herself the Transleithan Slav population of the South. But the amplitude of the concession involved in this system of

dualism, on the one hand, instead of solving, complicates the remaining portion of the problem which affects the Cisleithan populations, while it has not as yet, on the other hand, decided the question whether two sovereign autocracies can work together as one Empire.

6. While centripetal and centrifugal forces are thus engaged in mortal tug, a feud of extraordinary bitterness likewise prevails between Church and State. The worst excesses of the Papal claims received a solemn consecration in the Concordat of 1855. Upon recovering her liberty, Hungary in a moment shook off the intolerable yoke of this unhappy instrument; and the ground, on which she repudiated it, was the firm ground of its illegality when tested by her known constitutional traditions. In the rest of the Empire, it was first irregularly contravened by successive laws; and it has at length, within the last few months, been formally renounced. But the spirit, which devised it, is not exorcised, either from the priesthood or the rural population; and this ever-wakeful influence, reckoning on the circuitous attainment of its end, may join itself to the other disintegrating forces already at work, and may greatly impede the consolidation of the Empire. The Austrian and Hungarian * Bishops have indeed well sustained their share of the contest at Rome against the last extravagance of Papal infallibility. But the conduct of the Spanish Episcopate at the Council of Trent proved, that a sentiment of nationalism in an ecclesiastical body is no sufficient guarantee of a generally liberal mind.

7. Besides all this, financial difficulty of the gravest

*[The phrase, as it is here used, includes the Bishops of the Slavonic provinces, and especially the most eminent among them, Bishop Strossmayer.—W. E. G., 1878.]

kind appears as an item in the long account of political embarrassments. Constant deficit, and accumulating debt, have brought matters to such a pass, that Austrian credit is now much lower than that of any of the other European Powers standing in the first rank. And yet it has been found, or thought, necessary by the Austro-Hungarian Government to spend several millions sterling since the month of July, with a view to the maintenance of its neutrality in the present war.

8. It may strike the reader that, in this painful enumeration, we have made no reference to that which the world considers without doubt as the greatest of all the calamities which have fallen upon Austria—her recent losses of territory and rank, and her exclusion from the German Confederation. The omission has been deliberate; and the reason is, that in our view these events have supplied the starting-point of her new life, the necessary conditions under which alone she could attain to a state of health and vigour. The present state of Austria is at least one of hope. It is a state far better than when Metternich made war by his system alike upon morality, freedom, and the sentiment of nationality; or even than when Schwarzenberg, with a notable combination of skill and resolution, defeated the first efforts of Prussia to attain the hegemony of Germany. Then the superstructure was undisturbed; but the foundations were gradually and surely eaten away. Now the superstructure has been disturbed, but the foundations are in course, at least, of progressive renewal. As long as Austria kept her grasp upon Italy, she could not establish Constitutional Government, and she remained always liable to assault from France. As long as she remained a great German Power, she was tempted to think herself strong

enough to refuse the claims of Hungary to her historic rights. In almost every one of her constituent provinces, she was at war alike with the aspirations of freedom, and with the traditions and sympathies of race.

9. Never was there a war shorter than that of 1866: but its consequences were immense. It restored the national existence of Germany, and brought within view its complete consolidation. It consummated the national unity of Italy. It put an end to all possibility of refusing the demands of Hungary. As part of the Hungarian arrangement, it secured free government for the whole Austrian Empire. And, lastly, in thus restoring the power of utterance and action to that country, it shattered the fabric of Ultramontanism which had been built up by the Concordat of 1855. Such were the results, in the South, of those few weeks of war.

10. Of the motives of the assault, of its immediate causes, we need not speak. In this country the career and attitude of Prussia, when it broke out, were generally condemned; and a decided change in the public sentiment, which was manifested at its close, was ascribed to a cause no worthier than the servile worship of success.* This being so, it is satisfactory to learn that our own change of sentiment only reflected a corresponding change in Germany itself. At least M. Laveleye describes as follows the prospects of Prussia at the commencement of the struggle:—

"En présence de si redoutables ennemis, la situation intérieure était désolante: le peuple, et ses représentants, en hostilité ouverte avec le gouvernement; la bourgeoisie indignée de voir une lutte effroyable s'engager entre Allemands, guerre odieuse, rendue inévit-

* M. Laveleye joins in the sneer, vol. i. p. 241.

nble par la volonté d'un seul homme; cet homme, le ministre dirigeant, M. de Bismarck, d'une impopularité si universelle et si exaspérée, qu'elle armait le bras d'un jeune étudiant venu de l'étranger pour délivrer son pays d'un tyran détesté; toute la population civile, furieuse d'être arrachée aux travaux de la paix et aux profits d'une activité industrielle merveilleusement prospère; une partie importante de l'armée, la landwehr, si irritée qu'elle allait, disait-on, tirer sur les officiers de la ligne plutôt que sur l'ennemi; toutes les entreprises subitement arrêtées, les ouvriers sans emploi et par suite sans pain; partout la défiance, la ruine, le désespoir; l'enthousiasme nulle part." (Vol. i. p. 4.)

But the war, then so detested in Prussia, is not now deplored even by any one of all the portions of the Austrian Empire.

"Aucun d'eux, pas même Vienne, ne regrette le coup de la destinée, qui a brisé le joug commun." (Introduction, p. viii.)

11. It is indeed wonderful to reflect, that only seven years * have passed since Austria appeared to be on the point of establishing an absolute supremacy for herself in Germany, by introducing into the Confederation the whole of her non-Germanic population. How well for Europe that she has escaped that ill-omened and ill-conceived consummation! But her efforts to achieve it may be taken at least as tending to prove that she felt she could not remain as she was. It had grown to be a necessity that she should become either more German, or less so: that if she could not compensate Germany for its want of organisation, unity, and national life, by a great accession of material force, she would relieve it from the incubus of her absolutism and her Ultramontanism; from the discredit of her policy, so obnoxious to the most legitimate sentiments of nationality, and, worse than all, from the Austro-

* Vol. i. p. 235.

Prussian dualism, which baffled the policy of a great and united Germany, and neutralised its power in the European family.

12. While we are far from believing that Austria has reached the end of her internal troubles, we are sure that, in encountering them, she carries with her the sympathies of every liberal-minded man in this and in every other country. Her task is the difficult one of combining many different races and provinces into one firm and yet free political organism. In this effort, she has right on her side; for her ancient capital and throne form the best and the most natural centre for the whole of the inhabitants of the Empire. That they should be broken up into the minute subdivisions indicated by their specific varieties, would be good neither for Europe at large, nor for the great Eastern question; nor, above all, for themselves. Something in the nature of a Federal monarchy, with a balance of power resembling that which has been established in the American Union by the great war of 1861–5, is probably the adjustment best suited to her case; and to the best result, be it what it may, we trust that she may gradually feel and find her way. She contains within herself immense elements of material and moral power, and she may yet discharge on behalf of Europe most important functions in connection with the question, or rather questions, of the East. But, if she is to prosper, it will be well for her to practise for a time a great abstention; and to decline, unless it be on the clearest grounds, entering into the whirlpools of the general politics of Europe. For here, as in Italy, the work of internal consolidation is the business of the hour; and this work can only be procrastinated or marred by the feverish desire, or the costly and perilous

practice, of struggles for influence abroad. In attempts to maintain the mere credit and appearances of the first rank of power, either of these countries might place in jeopardy the solid conditions of a really powerful and prosperous future.

13. Singularly contrasted with the fortunes of her southern sister have been those of Prussia. The Habsburgs and the Hohenzollerns, indeed, are both of them families traceable to a municipal origin; the one in Switzerland, the other in Würtemberg. But while the one, in the person of Rodolph, sprang six hundred years ago at once into the full dimensions of greatness, the other came very slowly to its maturity and strength. They might be likened to two youths, one of whom has grown with portentous rapidity in early boyhood, and has suffered for it in after-weakness; the other, gathering solidity during the time when he was outstripped in stature, has ultimately attained an equal or greater height, with a compact instead of a loose and ill-assorted figure, and with a tough and well-ripened constitution. At the beginning of the last century, when Prussia became a kingdom, her population had only reached the figure of fifteen hundred thousand. When Frederic II. took his inheritance, it was two millions and a half. It passed to his nephew with about five millions. At the epoch of 1815, it reached ten. Half a century of peace and intelligence, without territorial acquisitions, brought it in 1865 to nearly twenty millions. Thirty millions are now either directly subjects of the Prussian Crown, or represented and governed by it for every purpose of diplomatic weight and military power; besides eight millions more, inhabitants of the South German States, among whom the national sympathies have been shown to

predominate over every municipal feeling. It has in truth passed beyond all doubt or dispute, that Germany will establish her virtual unity, and that Prussia will be its head.

14. Down to the time of the French Revolution, no continental Power had played a part so considerable on the European stage, in proportion to its population, as Prussia. The terrible chastisement, that she underwent at the hands of Napoleon, appeared to reduce her to a comparative insignificance. But she was destined to prosper by affliction. It was the direct effect of the measures imposed by the conqueror to drive her upon the use of such remedies, as directly went to fit her for the gigantic efforts, with which she now astonishes the world. She sought her strength in high intelligence, and in thoroughly effective organisation. She emancipated her peasants; she established her system of national education; and, bound by Napoleon to keep no more than 42,000 men under arms, she resorted to a system of short service in the ranks with strong reserves, which enabled her to train so considerable a portion of her population, that, so soon as in the great European crisis of 1813, her armies already numbered three hundred thousand men.

15. She had not, however, as yet fallen upon an opportunity for fully re-establishing the military fame, which had suffered so much at the outset of the Revolutionary War, and at Jena. She obtained little martial credit for the victory, morally so inglorious, which she won against Denmark. When the time came for her meeting Austria in arms, the friendly spectators trembled for the result, and the hostile awaited it with exultation. Europe then underwent a great disenchantment. But when, once more, Prussia had to don her armour against France, again a

tremor thrilled the ranks of her well-wishers: even her own valiant people, while resolved to do or die, and hopeful as to the result they might finally obtain by a dogged perseverance, nevertheless anticipated a dark and stormy opening to the war. Nay, we believe that if the heart and mind of her rulers could have been read, many even among them, though without doubt as to their duty, were not sanguine as to the impending destiny of their country.

16. In part, this may have been due to the belief that France had gained some ten or fourteen days in point of preparation; but it must have been mainly owing to the natural and modest apprehension of a conflict of life and death with the first military Power in Europe, which had enjoyed its primacy on the continent for two centuries and a half; which, during almost the whole of the Revolutionary War, had seemed to hold every nation in the hollow of its hand; and which finally succumbed, at the close of that great struggle, only under the double force of nature madly defied amid the snows of Russia, and of the combination of a crowd of foes. Again has come upon us the shock of surprise, and with a violence never felt before. The wealth of France is greater than ever. Her high courage has not declined. The splendour of her martial traditions has been such, that she came into the arena almost with the halo of invincibility around her. The Chassepots are admitted to have commanded ranges entirely beyond the power of the needle-gun. Her *mitrailleuses* were met by no corresponding arm, and are allowed to be, for certain uses and in certain positions, most murderous instruments. Nor, perhaps, if performance in war could be measured by the absolute amount of loss in life and limb inflicted on an enemy, were her

achievements ever greater. Yet, as each well-aimed blow descended on her, it has done its deadly work. Straining every nerve to repair her losses, every new reinforcement that she sent forwards did but add to them; until at length,

"In *ten* great battles ruining, overthrown," *

she arrived at the recent surrender of the Emperor, and the capitulation of ninety thousand soldiers, now prisoners of war. These myriads await in Germany the commands of those whose capital they once thought to enter on another errand, and with a different bearing. There is, indeed, something almost of miracle or of magic in the administrative perfection, to which the combined action of necessity and sagacity have worked up the Prussian system. Or, if we dispense with the language of figure, and if we set aside for the moment the moral of the case, we surely must conclude that the army of the North German Confederation has been brought, by the skill and wisdom of its rulers, to the highest mechanical perfection ever known in history.

17. The nation has put forth its whole power, with all the order and symmetry that belong to bureaucracy or to absolutism, and with all the energy and fire that belong to freedom. In Prussia proper, and now as it appears through all Germany, the most consummate army ever known is put into the field with the greatest expedition, and at the smallest cost. Besides all the known and usual departments of activity, those services, which lie outside the common routine, have all been studied, and all developed with an equal prudence and care. The

* Tennyson's 'Guinevere.'

quantity and quality of the artillery have been alike remarkable, and have, like the skilful massing of superior numbers, contributed largely to success. If the steady fighting of the Germans is admired, their flying service, which scours the country, presents itself at a thousand points at once, and makes perfect the stock of information, is viewed with nothing less than wonder. Other armies can destroy a railway; the Germans carry the means, in men and tools, of making one. It seems that even grave-digging is provided for by a special corps. We need not be surprised, then, if their commissariat has fed in a foreign land, without apparent difficulty, more than double the number of mouths for which the French had to provide on their own soil; a duty, which they did not perform without grievous complaints of insufficiency and failure. But every German seems to be in his place, and to know his proper business. The finished intelligence, of large reach and measure, which presides over the whole strategic operations of Von Moltke, is proportionally represented in every military organism, from the *corps d'armée* to the company. Miscarriage or mistake seems no more to attach to their ordinary operations, than to the working of the machinery of a cotton factory. But when any of these masses are resolved into their parts, the units, too, of which they are formed have each had their separate training, and each is capable of acting alone in his own sphere.

18. Undoubtedly, the conduct of the campaign, on the German side, has given a marked triumph to the cause of systematic popular education. "*Diu magnum*," says Sallust, "*intra mortales certamen fuit, vine corporis, an virtute animi, res militaris magis procederet.*" The mind has now gained a point in the competition with its mate-

rial partner, its "muddy vesture of decay." But the moral of the case must not be set aside; and moral forces, too, it must be owned, wrought at the outset with an undivided efficacy in favour of North Germany. The material and mechanical process could not have been so consummate unless it had been backed by the elements of a higher strength; and the world is not yet so depressed, nor the law of the stronger so absolute, as that physical power and the calculating faculties should alone determine the great issues of combat. There was of old some secret might which enabled Greece to withstand Darius and Xerxes, and Switzerland to withstand German and Burgundian invaders, and Scotland to withstand England, and America to withstand both. The sense of a good, that is, speaking generally, a defensive cause, of fighting for hearth and home, of delivering no blow except in answer to one given, or intended and prepared, is not only a moral warrant, but a real and fertile source of military energy. A strong undoubting persuasion of being in the right, of itself, though it be not omnipotence, is power.

19. This immense advantage the Government of France most rashly and wrongly gave over into the hand of its already formidable antagonist. War was proclaimed, and was waged, by France. Doubtless the spirit of her soldiery and of her people has been aroused by a sense of duty to their country. But even the sense of duty to our country cannot have that moral completeness which is necessary for the entire development of human energies, unless the country, which commands the services of her children, has herself obeyed the higher laws of public right. The Frenchman capable of reflection could hardly escape from this sad alternative; either the war was aggressive, or it was dynastic; in the one case Germany was to be a victim,

in the other France. What, then, was the immediate plea, which France alleged for this deadly quarrel?

20. Though it is painful to lay open a dismal chapter in the history of a great and famous nation, yet truth compels the admission, that a spirit of perverse and constant error seems to have governed from the first the ruling powers of France in the conduct of the diplomatic controversy, which preceded and ushered in the war. We shall state the facts as they appear on the face of the Papers presented to Parliament. If appears as though an adverse doom were hovering in the air, and a lying spirit had gone forth from the courts of heaven to possess and misguide, with rare and ineffectual exceptions, the prophets of the land. The late French Government, for whose faults that gallant people is now paying such tremendous forfeit, selected first its own ground of quarrel. In this it had no small advantage. The foreign policy of Prussia, if it has been *sans peur*, has assuredly not been *sans reproche*. One stain upon that policy it scarcely lay in the power of the Imperial Government to notice; for when, in 1863–4, the British Government proposed a combination of the two Powers to prevent any violent settlement of the question of Schleswig-Holstein, their proffer was very decidedly declined, and the German aggression was left to take its course. Still it is believed that acuteness and skill, far less than France has always at her command, might have availed to show at least plausible grounds of complaint against Prussia for her proceedings in and since 1866, and to represent some of them as constituting offences against the law and menaces to the tranquillity of Europe. Be this as it may, that chapter of argument remains unopened. Prior misconduct of Prussia, though it might have been brought into the

account, yet actually constitutes no part of the *res gestæ* which laid the ground for the present war, It was the candidature of the Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern for the crown of Spain on which, and on which alone, the Imperial Government chose to raise the quarrel.

21. Now, viewing the case with a cold impartiality, and deeply impressed, as we have ever been, with the value and importance not only of friendly relations, but even of something in the nature of a special amity, between France and our own country, we sorrowfully place upon record the conviction that the whole proceedings of the French Government, in the conduct of its controversy, constituted one series of unrelieved and lamentable errors; errors so palpable and wanton that, when men observe them in the conduct of a Government which rules perhaps the most richly endowed nation in the world, they appear so wholly unaccountable, upon any of the ordinary rules of judgment applicable to human action, that they are almost perforce referred by bewildered observers to blind theories of chance and fate.

22. The first question in order which arises is upon the original theme of quarrel. Did the Hohenzollern candidature, with its expected acceptance by Spain, afford such a cause of complaint to France as would have justified the resort to arms? Upon this point it may certainly be said that, even if the negative be true, yet the affirmative, when considered in the light of European history and tradition, involves no violent offence to the common reason and feeling of the world. And yet, perhaps, it might be fairly asked whether if France, in 1870, was entitled to object to a Hohenzollern in Madrid, Europe might not with as much reason have objected, in 1852, to a Napoleon in Paris? However, we assume, as the

British Government assumed, that on the whole the French demand for the withdrawal of the candidature was so far legitimate, as to entail a very heavy responsibility on those who should resist it.

23. But, at the very first moment, the demand had been associated with proceedings tending in the highest degree to increase the difficulties of compliance with it. The case was one in which the Imperial Government ought evidently to have invoked the aid of a friendly State, and for the time to have placed their cause in its hands. Or, if they were not prepared to make over its advocacy to others, they ought at least to have addressed their request through the usual channels to the two Powers complained of. Prudence and principle alike enjoin the rule that, when an injury is alleged by the party supposing himself wronged, and redress is demanded without any prior proof of the case before an impartial authority, at least the manner of requiring the removal of the alleged wrong shall be such, as will not inflict public shame on the person, whose guilt is, after all, only proved to one side. But, instead of this rational mode of action, it was to the Legislative Chamber that the very first communication of the French Government was made, with an intimation that, if the demand were not complied with, the quarrel must be carried to the last extremity. Thus the Ollivier Administration, while urging a requisition in itself open to controversy or cavil, did all it could, by its unwarrantable method of procedure, to make concession difficult for the Powers from whom it was required.

24. The aid, however, of the British Ministry, and that of other Powers, had been requested by France. Whether because of the advantage of proximity, or of a

more disembarrassed promptitude of action, or because the world has been more fully informed of our national part in the proceedings than of that taken by other countries, the British Government appears to have taken a principal share in obtaining the withdrawal of the candidature by Spain, and a renunciation, by the father of the Prince in the name, and on the behalf, of his son. Spain undoubtedly deserves credit for the readiness with which she acceded to the demand. She deserves it the more, because she had encountered wearying difficulties in her search over Europe for a King. It was, therefore, no small sacrifice to the general good which she made, when she surrendered an arrangement for her own domestic purposes such as she had reason to think eligible.

25. So far all went well. But as Prussia, by an act of the Sovereign, if not of the State, had been a consenting party to the proposal that Prince Leopold should take the Spanish throne, it was perfectly just to expect that she should also declare in the same manner her consent to his withdrawal. Without this, indeed, the withdrawal could not be considered to be complete; and Prussia might, in some future contingency, have made it a ground for the revival of the design, or worked it into a matter of controversy or quarrel. But this point also, notwithstanding the ill-starred mode in which the demand had been preferred, was gained; and the King became a party to the cancelling of the whole arrangement. What was, hereupon, the conduct of the French Government? They had defined for themselves the cause and the limit of their complaint. It was now fully removed. They acknowledged the removal; and they declared the quarrel to be closed as regarded Spain. But, to the astonish-

ment of the world, they imported a new term into the controversy, and thereby gave some warrant to a suspicion that they were determined not to part with their grievance, but to turn it to account.

26. The Duc de Gramont announced, that the communications with Prussia were not yet at end; and he required of the King an engagement, that under no circumstances would he consent to the revival of the Hohenzollern candidature. It was not possible that any one conversant with the laws of just self-respect, to say nothing of those of punctilio, could suppose the King of Prussia would, or ought to, comply with such a demand. But, heaping blunder upon blunder, the Government of France overlooked the fact that, in the view of the world, Prussia could at most be only regarded as an accessory to the offence, whereas Spain was the principal. Yet the principal was absolved upon the mere abandonment of the candidature, while the accessory was required to declare he never would offend again. Once more we say, this inequality could receive in the eyes of the world only one explanation—that the situation, the military preparations of four years, the start supposed to have been gained over Prussia, were too good things to be parted with. It would be unjust to say that a motive so indescribably wicked was consciously and deliberately entertained by the Emperor, or by the Cabinet then at the head of affairs in France: but, setting aside this odious supposition, what a picture of folly, inconsistency, and temerity is presented to our view in the France of 1870, as she has been unworthily represented by her Imperial Government!

27. We need scarcely stop for more than a moment to remark that, in their almost preternatural perverseness, the French Government had certainly given to the friendly

Powers, whose aid they asked, a very serious ground of complaint, had there been a disposition to take advantage of it. Let us consider how the case stood between them. A State lays its grievance before its neighbours. It desires their assistance for its removal. They accede to the request, and commit themselves in the cause, not in obedience to any clear dictate of justice, but on grounds of policy and prudence, and because of the great importance of giving satisfaction, and so preventing bloodshed. They succeed in obtaining the demand they were asked to make. The complaining Power then changes its ground, and refuses to accept, at the hands of its friends, what it had laid before them as the object of its desires. We contend that this is a breach of a virtual covenant spontaneously undertaken, and is a proceeding wholly at variance with the true spirit of international obligation.

28. But, if the Government of France was less than courteous to its allies in this strange proceeding, it was more than cruel to itself. It is beyond all doubt that, when the candidature had been withdrawn, France stood possessed of a great diplomatic triumph, and of one gained with a marvellous rapidity. She had the option of retiring as victor from the field, of leaving the Prussian Government under a *soupçon* of discredit, and of closing the question with a manifest increase of credit and influence in Europe. But, instead of quietly harvesting their very considerable gains, her Ministers thought proper to advance a fresh demand, which only a great amount of military success could have covered from severe and immediate censure, and which now adds a real disgrace to the conventional dishonour of adverse fortune in arms.

29. The British Government evidently felt that, having become a mediator for France at her own request, they were now entitled and in duty bound to pass judgment, though in the mild and measured terms required by friendly intercourse, on the ulterior proceedings of their ally; and accordingly, without losing a moment, Lord Granville represented at Paris that the demand made on Prussia for a prospective engagement could not be justified, and ought to be withdrawn. This representation was at once parried by the reply that an insult had just been offered by the King of Prussia to Count Benedetti, the French Ambassador, which rendered it impossible to consider the British representation. The ground for this plea was a paragraph in a newspaper, considered to represent the Prussian Government. Shortly after it proved to be wholly erroneous. But what can we think of those who could declare the appearance of such a paragraph to be a reason, not for explanation or apology, but for the refusal to consider the request of a friendly Power, and for an immediate resort to the arbitrament of war?

30. Yet another effort, however, was made by the Government of this country. The Congress of Paris, in 1856, had recorded in a Protocol its unanimous opinion that, before having recourse to arms, any Powers engaged in controversy would do well to refer their cases to arbitration. An appeal, founded on this Protocol, was addressed to both Prussia and France. The Prussian Government replied to the effect that they were passive in the whole affair, and that it did not fall to them, accordingly, to take the initiative. But the terms of this reply were such that, had France been willing to move, Prussia could not consistently have refused her concur-

rence. Unhappily the answer of France was, though not a discourteous, yet a positive refusal, on the ground that the matter in question was not suited to a reference of this nature. And thus, driven on by that worst and most terrible of the Furies, the fury in the breast of man, the Ollivier Administration pursued its insane career.

31. We must not, however, omit to notice that, in this most strange history, the errors of detail, grave and constant as they have been, were swallowed up in one master-error. The course of the Bismarck policy in Germany had not been one of the smooth and easy progress which, from what has now happened, we might be apt to suppose. That policy was threatened from a variety of quarters. The democratic party was intent upon more free institutions. The Ultramontane party, with its root and centre in Bavaria, abhorred the transfer to a Protestant Crown of the ruling influence in Germany. Local attachments, among the populations of the absorbed and the menaced States, dreaded the power of centralisation. The members and friends of royal Houses, which had suffered, abounded in ill-will. The unscrupulous character considered to attach to many of the Prussian proceedings, must have tended to estrange upright and tender consciences. True, all these forces were overborne by the paramount instinct which made Germans yearn to find their strength in unity, and by a state of facts which showed them that their hope of unity must, in order to be practical, have Prussia for its basis.

32. But they were dissipating and disturbing forces; they were drawbacks and deductions from the might of a great people. One way there was to rally them, in so far as they contained national elements, and to drive into

utter insignificance such elements of their composition as were wholly dark and irreconcilable. It was that an attack should be made on Prussia by her ancient enemy, not for her sins, which may have been many, but for her virtue, which was one, and which to the German mind, not unnaturally, outweighed and eclipsed them all; namely this, that she was the strength and hope of Germany. The Germans knew that there had been promulgated in France almost a gospel of territorial aggrandisement at their expense; that the statesmen and orators of that country were largely imbued with the idea; * that of its recognised parties, either none wished, or none dared, to disavow it; that the evil traditions of former times taught or tempted every French Government to assert the right of interfering in the transactions and arrangements of neighbouring countries, on the ground of the exigencies or interests of France. The demand, which was made on the King of Prussia, received from

* In the *Daily News* of September 15 (1870), there appeared a letter, friendly to France in its general upshot, from which we extract the following passage. The reader will judge whether the list it contains is very far from being correct:—"The Orleanist, the moderate Liberal, the Republican, in short, the whole of France shared and still share it. Men of all parties expressed it; the Roman Catholic Montalembert, the apostle of free trade Michel Chevalier, the Orleanist Thiers, the moderate Republican Jules Favre, the Republican poet Victor Hugo, the socialist Republicans Louis Blanc and Barbès, and all their parties and followers, spoke or wrote of the necessary acquisition of the left bank of the Rhine. The whole of France, of all parties and Governments, the present generation and the present Republican Government included, advocated the policy of Richelieu and Mazarin, viz., acquisition of the left bank of the Rhine, and the division and humiliation of Germany." It is right to state that a defensive plea, and one weighty if sound, has entered at times into this claim; the plea that the transfer of the old Ecclesiastical Electorates to Prussia had materially altered the balance of power to the prejudice of France; and that the existing French frontier was open to invasion.

the heart and mind of Germany but one interpretation; it was taken to be an assertion of the right of France to dictate, and a proof of her intention to use that right so as to stain the honour, baffle the hopes, and degrade the destinies of the German race.

33. So much for the diplomacy anterior to the war on the side of the Government of France; a chapter which, for fault and folly taken together, is almost without parallel in the history of nations. But wonder rises to its climax when we remember that this feverish determination to force a quarrel was associated with a firm belief in the high preparation and military superiority of the French forces, the comparative inferiority of the Germans, the indisposition of the smaller States to give aid to Prussia, and even the readiness of Austria, with which from his long residence at Vienna the Duc de Gramont supposed himself to be thoroughly acquainted, to appear in arms as the ally of France. It too soon appeared that, as the advisers of the Emperor knew nothing of public rights, and nothing of the sense of Europe, so they knew nothing about Austria and the minor German States, and less than nothing about not only the Prussian army, but even their own.

34. Some degree of mystery still hangs over the faults of the military administration. We do not know in what proportions there prevailed the various elements of neglect, weakness, or corruption, in the conduct of the Emperor, in appointments great and small, in recruiting, in the provision of *matériel*, and in forwarding to the frontier. The result was one in universal and dismal contrast with the boast uttered by M. Rouher, in a moment of unhappy exultation, that the last four years had been spent in bringing the warlike preparations of

France to perfection. But we shall consider the military features of the campaign in another part of this Number,* and we do not propose to dwell on them here.

35. The same perverseness, which had marked the diplomacy of the Duc de Gramont before the war, still clung to that infatuated minister. It seemed not merely that many things must be done wrong, but that nothing could be right. Even when there was a case, yet from want of skill nothing could be made of it; and when the action chanced to be a proper one, it was to be spoiled by the mode of acting. Of this there was a conspicuous example in the instance of the treaty proposed by the British Government to the belligerents for better securing the neutrality of Belgium. The proposal reached Paris sooner, by several days, than it came to the knowledge of Count Bismarck; and its first reception, according to the statements made to Parliament, was favourable. But soon the Duc de Gramont began to haggle. First one explanation was necessary, and then another. Nor was its principle left without criticism. The treaty might be signed, but the French minister could not see the use of it.

36. Now, surely, it required very little discernment to perceive the use of it for France, whatever it might be for Belgium. The project principally, but diversely, connected with the names of the Counts Bismarck and Benedetti, which we may therefore presume to call the Bismarck-Benedetti project, had startled and had shocked the world. The explanations, which followed, amounted to no more than a game of battledore and shuttlecock, in

* [An impersonal reference to an Article in the same Number, by another writer.—W. E. G., 1878.]

which the charge remained exactly as it was, and was tossed backwards and forwards between the two disputants on more or less even terms. Indeed, the case was rendered worse by the allegation of each party that not on this occasion alone, but on many more, his virtue had been solicited by the busy iniquity of the other. Under these circumstances, it was a great advantage to have an opportunity, at the earliest moment, of manifesting the sense at least of the actual Government of France, by giving an undertaking to England, not only to respect but to defend Belgian neutrality. This advantage Count Bismarck at once perceived. One and the same day sufficed for him to form his own judgment, to obtain the consent of his Sovereign by telegraph, and to bind himself, by a conclusive acceptance, to the British Government. The lagging answer of the French Ministry, thus distanced in the race, was some time afterwards given; but the whole advantage of priority, which circumstances had secured for them, was lost.

37. No less injudicious was the French diplomacy on other points. In the difficult question with respect to the export of munitions or arms from neutral countries, it was plainly for the advantage of the country which commanded the sea, and which depended more than her foe on foreign supply, to adopt frankly the American view, that the export should be free. And of this view she claimed the full benefit, when we learned, from the mouth of Count Palikao, that 40,000 rifles were to be brought forthwith from England. With what surprise, then, will it be also learned, that Belgium, which might have passed American or British rifles into North Germany, or might have exported the product of the factories of Liége for her own benefit, has, under pressure from

France, and not without a protest, forbidden both the transit and the export?

38. Again did the Imperial Government find occasion to go wrong with reference to Denmark. At the outset of the war, the situation of the Danes was this. The people had no gratitude to France; she had declined to act with England on their behalf in their supreme struggle of 1863-64. But they had a very decided resentment against Prussia, as they conceived her to be chargeable with crafty and violent injustice. So that her popular sentiment was strongly in favour of joining the enemy of Prussia. But the Government of the country wisely recollected that they had more to think of than the gratification of even just antipathies. They seem to have asked themselves the very natural question, What would happen if Prussia were victorious in the war? France could give them no guarantees of a nature to be available in such a contingency; they might lose that hold on the moral sense of Europe, with regard to the Danish part of Schleswig, which they now retain; and Prussia might have a case, plausible at least, for completing her work by the absorption of the little State.

39. And yet the Government of France, apparently without feeling its ground in the first instance, committed itself by sending, with some parade of publicity, the Duc de Cadore to Copenhagen, to request the Danes to put in jeopardy their existence as a nation for the purpose of making an addition to the French means of warfare, which in no case could have been very great, and which, in the course that events have taken, would have been wholly insignificant. The impolitic proposal received a natural rebuff. And it is almost needless to add that the popular sentiment of Denmark on the point has changed.

The people are now full of gratitude to the Government for its wisdom, forethought, and self-restraint. Let us hope that from mercy, from policy, or from the sense of decency on the part of Prussia, it will obtain its reward.

40. Yet once more have we to point out the singular mismanagement of the French Ministry. As the war proceeded, the North German Government was gradually overwhelmed with the number of wounded. After each bloody engagement it found itself in charge of suffering multitudes, not German only, but also French. Until after the sixth battle, that of Gravelotte, had been fought, the German authorities encountered this difficulty as they best could. And we can hardly go wrong in giving credence to the consentient accounts from every quarter, of the humane, liberal, and kindly treatment, which they have accorded to the wounded captives. But town after town, along a lengthening radius of railway, was charged up to its full capacity. One district within moderate distance remained free; the district of Aix-la-Chapelle. But it was not accessible by railway through Prussian territory. The line, which leads to it, passed through Luxemburg and through Belgium. The North German authorities applied to the Governments interested, either territorially or by guarantee, for permission to make use of this line of transport for the wounded, under the condition of their passing without any military guard. Belgium declared herself ready to assent. Great Britain recommended the proposal to favourable consideration. But the Government of France interposed a peremptory objection *in limine*, on the ground that, by diminishing incumbrance on the lines, it would give the enemy new facilities for forwarding men and supplies to the front.

41. Now we are far from denying that a Power engaged

in war may, without being subject to summary condemnation, even require that a large amount of relief shall be withheld from the enemy's wounded and her own, if it can be proved that the measures, by which that relief is to be secured, will greatly strengthen the enemy's aggressive means, and thus aggravate presumably the general mischiefs of the war. But, on the other hand, it is obvious to remark that a mere diminution of the back freight for the trains which brought up the German men and *matériel*, by opening a new channel for such freight through Luxemburg, would seem to be a matter of small account in regard to any additional facilities it could give for carrying the forward loads to the seat of war. Something, too, was due to the great humanity with which the French wounded had admittedly been treated within the German borders, and yet more to the vast amount of suffering unrelieved. But that which constituted the palpable offence in the case was this, that no proof or serious explanation was given of the alleged military advantage to the enemy; no middle term was proposed, such, for example, as the release *ipso facto* of all French wounded who should pass the neutral frontier; there was only a hard and high-handed assertion of extreme rights, tending to deepen the painful impression, which so many of the steps taken by the rulers of France in this deplorable controversy had produced.*

42. To this review of the immediate causes and diplomatic incidents of the war, in itself sufficiently painful, the recollection of the long alliance between France and

* Our argument has been justified by the more recent facts. Since the battle of Sedan, it appears that, from the sheer necessity of the case, German wounded have traversed Belgium in considerable numbers, without notice from the Government of the country.

our own country, which has marked for good the history of this generation, adds a sadness that is inexpressible. It is not possible indeed, after the disclosures of the Bismarck-Benedetti project, to look back upon that alliance with the unqualified satisfaction in which we should have gladly indulged. We may feel the impulse to explain,

πῇ δὴ συνθεσίαι τε καὶ ὅρκια βήσεται ἡμῖν

But we may also check that impulse; and rather dwell with pleasure on such recollections as those of an honourable war waged in common, of sentiments in great part concurrent on the weighty question of the reconstruction of Italy, of generous sympathy accorded to us in the crisis of the Indian Mutiny, of timely support received at a critical moment of correspondence with America; and not least of that Treaty of Commerce which has done so much, independently of its merely economical results, to weave between two great nations a web of concord so firm in its tissue that, though at this moment it may naturally be subject on the side of French opinion to a strain, we trust and believe it never will be broken.

43. We shall not attempt to sketch the career or character of the man who perhaps now contemplates the undulating landscape from the brow of Wilhelmshöhe, as his uncle from the rock of Saint Helena gazed upon the sunset and the ocean. Some points of conduct, relating to the present war and the battle of Sedan, we advisedly pretermit. They are more likely to receive full justice at the hands of Continental than of British writers. In Napoleon III. we should "damn the vices we've no mind

* Il. ii. 339.

to." But there are some things that may be said on behalf of the fallen. Two services he has conferred upon the world. He gave the first, and as it proved the effectual, impulse to the restoration of the national existence of Italy; and thus to closing one of the traditional battlefields of Europe. And he principally of all men, unless we except Mr. Cobden, contributed not only to the development of French industry but to the principle, so to speak, of that extended, free, and essentially friendly intercourse among nations which grows out of more open trade. They were not the friends of the Emperor, who declared that the Treaty of Commerce must be torn with cannon. And up to a certain time it cannot be denied that France owed him much, at least in point of influence and power. The period of ten years from the Crimean war was for France a period such as she had never known from 1815 to 1848, a period unquestionably of towering influence, prosperity, and weight. But the Nemesis of the *coup d'état* pursued the Emperor; and the Emperor involved the Empire.

> "Numerosa parabat
> Excelsæ turris tabulata, unde altior esset
> Casus, et impulsæ præceps immane ruinæ."
>
> Juv. *Sat.* x. 105.

44. The Mexican expedition, and the whole scheme of ideas with which it was connected, constituted such a compound mass of blunders, like a huge agglomerated iceberg rising high to heaven and sinking far into the deep, that it might have been deemed incapable of adoption even by an ordinary human being, if it had not captivated what was then considered the astuteness of the Emperor. With him it inveigled the most upright

and intelligent of Austrian princes, and that pure flower of Royalty, the Empress Charlotte, who in every quality of mind and body excelled among the women of her age, and whose intensity of character received a mournful, but we will yet hope not a final witness, from the disturbance of the seat of reason produced by political misfortune.

45. In this transaction was first clearly disclosed the singularly chimerical cast of a mind, that seemed in some forms to exhibit strong signs of power. The disastrous issue of the Mexican affair damaged the position and influence of France, dissolved the halo that seemed to surround the Emperor, raised the hopes of the enemies of his dynasty, and put him, we fear, upon a series of abortive ventures for the recovery of what had been lost. One of these, indeed, would have deserved all praise, had it been followed up with that consistency, which is the best evidence of good faith. The abandonment of personal government was however too conclusively shown to be unreal, when the power of appeal to the people which cannot govern, over the heads of its representatives who can, was reserved on behalf of the Emperor. The trumpery affair of the Belgian Railway, some eighteen months ago, was so handled as to indicate distinctly that there existed a restlessness among the ruling powers of France. But M. de Lavalette, the author of the admirable circular of September 1866, was then happily the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the controversy was after a time composed by the zeal and skill of Lord Clarendon. And so at length we arrived at the epoch when an evil star of Napoleonism had mounted to the highest heaven. Disaster, by the side of which even the disaster of Moscow grows pale, has overtaken it, and it

has been struck, in all likelihood finally struck, to the ground.

46. If we think this great event a cause of congratulation to Europe, it is by no means because the Emperor is responsible for all that the name implies. Nor, unhappily, is it because the rival names represent opposite and sounder principles. It would be difficult to take the character of the King of Prussia for a symbol of political wisdom or moderation, of that of his powerful Minister for a guarantee of scrupulousness and integrity. But the deepest and most formidable complication of the present crisis on the Continent is, in our view, that which has reference to the internal condition of France and to the character of its people. The extraordinary race by which that land is inhabited appear to be richly, nay supremely, endowed with every gift but one; the gift of true political sagacity. Hence it is that, while they are the greatest framers of logical processes, and the most prolific parents of abstract ideas for the solution of all manner of problems, they seem to show in their own case little practical tact available for the management of human affairs. In every other race of excellence, they commonly conquer or vie with the foremost of European nations; in national self-knowledge they seem to be behind the hindmost. France does not know, and cannot discover, how to constitute herself.

47. Gifted with great administrative faculties, her people have now, for near a hundred years, exhibited a woful incapacity for adapting their institutions to their wants, or for imparting to them a character of durability. No French constitution lives through the term of a very moderate farm-lease. The series of perpetual change is not progression; it is hardly even rotation, for in rota-

tion we know what part of the wheel will next come round, whereas the French polity of to-day in no degree enables us to judge what will be the French polity of to-morrow. Accomplished and consummate in the branches of an almost universal knowledge, in this single but great chapter of the appliances of civilised, not to say human, life they have yet to learn their alphabet. What might France not be if, instead of allowing her mouth sometimes to water for the annexation of Belgium, she could import from beyond her northern frontier the political common sense, which makes that small country one of the best governed and most respected members of the European system?

48. With this crudeness, changefulness, and barrenness in point of achieved political results, France becomes before all things a calamity to herself, but she becomes also of necessity a standing cause of unrest to Europe. She spreads a kind of tremor through its ordinary atmosphere. There is always a fear, lest something or other should be required to satisfy her dignity, to slake her thirst for fame, to sustain, almost to titillate, her consciousness of predominance. Nor, when she is unable to arrive at any stable or permanent views with regard to her constitutional government, can we reasonably expect that she should be able firmly to grasp the principles of mutual respect, and several independence, which must regulate a well-ordered family of nations.*

* [It is pleasant, after the lapse of over eight years since this article was written, to turn to account the light which they have thrown upon individuals and nations, so far as this can be done by distant observation. The character of the German Emperor, always known for manhood and fidelity, has acted favourably, by wisdom and moderation, upon the great European issues of 1875–8. There are reasons, which

49. Now justice forbids us to saddle the responsibility of these radical evils upon the Second Empire. If in regard to any of them it was a cause, it had first been an effect. It may be said that it has had its own special sins: the taint of its inception, the traditions of a brilliant but ominous and mainly evil name, and the capital and standing fault of being in an eminent degree apt to work the foreign policy of the country for dynastic purposes. But, if we are to bestow censure on the particular party which has recently ruled in France, for flattering aggressive traditions and for stimulating, through a powerful standing army, that professional spirit of the soldier which, if it be a necessity, is also apt to be an evil and a danger to every country, it is fair to ask what other party opposed to the ruling one, what other period of recent French history, shall we select for approval? The policy of Louis-Philippe and M. Guizot was indeed, in the main, pacific; but this very fact was one of the causes of their fall and expulsion.

50. Is there then no charge, which lies against the Empire as especially its own? Unhappily there is. They were warlike and not peaceful memories which, clustering round the name of the First Napoleon, made that name a passport to public favour in the person of

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were not known to me in Oct. 1870, for believing that Prince Bismarck ventured much, and nobly, in endeavouring to limit the scope of the War, which failed only through the fault of others. And, last and most of all, the political qualities exhibited, in their internal concerns, by the French nation during the last two or three years have been such that, whether the three paragraphs in the text (46–8) were or were not justified at the time, they would, if written now, be highly unjust and irrational. I leave them to the reader's judgment for the time when they were written: to the following years they have no applicability whatever.—W. E. G., 1878.]

his nephew; and, founded in its origin on a combination of force and fraud, the Empire perforce became thereby, in no small measure, an example of that degrading form of human things, in which right is based only upon power. The Emperor promised, and possibly at times desired, to give to France freer institutions. But it was only after he had held supreme power for seventeen years, that he dared to set about what was too soon shown to be after all only a nominal fulfilment of the promise. Unhappily, he then, by the reservation of the right of appeal to the people over the heads of their representatives, deprived the new-born system of all that vitality which belongs to genuine freedom. So that through the whole reign the French nation was really under despotic rule. A people so intellectual, and so advanced, could not thus forego its liberty without profound injury to its national life.

51. The highest example was not edifying. Moreover, in the midst of such a people, absolute rule could only subsist by the zealous and energetic aid of a body of satellites, who were compensated for the unsavoury character of their functions by the high rate of their wages. The profuse and enormous luxury of the Imperial family tended to raise this rate still higher. "*Pro pudore, pro abstinentiâ, pro virtute, audacia, largitio, avaritia vigebant.*"* Where at head-quarters prodigal enjoyment, approaching in its character to public pillage, was the rule, the example set by such authority was followed with a close fidelity in each lower and wider circle of administration. If such a system was adverse to public honesty, it was fatal to public spirit.

* Sall. Catil. c. 3.

52. While all was thus unsound beneath, on the surface all was gorgeous; and the glare of Parisian gaiety and splendour more than ever imposed upon the eye, and tainted the conscience, of the world. It was a close and foul atmosphere, of which the evil odour was only kept down by clouds of incense and floods of perfume. Admitting freely that there were good deeds, and great deeds, which leave trails of light upon the course of the Second Empire, we feel that for France it was a snare, a calamity, a hopeless impediment to solid well-being. Strange indeed that, being such, it should have received thrice over the solemn sanction of an overwhelming popular suffrage; and happy the release from the illusion, even though it will be achieved in the midst not only of disaster but of agony. Nothing can compensate a people for the loss of what we may term civic individuality. Without it, the European type becomes politically debased to the Mahometan and Oriental model. For many generations it has been waning away in France. The great Revolution did not restore the institutions necessary to rear it. Napoleon I. ruthlessly destroyed, in the municipality and the commune, the remaining depositaries of public spirit, responsibility, and manhood. The system of Napoleon III., which worked despotic power under the mask of universal suffrage, aggravated the evil by concealing it:

> "While rank corruption, mining all within,
> Infects unseen." *

53. It will take long to build up this part of the social edifice. Nothing, probably, but the direst calamity could

* 'Hamlet,' iii. 4.

have availed to show the necessity, or prompt the effort. May the time have come! for none can despair of France; and least of all those, who strive to lay bare the sore as the first step towards healing it. But, until France can lay more firmly the foundations of her own government, she never can fulfil all the duties of good neighbourhood to Europe; for those who rule her, feeling themselves dependent on momentary and factitious aids for the maintenance of power, will endeavour to extract from an imposing and ambitious policy abroad the materials of popularity at home. It is a fatal condition for a people, when its rulers descend from their high position to inflame its passions and to trade upon its besetting and traditional infirmities; and when, in the dynastic controversies which sway the land, the aim of each party seems to be to stir the national vain-glory to fever-heat. Of this mischief, the recent war has afforded a painful and egregious instance.

54. The reproach of a pacific policy from powerful opponents helped at least to drive the party of the Emperor into a mood determined upon war, and seeking only the occasion. It was found in the Hohenzollern candidature. The victorious Germans have since been bidden to stay their onward steps, on the ground that the war was not the war of the French people. We fear that, as between nation and nation, there is little force in such a plea. It is impossible to exempt a people from plenary responsibility to another people for the acts of its Government. And yet the allegation in itself is true. It was a faction, in the narrowest sense, which sympathised with the worse, and overruled the better, minds of the Emperor and his Government; and which, by clamour in the Chamber and intrigue in the Court, hurled France into

the war, from the anticipated success of which they reckoned on receiving a new lease of power and of emolument. There is too much reason to believe that the agency of the Government was employed in Paris, during the early part of July, to draw from the excitable, the venal, and the worthless an artificial but violent applause, and to check and discountenance any public expression of the sober judgment of the country, which would have spoken in very different accents. For many a long year, France will rue the consequences of this terrible political offence. In fame, in influence, she must be content with a lower rank, perhaps even for generations to come; and though her wealth will still be vast, even this will certainly be reduced, as a consequence of the war, by several hundreds of millions of pounds sterling.

55. It may seem strange, after an outrage so grave, and a disaster so overwhelming, if we discover in the facts any ground of comfort or of hope; but we hold advisedly that the growth of pacific ideas and habits may be traced in the recent history of France, though not in its very latest chapter. Of the five wars, in which the Emperor Napoleon III. has engaged, none have been demanded by the public opinion of the country. The Crimean and Italian wars, which contemplated purposes useful to Europe, were certainly not forced by opinion upon the Government; while it may with truth be said that the Mexican and German wars were forced upon the people. But may we not draw hope for the future from the terrible chastisement of a rash and unscrupulous ambition, and from the heavy burden of debt which the war will entail; a burden such that we shall not be surprised if France should obtain the unenviable privilege of a public debt nearly or quite equal to our own in amount, and heavier

in yearly charge? The disenchantment may be effectual: Such a state of ideas may come to prevail in France, that the people will not hereafter, even passively or for a time, be led astray by the demons of territorial and military ambition. When the vast and varied energies of that people are left free for the pursuits of peace in thought, in art, in industry; when France, instead of looking askance, with a covetous eye, at objects fatal to European peace, becomes only a vigilant sentinel against any who would disturb it; she will gradually rise anew to her ancient influence and power, and will in all likelihood commence a happier, though not a noisier, era of existence than any she has ever known.

But, for the present,

"All is passed: the sin is sinned." *

56. We have seen on the side of the French, tradition and expectation, the mitrailleuse and the chassepot, and a supposed start in the first moment of the war. With all this, there appears to have been a feeble and corrupt army-government, and a proneness to deep military disorganisation among both officers and men.† Against them the Germans brought numbers, discipline, organisation, a vast artillery, a complete system of scouting and

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* Tennyson's 'Guinevere.'

† We extract the following passage from a captured letter of an officer of MacMahon's army, dated August 26:—

"L'insuffisance des distributions et le désordre des premiers jours de notre retraite sur Saverne et Luneville, a jeté la plus grande indiscipline dans notre corps. Partout on pille et on vole, même dans les maisons; les villages, où nous avons passé, sont plus désastrés qu'ils ne le seraient par les Prussiens. On se vole aussi dans l'armée, même entre officiers; c'est une démoralisation abominable. Notre général en chef fait, depuis deux ou trois jours, de louables efforts pour faire

intelligence, and an incomparable leadership. Nothing, indeed, can be more perfect than what we may term the cast of parts on the German side: the venerable age and hardy courage of the King, the genial intelligence of the Crown Prince, the resolute will and clear eye of Count Bismarck, the profound strategy of Von Moltke, seconded by the ablest coadjutors, and disposing of human life with an appalling profusion, but in steady and regulated proportion to its supply and to its ends.

57. In the course of these observations, we have proceeded upon the supposition that, at some period in the history of this, as of former, wars, the views of the respective parties would be brought, by the force of circumstances, within measurable distance. It is painful to observe, at the latest moment before we go to press, that this period has not yet arrived. The public sentiment of this country has approved the evident opinion of the British Government, that the desire to do good does not relieve those, who may entertain it, from the duty of accurately considering the means at their command, and moreover of refusing to make attempts, which are not entitled to the credit of benevolence, unless they proceed upon an intelligent computation of the respective likelihoods of a beneficial or a mischievous result. But the silence of a Government need not be copied by those who, not invested with authority, aim at assisting the public mind and conscience by discussion. We, therefore, need feel no scruple in saying that it is difficult to

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cesser ces désordres, mais il aura beau faire; notre armée, qui a déjà les généraux les plus incapables, et les officiers les plus ignorants de l'Europe, a aussi les soldats les plus indisciplinés. Nos troupes d'Afrique sont une plaie: elles ont gâté le reste de l'armée sous le rapport de la discipline." "N. N."

accept the present reported position, either of the one party or the other.

58. In France, the Government of National Defence commenced its career by imprudently asserting the doctrine of the inviolability of a soil which, having recently received addition, seemed also to be capable, in the abstract, of suffering subtraction. As though raising pretension were the best way of securing performance, it was further declared that every fortification must remain entire. We will yield, it was said, "*ni un pouce de notre territoire, ni une pierre de nos forteresses.*" * Since this declaration was first made, the Germans have taken Strasburg, repulsed new efforts of Bazaine to break their lines before Metz, invested Paris, and proved, in several actions, the incapacity of the force, which composes its garrison, to make impression on the enormous beleaguering host. The French Government of Defence meets this state of facts by reiterating a boast so wofully out of proportion to its powers and its prospects, that it sounds to Europe like a hollow mockery, while it probably serves to cherish in France the most ruinous delusions.

59. On the other hand, Germany, by the circulars of Count Bismarck, declares that together with indemnity for the past, she must have security for the future; and, laying down not less absolutely the practical application of her very just principle, adds that this security must be taken in the abstraction of French territory. Now this means French territory with its inhabitants. And the question immediately arises, is there to be no regard paid to their feelings in the matter? We do not dispute the

* From the report of M. Jules Favre on his conference with Prince Bismarck at Ferrières.

title of Germany, as matters stand, to be secured by special stipulations; to place France under such limitations in regard to the exercise of her sovereignty in the districts claimed, as shall virtually guarantee their military neutrality; nay, to extort the territory itself from France, provided the population be willing parties to the severance. But not until it has been proved, that transference of the territory is the only way of giving security to Germany, can she be justified in even raising the question without some reference to that essential element.

60. Unhappily, however, M. Jules Favre reports that in the conference of September 20, Count Bismarck used the following extraordinary language, in speaking of the inhabitants of Alsace and a portion of Lorraine, which he had announced his intention to appropriate: "*Je sais fort bien qu'ils ne veulent pas de nous. Ils nous imposeront une rude corvée; mais nous ne pouvons pas ne pas les pendre.*" This, if it were really made, is a harsh, almost a brutal announcement.* Of the whole sum of human life, no small part is that which consists of a man's relations to his country, and his feelings concerning it. To wrench a million and a quarter of a people from the country to which they have belonged for some two centuries, and carry them over to another country of which they have been the almost hereditary enemies, is a proceeding not to be justified in the eyes of the world and of posterity by any mere assertion of power, without even the attempt to show that security cannot be had by any other process.

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* See the note above, p. 232; as bearing on the whole of this and of the following paragraph.

61. We hear much of the civilisation of the Germans. Let them remember, that Italy has been built up, at least from 1860 onwards, upon the groundwork of the expressed desires of the people of its several portions; that England surrendered the possession of the Ionian Islands in deference to the popular desire, expressed through the representative Chamber, to be united to Greece; that even the Emperor Napoleon took Savoy and Nice under cover of a vote, as to which no one can say that it clearly belied the real public sentiment. This is surely a great advance on the old and cruel practice of treating the population of a civilised European country as mere chattels. Are we to revert to that old practice? Will its revival be in harmony with the feeling, the best feeling, of Europe? Will it conduce to future peace? Can Germany afford, and does she mean, to set herself up above European opinion? We can hardly hope that M. Favre has misrepresented Count Bismarck, since the commentary of the Chancellor on Mr. Favre's report takes no exception to this part of it; but we still trust that Count Bismarck has misrepresented his country. But if neither is the case, then we must take leave to say that Germany will yet have to prove her civilisation by some other means than by boasting that six, or that six hundred, letters have been written in good Sanscrit by the soldiers of her army to their friends at home.

62. Yet, great and overpowering as are the questions of the war itself in their present forms, they draw after them the shadows of something greater still than the terms of peace on which it is to be concluded—their consequences on the future of Europe. They may operate in either of two diametrically opposite directions. The one would be as injurious, as the other would be beneficial, to the

civilised world. It is unhappily as yet quite uncertain which way the bias will incline.

63. Amidst the many additions which this age has contributed to the comfort and happiness of man, it has made some also to his miseries. And among these last is the deplorable discovery of methods by which we can environ peace with many of the worst attributes of war; as, for instance, with its hostility to the regular development of freedom, through the influence of great standing armies, and the prevalence of military ideas; with its hostility to sound and stable government, through crushing taxation, financial embarrassment, and that constant growth of public debt which now, with somewhat rare exceptions, marks the policy of the States of Europe; with the jealous and angry temper, which it kindles between nations; and lastly, with the almost certainty of war itself, as the issue of that state of highly armed preparation, which, we are affectedly told, is the true security for the avoidance of quarrels among men.

64. This state of things had reached a point, more than a quarter of a century ago, at which Sir Robert Peel, then representing the Tory or Conservative party in England, with the Duke of Wellington as his colleague, thought it grave enough to be the subject of a solemn appeal to the right feeling and good sense of Europe for its abatement. What has since happened? The nations, which were then chastised with whips, are now chastised with scorpions. Apart from the momentary exigency of the present war, the standing armies of Europe must comprise double the numbers, and must be maintained at more than double the expense, which were then deemed intolerable by persons of such great authority. Growing military establishments, growing debt, growing danger; such is the summary but

true description of the course of affairs down to the awful climax of the present crisis. And the question now stands for a speedy solution, whether the terrible waste of blood and treasure, which is still proceeding, is to stimulate yet more madly for the future the mania of recent years, or is to usher in a period of disarmament and common sense, with some rational chance of tranquillity.

65. There is one consequential change which we must take for granted—a disposition to approach to, or borrow from, the military system of Prussia. To that military system, which has now become the system of Germany, we are aware of but two objections; these, namely, that it is founded on the principle of compulsion, and that its scale is enormous. The most perfect of all armies in its equipments, the Prussian army is maintained at a charge of 735 francs, or about £29 10*s.* per head. The French army, which shares with it the economy resulting from compulsory, and therefore underpaid, labour, and which cannot boast anything like its efficiency in the non-combating departments, costs about one-third more, or £41 10*s.* per head.* The Prussian Army system works by short service and large reserves. It interferes very little with domestic ties. The system it employs for the choice of officers secures the highest efficiency for that capital and governing element of the service, by a severe and practical training, without being open to the objections that attach to mere promotion from the ranks.

66. It can hardly be doubted that other countries, and that we ourselves, shall endeavour to learn all we can from the Prussian system. Indeed, in our own case, under the wise administration of Mr. Cardwell, which

* Laveleye, vol. i. p. 81.

has effected so many improvements, this process has already well begun, in the adoption of the system of shorter service. It must be established among us with due regard to the circumstances of difference which mark the British Empire; but we trust with no further deviation from its principle than such differences absolutely require. What is, if possible, yet more important is the resolute reform of our method of officering; and as Prussia is a country rigidly aristocratic, we trust that the adjustment which has led there to such admirable results, may be found to be, either in its earlier or later form, applicable to our wants. The relative augmentation of a really light cavalry; the local organisation of the regular force, which seems to afford such great facilities for repairing casualties; the means of rendering army officers available for the auxiliary forces, and the question how far civil employment can be put into beneficial connexion with army service, by way both of reward and of reserve; these are among the questions which the present crisis is likely to bring into practical discussion. Lastly, Parliament and the country will, without doubt, remember that among the features of the German system none is more marked than its economy; and the same principle, with due allowance for the greater cost of labour, and of free labour, will, we trust, be steadily kept in view.

67. But it will be a dismal period indeed for Europe, on which we are about to enter, if ever the countries which unhappily still put in force the system of coercive service in the army, under whatever name it may be called, shall be tempted to embrace that one Prussian principle which, as a general rule, compels every able-bodied man to be a soldier. We venture to predict that no European State, which shall place itself in a condition

to put the mass of its people under arms like Prussia, will effect this great object at anything like the Prussian rate. Even in Germany, this method of organisation has led to a heavy increase of taxes; in other countries of dearer labour and less careful administration, such as France, the charge would be ruinous.

68. It is impossible to estimate aright her future military policy, without taking into view the great, nay, the vast increase of charge for debt, which this war will entail. So heavy, in our opinion, will this be, that it will barely be possible for her to sustain it without reductions. She will, therefore, be almost compelled to avoid the cost of yet further extending her military establishments; and she will also, without doubt, experience a powerful reaction from that system of Bonapartism and "bloated armaments," which has cost her so dear. We therefore cherish the hope that this great nation, hitherto so military in ideas and tendencies, may henceforth become the head of a pacific policy on the continent of Europe. Should the popular constitutional tendencies in Germany prevail; should she qualify the principle of universal soldiering, which has now worked out its only rational aim, the independence of the country; the general establishment of this better policy will be easy, and its success pretty certain, at least until time enough shall have passed for men to forget the errors of their forefathers, and the sufferings which those errors have entailed, and shall again begin to tread the same dreary round of folly and remorse.

69. But even if Germany, gloating upon conquest, and enamoured of the instrument which has achieved it, should decline to remit the hard law which dooms the capable man, will he nill he, to a certain period of service,

it will not follow either that she will thereby increase her influence in Europe, or that the pacific policy itself would fail. For France, whom we have supposed to be its chief promoter, would be secure of an immense European support. Italy and Austria would be certain to follow her; Spain, Portugal, and Belgium might almost as confidently be reckoned on. From England she would, we cannot doubt, receive the most unequivocal favour. Nor should we despair even of Russia. The truth is, that nearly the whole of these countries have, by military prodigality, brought themselves to a pass in which accumulated financial difficulty threatens to become, within a short period of years, not merely an embarrassment to a minister, but a grave danger to the State; and we should wrong them in point of common sense, not less than of higher motives, if we supposed them to be without some desire to avail themselves of an incomparable opportunity for a serious conversion to a more rational, a more safe, and a more Christian policy.

70. We will not inquire how far the phlegmatic German will, as such, be a safer depository than the mercurial Frenchman, of vast military power, and of an acknowledged primacy in Europe, wrung from the grasp of his rival. Between the piety of the King of Prussia, which we believe never failed him during the Danish transactions, and the policy of the Chancellor of the Confederation, which, whatever else it may have been, has not been Pharisaical, we are sore put to it to decide whether, in the administration of its great prerogative, Germany will be worthy of the confidence of Europe. We may hope, but we cannot venture to affirm.

71. But it is not the nature of the animal alone, which determines its conduct when in harness. It is the power

of the bit, the efficiency of the driver, the regimen on which it is made to subsist. Our metaphor may not be a very perfect one; but we should venture to suggest that, as applied to this subject, the regimen represents the national temperament, the bit signifies the control of neighbouring Powers, and the driver is that lofty influence belonging to that general and fixed opinion entertained by civilised man, which happily in our times no state or nation, however powerful, can afford to disregard. Placed in the very centre of Europe, Germany would have puissant neighbours east, west, and south of her, in Russia, France, and Austria. Overweening and aggressive conduct on her part would be more easily checked by their combined action on her various frontiers, than would similar conduct on the part of any of these three Powers if we suppose them to have the power and the will to pursue it; for none of them would be so directly subject to the repressive military action of the rest.

72. We have not yet spoken of England; but of her we confidently hope that, which is also likely to be the case with Italy; that is to say, that her hand will be not unready to be lifted up, on every fit and hopeful occasion, in sustaining the general sense of Europe against a disturber of the public peace.

73. In truth the nations of Europe are a family. Some one of them is likely, if not certain, from time to time to be the strongest, either by inherent power or by favouring opportunity. To this strength great influence will attach; and great power over the lot of others. Such influence and power may be abused. In one important respect, Germany may be peculiarly open to temptation to abuse the power which she has undoubtedly acquired. She

alone among modern nations has discovered a secret, which releases her from one of the main checks on a disposition to go to war. She has learned to make it pay; to exact from the enemy the cost of her operations in the shape of pecuniary indemnity. At least, if the people do not find themselves reimbursed, the German Government undoubtedly drives in its wars a highly profitable trade; for the great sums, which were obtained in 1866 from Austria and from her allies, did not pass, as they would with us (if we ever got them), to the national exchequer, but remained at the disposal of the Sovereign and the Executive. On the other hand, from the very nature of their military system, no great people suffer so heavily from war as the Germans in two vital particulars; the sacrifice of the most valuable lives, and the contraction and interruption of the national industry. On the whole, it seems reasonable to hope that the practical character of our Teutonic cousins, together with their huge actual mass of domestic sorrows, will assist them to settle down into a mood of peace and goodwill. But whether they do or not, it is idle to apprehend that they have before them a career of universal conquest or absolute predominance, and that the European family is not strong enough to correct the eccentricities of its peccant and obstreperous members.

74. And now, in conclusion, what is to be our share, as one member numbered in that family, of the political lessons of the war, and of its results? Certainly it will be our own fault, if they are anything else than good and useful. Happy England! Happy, not because any Immaculate Conception exempted her from that original sin of nations, the desire to erect Will into Right, and the lust of territorial aggrandisement. Happy, not only

because she is *felix prole virûm*, because this United Kingdom is peopled by a race unsurpassed, as a whole, in its energies and endowments. But happy, with a special reference to the present subject, in this, that the wise dispensation of Providence has cut her off, by that streak of silver sea, which passengers so often and so justly execrate, though in no way from the duties and the honours, yet partly from the dangers, absolutely from the temptations, which attend upon the local neighbourhood of the Continental nations.

75. Let us examine this matter a little more closely. In the mixed dispensation of human affairs physical incidents often carry or determine profound moral results. Shakespeare saw, three centuries ago, that a peculiar strength of England lay in her insular and maritime position.

> "That pale, that white-faced shore,
> Whose foot spurns back the ocean's roaring tides,
> And coops from other lands her islanders—
> —that England, hedged in with the main,
> That water-walled bulwark, still secure
> And confident from foreign purposes."
>
> 'King John,' Act ii. Scene 1.

And yet no long period had then elapsed since that little arm of ocean, which France still calls the Sleeve, had been from England into France, if not from France towards England, the familiar pathway of armed hosts. The prevision of the poet has been realised in subsequent history. Three hundred more years have passed; and if, during that long period, we have, some three or four times, with no great benefit to our fame, planted the hostile foot in France, the shores of England have remained inviolate, and the twenty miles of sea have thus

far been found, even against the great Napoleon, an impregnable fortification.

76. It may be said the case is now different. It is; and the differences are in our favour. Now as then, the voyage is a danger; now as then, leagues of sea, regarded as mere space, do not yield, as an occupied country may be made to yield, the subsistence of an invading army. Now as then, the necessary operation of landing affords a strong vantage ground of resistance to the defending force. Now as then, the sea entails some uncertainty in the arrival of supplies. But now, as it was *not* then, maritime supremacy has become the proud, perhaps the indefectible, inheritance of England. Nay, recent experience has lifted us even to a higher stage than we had reached before; for whereas, in the days of wooden ships, we were inconveniently dependent upon foreign supply for our materials, we now, being the greatest iron-makers, are thereby also the greatest and most independent shipbuilders, of the world; and while the change of armament has greatly diminished the mere number of crews, and thus reduced the drain upon a population scarcely equal to the demands of our empire, on the other hand freedom of trade, instead of extinguishing, has enlarged that nursery of seamen, from which, in case of necessity, we might hope to man at adequate wages an almost unbounded fleet. Steam, applied to navigation, has done at least as much for a defending as for an invading Power. Even the stores of coal needed for marine locomotion are principally ours. And while, by the aid of this powerful agent, the ships of both nations may scour the coasts, with favourable weather, at from twelve to fifteen or sixteen miles an hour, the railways which gird the land, to say nothing of the telegraph, may

in all weathers carry the armies which are to guard it and their *matériel* from point to point, at twenty, thirty, or forty.

77. Lastly, the enormous appliances of modern armies, their weapons, ammunition, transport, clothing, subsistence, and all the non-combating departments attached to them, are so much of dead weight attached to the live weight of the expedition, which clog and hamper its passage over sea. So much so, that it took weeks for the united power of England and France to arrange and effect the transport of 50,000 men, provided only with means for the moment, from Bessarabia into the Crimea, though not a vessel, nor a gun, nor a man, were on the ground to prevent their landing. It is hard to say whether, or when, our countrymen will be fully alive to the vast advantage they derive from consummate means of naval defence, combined with their position as islanders. Our lot would perhaps be too much favoured if we possessed, together with such advantages, a full sense of what they are. Where the Almighty grants exceptional and peculiar bounties, He sometimes permits, by way of counterpoise, an insensibility to their value. Were there but a slight upward heaving of the crust of the earth between France and Great Britain, and were dry land thus to be substituted for a few leagues of sea, then indeed we should begin to know what we had lost.

78. It might as a general rule be supposed that where there were such inestimable aids towards immunity from attack, there might also be facilities for offence, dangerous to the peace of others. But here it is not so. While everything combines to make us safe, everything also combines to make us harmless. To judge from recent experience, the relative share of maritime force in aggres-

sive warfare is dwindling; and we are a Power essentially, incurably, maritime. It can never be our interest to impose on ourselves the vast injury which would be caused, where labour is for the most part so valuable, by any attempt to vie with the mere numbers of the standing armies of the Continent; and all the sea does for us, as defenders of our own shores, it would impartially do against us when we proceeded to attack the shores of others.

79. And yet we are not isolated. With such a bulwark, and under such restraints with regard to all purposes of violence, we are placed, and that by the very same means, in the closest proximity with Continental countries,

"For seas but join the nations they divide."

With every one of them, and with vast multitudes of persons in each of them, we have constant relations both of personal and of commercial intercourse, which grow from year to year; and as, happily, we have no conflict of interests, real or supposed, nor scope for evil passions afforded by our peaceful rivalry, there is nothing to hinder the self-acting growth of concord. Withdrawn from the temptations of Continental neighbourhood, we are withdrawn also from the direct action of most of the quarrels of Europe. But so far is this state of facts from implying either a condition or a policy of isolation, that it marks out England as the appropriate object of the general confidence, as the sole comparatively unsuspected Power.

80. In every quarrel, in every difficulty, it is her aid that is most courted; it is by her agency that parties, if they seek a mediator, prefer to come together; it is under her leadership that neutrals most desire to move. And this, not because she is believed to be exempt from infirmity,

but because she is known not to be exposed to temptation. All that is wanted is that she should discharge the functions, which are likely more and more to accrue to her, modestly, kindly, and impartially. She will not be popular at all times and with all. In a deadly quarrel such as this, a rigid equity is likely to present to both parties an appearance of coldness and want of sympathy.* She will not be able to keep pace with ardent expectations, which will reproach her with insensibility to public right, with degeneracy from her old traditions of energy and activity, with a tradesmanlike devotion to her peaceful industry. But all these reproaches are only the measure of the anxiety of those who utter them, to obtain the full advantage of that moral weight which her action, if conducted with tolerable judgment, is sure to command.

81. But, in order that she may act fully up to a part of such high distinction, the kingdom of Queen Victoria must be in all things worthy of it. The world-wide cares and responsibilities, with which the British people have charged themselves, are really beyond the ordinary measure of human strength; and, until a recent period, it seemed the opinion of our rulers that we could not do better than extend them yet further, wherever an opening could easily or even decently be found. With this avidity for material extension was joined a preternatural and morbid sensibility. Russia at the Amoor, America at

* It would be easy at this moment to point out the occasional unjust accusations and treatment from both sides in the war, to which we are subject; but it is our duty as well as our wisdom to remember, and to allow largely for, the effects of the excitement attending a mortal struggle, and to believe that our good friends, both in France and Germany, will themselves, when calm is restored, speedily perceive the truth.

the Fee-Jee or the Sandwich Islands, France in New Caledonia or in Cochin-China—all these, and the like, were held to be good reasons for a feverish excitement, lest other nations should do for themselves but the fiftieth part of what we have done for ourselves. These fancies we have outlived. We have awakened to the fact that our duties are already more than adequate to our capacities, that we are hindered, embarrassed, weakened, by the weight of our engagements, and that the secret of strength lies in keeping some proportion between the burden and the back.

82. As regards our Colonies, we have gradually reached the invaluable knowledge, that one and the same secret, the secret of a free autonomy, is a specific alike for the relief of the mother-country, the masculine and vigorous well-being of the dependency, and the integrity of the Empire. As regards the Empire in India, we more and more strive to realise the generous conception, according to which we hold a moral trusteeship, to be administered for the benefit of those over whom we rule. As regards the three kingdoms, the policy of Parliament is aimed at making them a perfectly compacted body, and raising them to the highest level of intelligence and civic energy. Ireland, our ancient reproach, can no longer fling her grievances in the face of Great Britain. Ignorance can no longer plead that it is compulsory, because the road is barred to knowledge. Industry can no longer complain that it is excluded from political power; and never again can the land be racked with the discreditable intrigues of 1866, to arrest the extension of the franchise.

83. We have ceased, or are fast ceasing, from the feverish contest for influence all over the world; and we are learning that that influence which is least courted,

and least canvassed for, comes the quickest, and lives the longest. If we no longer dream of foreign acquisitions, we are content in having treaties of mutual benefit with every nation upon earth; treaties not written on parchment, but based on the permanent wants and interests of man, kept alive and confirmed by the constant play of the motives which govern his daily life, and thus inscribing themselves, in gradually deepening characters, on the fleshly tablets of the heart. We may well ask, and in a happier sense,

> "Quæ regio in terris nostri non plena laboris?"
>
> Æn. i. 460.

One accomplishment yet remains needful to enable us to hold without envy our free and eminent position. It is that we should do as we would be done by; that we should seek to found a moral empire upon the confidence of the several peoples, not upon their fears, their passions, or their antipathies. Certain it is that a new law of nations is gradually taking hold of the mind, and coming to sway the practice, of the world; a law which recognises independence, which frowns upon aggression, which favours the pacific, not the bloody settlement of disputes, which aims at permanent and not temporary adjustments; above all, which recognises, as a tribunal of paramount authority, the general judgment of civilised mankind. It has censured the aggression of France; it will censure, if need arise, the greed of Germany. "*Securus judicat orbis terrarum.*" It is hard for all nations to go astray. Their ecumenical council sits above the partial passions of those, who are misled by interest, and disturbed by quarrel. The greatest triumph of our time, a triumph in a region loftier than that of electricity and steam, will be

the enthronement of this idea of Public Right, as the governing idea of European policy; as the common and precious inheritance of all lands, but superior to the passing opinion of any. The foremost among the nations will be that one, which by its conduct shall gradually engender in the mind of the others a fixed belief that it is just. In the competition for this prize, the bounty of Providence has given us a place of vantage; and nothing save our own fault or folly can wrest it from our grasp.*

* [This Article is the only one ever written by me, which was meant, for the time, to be in substance, as well as in form, anonymous. Motives of public duty, which appeared to be of sufficient weight, both led to its composition, and also prohibited me from divulging the authorship.—W. E. G., 1878.]

VI.

THE HELLENIC FACTOR IN THE EASTERN PROBLEM.

1876.

1. PROBABLY for the first time during two thousand years, the silence of the Pnyx at Athens was broken a few weeks ago by the stir of an assembly comprising, as we are told, about ten thousand persons.† It had been preceded elsewhere, for example in Zante, by a similar and not much smaller meeting. It is interesting for us Englishmen to observe both the Greeks and the Romans of to-day following, like ourselves, the traditions of their remote forefathers, and handling matters of prime public interest in public assembly. In the millennium preceding the long term which I began by naming, such a proceeding would have been regular, and familiar, in any part of Greece.

2. The object of this rather notable gathering was to put forward a claim on behalf of the Hellenic provinces still in servitude, and not permitted even to speak authentically for themselves. The claim is for an equal share in the emancipation, which has been demanded, in various quarters, on behalf of the Slavonic subjects of the Ottoman

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† 'Compte Rendu de l'Assemblée,' &c. Athens, 1876.

Power. The meeting was first addressed by the Professor of History in the University of Athens, who advanced this among his claims to speak on the occasion—that he had seen his brother and his brother-in-law beheaded, his father and his uncle hung. He noticed the general grounds, on which those of his own race are entitled to no less favourable consideration, than their brethren in misfortune, farther north. He noticed also the great distinction between them: "The Slavs have risen this year, the Greeks have not." And the distinction is most important. Repudiating heartily the doctrines of the supreme rights of overbearing might, which still appear to find some countenance among us, I must still admit a material difference between those who show that their enfranchisement is required for the general tranquillity, and those who do not. It is much, if right be done in the first-mentioned class of cases; for Human Justice is ever lagging after Wrong, as the Prayers in Homer came limping after Sin.* Even to the great Healer, during his earthly walk, the "sick folk" were *brought*. Gratuitously to search out all the woe of those who suffer in silence and inaction, desirable as it might be, is scarcely within the conditions of human strength.

3. But this is not disputed by the Greeks of, or beyond, the Kingdom. It appears to be met by a plea of fact which, if it can be made good, is relevant and important. It is thus stated by Professor Papparrhigopoulos:—

"The Powers have made use of every means to repress the disposition of the Greeks to war, by promising that the Greek nation, which for the time refrained from complicating the situation, should at the settlement obtain the same advantages as the Slavs." †

* Il. ix. 498. † Compte Rendu, p. 6.

Professor Kokkinos, following in the discussion, says that free Greece, loyal to the Powers of Europe, had encouraged their brethren still in servitude to rely on those Powers, and that Europe had suitably acknowledged the prudence and patience * which were thus exhibited. The Minister Coumoundouros, in reply to a deputation appointed by the assembly, encourages them to hope that the enlightenment of the Porte, *and* the humanity of Europe, will not drive them to embrace the belief that the gates of Justice may be shattered, but opened never.†

4. Of the steps thus alleged to have been taken by the European Governments, the public, and also the Parliament, of this country are, I apprehend, up to this time in ignorance. It does not appear to me that such steps, if taken, were necessarily wrong, or that, in the midst of the existing complications, it must have been wrong to postpone a statement of their nature. We have indeed, in the Parliamentary Papers of 1876,‡ a communication from the Consul at Canea, affirming the existence of general and deep-seated discontent in Crete, together with the draft of a large measure of change proposed by the Christians; but there is no indication of opinion, or account of any steps taken, at the Foreign Office.

I have thus stated the claim put forward by the Greeks themselves to a hearing at the Conference of the Powers on Eastern affairs, if such a Conference should be held. There are signs, which render it more or less probable that they may proceed to substantiate their claim by *voies de fait*. In any alternative, it is not wise to attempt to get past the present disturbance without giving their existence even a thought.

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* Compte Rendu, p. 14. † *Ibid.* p. 22. ‡ No. 3, p. 284.

"It will but skin and film the ulcerous place." *

For months the Christians of Turkey, other than Slav, have been out of sight, and out of mind. It certainly is not too early to examine a little into their cases.

5. There are four Christian races under the dominion of the Porte. The question of the Slavs is going to the Conference, or the sword. The case of the Wallachs of Roumania is happily disposed of; one of the greatest and best results of the Crimean War. The case of the Armenians, who, like the Wallachs, are stated to be four millions, is presented argumentatively in a *Mémoire* † dated October 1876, and laid before each of the Great Powers. The more proximate case of the Hellenic provinces of European Turkey is that which I shall now endeavour to unfold. And this not only because it is the portion of the house next to the present conflagration, and most likely to be caught by it; but also because the history of the proceedings, through which the Kingdom of free Greece was established, affords most interesting precedents, and an admirable guidance for any Government, or representative of a Government, desirous to deal with the great Eastern problem in the spirit of the best traditions of his country. On their title to be dealt with by the Conference I do not presume absolutely to pronounce. We may see applied to these populations the maxim—

"The voice of any people is the sword
That guards them; or the sword that beats them down." ‡

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* 'Hamlet,' iii. 4.

† Mémoire sur la situation actuelle des Arméniens et sur leur avenir. Dated from 74, Lancaster Gate, London.

‡ Tennyson's 'Harold.'

I cordially hope that it will be deemed wise and just to consider their case. But, without prejudging the point, I proceed to sketch in outline the most material parts of an interesting history.

6. In common with the Italians, but in a still more conspicuous degree, the Greeks have been remarkable among men alike for the favours and the spite of fortune. And it is no wonder if, amidst many difficulties and discouragements, and even such discouragements as arise from defects and vices of their own, they cling to the belief that the severity of their trials is in truth a presage of a happy and distinguished future, acting like the flame of the furnace on the metal which is to issue from it. The fall of the race was indeed from so great a height, and to such a depth of misery, as is without parallel in history. The first stage of their descent was when they came under the Roman dominion. But *Græcia capta ferum victorem cepit.* This first reverse was mitigated by the majesty of the Power to which they succumbed, and by a continuous intellectual reign; such a reign that, when Christianity went forth into the world, no sooner had it moved outwards from its cradle in Jerusalem, than it assumed the aspect of a Greek religion. That aspect it bore for centuries. In the Greek tongue, and by minds in which the Greek element predominated, was moulded that Creed, which still remains the intellectual basis of the Christian system. In the second century, it was still the ruling Christian tongue in Rome, where Pope Victor was the first who wrote in Latin on the business of the Church.* Perhaps the greatest measure, ever accom-

* Döllinger, 'Hippolytus und Kallistus,' chap. 1, p. 28. Plummer's Translation, p. 25.

plished, by a single man at a single stroke was the foundation of Constantinople; whose empire survived, by a thousand years, that of the elder Rome. Here, too, Greek influences acquired ascendency: and we ought to wonder, not so much at the final fall of the great city, as at its long survival; a survival, only brought to its term by the appearance on the stage of foes far more formidable than those, before whom Italy and its proud capital had licked the dust.

7. But, all this time, *numerosa parabat excelsæ turris tabulata.* When still the exclusive mistress of the most refined learning of the world, she was called to bear, in common with other not yet patrician races, the fearful weight of the Ottoman yoke. By the far-sighted cruelty of Mohammed II., the aristocracy of the Greek lands was completely swept away. They exhibited, indeed, no case like that of the general apostasy of the landholders in Bosnia: the repetition of this infamy on a smaller scale in Crete took place at a much later period. Greeks were not only deprived of their natural leaders; they were assailed at every point, and in the very citadel of the family life, by the terrible exaction of the Children-tribute. Not only was the system indicated by that phrase a most cruel and wicked one on the part of the conquerors who invented it, but it carried with it an amount of degradation to the sufferers who submitted, such, perhaps, as never was inflicted even on African slaves. Endured at first in the stupidity of terror, it laid wide and deep, during the two centuries for which it lasted, the foundations of baseness; and it is probably not too much to say that two centuries since its cessation *

* 'Finlay's Greece from 1453 to 1821,' pp. 194, 195.

have not yet everywhere effaced the effects. Nor is effeminacy, especially where thus engendered, a guarantee for humanity. The fathers who gave over the bodies and souls of their children to the tyrant were, thus far, sunk into the region of the brutes, and acquired of necessity something of that habit of mind which is as ready upon occasion to enforce the law of violence, as to cringe before it.

8. While such was the condition of the Greek race, considered on the side of their Ottoman masters, their horizon was not a whit less black in every other quarter. There is no chapter of history more disgraceful to Western Christendom, than that which exhibits the conduct of its various Governments with respect to the entrance of Turkish rule into Europe, and its continuance there. It made, indeed, vigorous and even noble efforts to repel the invaders; but this was when the Turks, having overrun that portion of the South of Europe which adhered to the Oriental Church, began at length to menace, and to some extent to occupy, such European ground, as lay within the precinct of the Latin Communion. These efforts were ultimately successful within their own range. But it was only towards the close of the seventeenth century, that the danger could be said to have passed away from Western Europe. And it was during the same period, which witnessed the great overthrows of the Turks at Vienna (1685) and Peterwaradin (1717), that they were allowed to add to their empire by wresting Crete from the Venetians, and by finally recovering the Morea. The efforts made by Venice were remarkable as proceeding from so small a State, confident only in maritime resources; but they were neither liberating nor crusading efforts, so far as the Christian populations were

concerned. They were commercial and territorial; and if the civil yoke which they imposed were lighter than that which they removed, it was sometimes found that they carried with them a new stumbling-block in the shape of religious rivalry,* whereas the Turks were, as a rule, in regard to questions between one form of Christianity and another, supremely and serenely impartial. At all events we find that, when the long war waged in Crete ended, in 1669, with its surrender to the Porte, the Greek population of the island, who might have given the victory to Venice, did not think it worth their while† to bestir themselves for the purpose. In general, either Europe was indifferent to the subjugation of Eastern Christendom, or at any rate, governed by their selfish jealousies, the Powers could not agree on the division of so rich a spoil,‡ and therefore they suffered a very unnatural oppression to endure.

9. But even political jealousy was not so keen and sharp-eyed an enemy, as ecclesiastical ambition. Of this we have the most extraordinary proof in the letter addressed by Pope Pius II. to Mahomet II. shortly after the capture of Constantinople. The Pontiff exhorts the victorious Sultan (1461) to embrace Christianity, and not only promises, upon that condition, to confer on him, by virtue of his own apostolical authority, the legitimate sovereignty of all the countries he had conquered from the Greeks, but engages to use him for the re-establishment over those countries of the supremacy of the Papal Chair. *Tuum brachium*, he says, *in eos imploraremus, qui*

* Gordon's 'History of the Greek Revolution,' i. p. 9.
† Finlay's 'Greece,' p. 132.
‡ Pichler, 'Geschichte der Kirchlichen Trennung,' i. 500.

*jura Ecclesiæ Romanæ nonnunquam usurpant, et contra matrem suam cornua erigunt.** Such was the consolation administered, on the Christian side and from the highest quarter, to those crushed under the calamity of Ottoman domination. It was their peculiar fate to be smitten on one cheek because they were Christians, and on the other because they were not Latin Christians. Had it not been, says Dr. Pichler, the learned historian of the Schism, for the religious division of East and West, the Turks never could have established their dominion in Europe.†

10. Finlay tells us that Greeks, prosecuting their calling as merchants in the West, used actually to assume the disguise of Turks, in order to secure for themselves better treatment than they could have received as Eastern Christians.‡ And yet we learn from the same author, that they suffered heavily for their supposed identity of religious profession with the Latins. The Moors, expelled from Spain, and taking refuge in the East, might not unnaturally pay off, when they found themselves in the ascendant, some of their old scores; part, at least, of what they had suffered from the victorious Christians of Spain. But the Jews also migrated in large numbers at the same time to the same quarter, and took a very high social position in the East as merchants, bankers, and physicians. How did they use it?

"They were eager," says Finlay, "to display their gratitude to the Ottomans; and the inhuman cruelties they had suffered from the Inquisition made them irreconcilable enemies of the Christians." §

11. Nor was this all. The Turks did not long enjoy

* Pichler, i. 501. † *Ibid.* i. 498. ‡ Finlay's 'Greece,' p. 186.
§ *Ibid.* p. 132.

a maritime superiority corresponding with their military power by land. They had not nautical, in the same high degree as soldierly, aptitudes; and they were greatly dependent for manning their ships on the Greeks, of whom they had 25,000 in the fleet defeated at Lepanto. Therefore the seas afforded the means of constant irregular attack on Turkey. They were covered with pirates; and the religious orders of St. John and St. Stephen found it a meritorious, as well as profitable, occupation to pursue buccaneering practices on the coasts of the countries and islands, which were mainly inhabited by the Greek race. For, in so acting, they were assailing the territories of the infidel, and diminishing his power. The Greeks were commanded into Turkish, and kidnapped into Christian, galleys. Barbary competed in these lawless practices. Devastation was spread over the coasts of Greece, which often became uninhabitable;* and this plague was not extirpated, until the epoch of political redemption came.

12. Nor was this singular complication of calamities materially relieved by the fact, that Greek intelligence had been largely drawn upon to bring up to par the scantier supply of Turkish brains. Among the Viziers and other governing Turks no small numbers were of Greek extraction or mixed blood; but no trace of this relationship seems easily perceivable in their conduct. Still more remarkable was the creation of the class of Phanariots, so called from the Phanar, a quarter of Constantinople which they inhabited; an artificial aristocracy,† in whom selfish interests left little room for the

* Finlay's 'Greece,' pp. 106–118.

† "A fictitious and servile noblesse."—Gordon, 'Greek Revolution,' i. p. 34.

growth of traditional feelings, so that their services to themselves were boundless, but to their nation rare. The opening for promotion tended to stir the desire for education so congenial to Hellenes. But, as tax-gatherers, these official Greeks were often the instruments of tyranny in detail; and a numerous body, possessed of influence, while on the whole they used it somewhat to alleviate oppression, at least in Greece, yet acquired an interest in supporting that Ottoman domination, upon which they personally throve.*

13. To the Greek race at large, these calamities were not only of an afflicting, but also of a most corrupting character. The song of Homer witnesses that even the mild slavery of the heroic ages took away half the manhood of a man.† But the slavery (for this it really was) imposed by the Ottoman Turk, not only substituting will for law, but mutilating the sacred structure of the family, and clothing the excesses of tyrannical power with the awful sanctions of religion, was such as to take away a full half of the remaining virtue of a slave. It seems indisputable that the effect was to corrode very seriously the character of the race.‡ The fetter, that eats into the flesh, eats also into the soul. God made man free, yet doubtless in foresight of the mischiefs that would result from the abuse of freedom. The abuse of it is fault and guilt, but the loss of it is mutilation. Under Ottoman rule, and in exact proportion as it was unqualified and unresisted, together with intellectual, moral, and domestic life, the sense of nationality, and the desire of recovery, sank to the lowest ebb.

* Gordon's 'History of the Greek Revolution,' 293–296.
† Od. xvii. 322.
‡ Gordon's 'History of the Greek Revolution,' i. 32, 33.

14. One treasure only remained to the Greek through the long night of his desolation; it was "the pearl of great price." Setting aside the involuntary victims of the Children-tribute, only a most insignificant minority of the Christian races, or at least of the greater part of them, submitted to purchase by apostasy* immunity from suffering. Yet that immunity carried with it free access to all the pleasures and advantages of life; especially to that most intoxicating and corrupting pleasure, the power of simple domineering over our fellow-creatures. That faith, which ought to bear fruit in the forms of all things fair and noble and humane, shrank into itself, as it often shrinks in cases less unhappy; and slept through the icy winter of many generations. But a twinkling light still marked the habitation it had not deserted; and it abode its time, bearing within itself the capacity and promise of a resurrection to come. While we admit and deplore the deep gloom of ignorance, and the widespread ravages of demoralisation, let there also be a word of tribute rendered to the virtue of one heroic endurance and persistency, which is without parallel in the history of Christendom.†

15. If we look to the means by which this great result was achieved, I cannot but assign the utmost value to the fact that even the popular services of the Eastern Church appear to be profusely charged with matter directly drawn from Scripture; and that access was thus given to a fountain of living waters, even where the voice of the preacher was unheard, and books were almost unknown.

* Gordon's 'History of the Greek Revolution,' i. 33.

† [Great honour is due to the population of Ireland for resisting the heartless propagandism of the penal laws. But the Ireland of the penal laws was a Paradise, compared with Eastern Europe under the Ottoman domination.—W. E. G., 1878.]

Thus the ministration of the Christian rites was kept in some relation with that action of the human intelligence, which they encourage and presuppose. But I think that the impartial student of history must also admit that, in these dismal circumstances, the firmly knit organisation of the Christian clergy rendered an inestimable service, in helping the great work of conservation. And it is not without interest to remark how many circumstances favour the belief that in this work the largest share belonged not to the monk in his cloister, or the Bishop on his throne, but to the secular, or, as they are now called, the working clergy. The institution of marriage made and kept them citizens as fully as the members of their flocks: and "chill poverty," if it "repressed their noble rage," removed them from the temptations, to which the order of prelates was exposed by their often close and questionable relations with Constantinople. Mr. Finlay, who has exposed the results of this contact with, to say the least, an unsparing hand, has nevertheless placed upon record the following remarkable judgment:

"The parish priests had an influence on the fate of Greece quite incommensurate with their social rank. The reverence of the peasantry for their Church was increased by the feeling that their own misfortunes were shared by the secular clergy. . . . To their conduct we must surely attribute the confidence, which the agricultural population retained in the promises of the Gospel, and their firm persistence in a persecuted faith. The grace of God operated by human means to preserve Christianity under the domination of the Ottomans." *

16. Let us now consider how the door of hope was opened, and the opening gradually widened, for the race. The

* Finlay's 'Greece,' p. 181.

decay and extinction of the Children-tribute, in the seventeenth century, is to be considered as the removal of an insurmountable obstacle to all recovery. The contact with Venice, even in political subordination, maintained variously at various times, and never wholly lost in the (so-called) Ionian Islands until the extinction of the long-lived Republic, may at least have tended to maintain some sense of a common life, and common interests, with the rest of Christendom. The gradual loss by the Turks of their military supremacy was at least a negative advantage, a remote source of hope, to those whom they held in servitude. Some admissions, too, must be made on behalf of Turkey. Whether to avoid trouble, or for whatever reason, in certain districts, as in the Armatoliks, in Maina, in Sphakia, a more or less wild local independence was permitted to subsist. And candour also compels us to confess that the gradual inroads of Russia, with its rising power, upon the Ottoman Empire, and its active interference in the Danubian Principalities, suggested in idea the figure of a deliverer, rising on the far horizon.

17. In the peculiar case of Chios, the large principles of local self-government, established under the Genoese trading company of the Giustiniani, were respected by the Sultans after the conquest of the island in 1566. It became the home of comparative security and prosperity. It retained this character until the epoch of the Greek Revolution, when all, or nearly all, was quenched in blood by a massacre even more sanguinary, though apparently in some respects less fiendish, than the Bulgarian massacres of the present year. By this condition of relative freedom, continued through generations, the inhabitants of the island rose to a superior level

of intelligence; and it is indeed a remarkable fact, that Chios has supplied the chief part of those mercantile families, so full of intelligence, enterprise, and shrewdness, who have given in our day to Grecian commerce its very prominent and powerful position in the West, as well as in the East, of Europe. What a lesson, on the comparative results of servitude on the one hand, and even a very modest share of freedom with order on the other!

18. When the Morea returned, by the Peace of Passarowitz in 1718, under Turkish dominion, the cessation of the Children-tribute had for some time removed a powerful check upon the growth of the population; and the system came, at least partially, into vogue of commuting the personal services of the rayah, and exactions in kind, for money payments of fixed amount.* In the eighteenth century, and in the nineteenth down to the time of the Revolution, the population of the Morea would appear to have increased from 200,000 (1701)† to twice that number.

19. The consequence of this rising energy was soon exhibited in the activity of Russian influence, and in the readiness with which welcome was accorded to the rather selfish plans of Catherine II. In 1770, her agents promoted a revolt in the Peloponnesos and in Crete, but with the avowed intention of bringing them under the crown of the Empress.‡ The result, as might be expected, was discouraging; and in the peace of Kainardji, which did so much to extend Russian power and influence over the Christians of Turkey in general, no other care was taken of the Greeks than the insertion of a clause of amnesty,

* Finlay's 'Greece,' p. 281. † *Ibid.* p. 237. ‡ *Ibid.* p. 308.

which was left to execute itself. What this meant, will be readily understood.* They shared, however, in principle, and they had qualities enabling them to turn to peculiar account, the strange but very valuable privileges of the Barat, under which Ottoman subjects, residing in Ottoman territory, obtained a charter of denaturalisation, and the privileges of the subjects of some friendly power, to whom their allegiance was transferred.†

20. But the time soon arrived when the Greeks began to feel the moral influence of the French Revolution, of growing commerce, and of the improvements effected in their language by progressive approximations to the ancient standard. By the time of the Treaty of Vienna, they had so far imbibed the spirit and sense of nationality, that it is said disappointment was felt on its being found that nothing was done for the Greek race. The influence of the mischievous combination, which daringly assumed the name of the Holy Alliance, was undisguisedly adverse to them. The Congress of Laybach, at the outset of the Revolution, declared its hostility to every struggle for freedom. The Congress of Verona,‡ which followed closely upon the great massacre of Chios, was not roused by sympathy or horror to authorise any positive measure or policy against Sultan Mahmoud; and the religious sympathies of the Emperor Alexander were upon the whole overborne, in the determination of Russian policy, by his horror of democracy.§

21. But the opinion and sense of communities had now

* Gordon, i. 31.

† Finlay's 'History of the Greek Revolution,' i. 131.

‡ *Ibid.* ii. 162.

§ A different view, to some extent, is taken in Joyneville's 'Life and Times of Alexander I.,' vol. iii. chaps. vi. and vii.

a larger influence than formerly on the course of affairs, and even on the action of Governments. The Greeks were advancing in education and in wealth, whilst the process of decay had visibly attacked the proud Empire of the Ottomans. Hellenic courage had revived among them, fostered partially by piracy and *brigandage*, but also by the formation of regular military bands, composed from the *armatoli*. These were a local Christian militia, who, in the strange and anomalous condition of the Turkish Empire, had been allowed to exercise great power in parts of the peninsula, until in later times the centralising operations of the Sultans, endeavouring to circumscribe their action, threw them into an attitude of resistance to the Government, and sometimes into habits of absolute rapine. From the materials thus supplied, several regular corps had been constructed in connection with various Governments. On the sea, there had been formed a race of hardy mariners, who manned the Greek trading ships, and knew how to work the guns, that they carried for defence against the piracy still infesting their coasts.

22. All these separate materials were brought into the possibility of combination by the Philikè Hetairia;* a secret society of considerable value, in whose bosom lay the seeds of the revolution, waiting the day when they should burst from the surface. This combination grew out of or replaced a literary institution called the Philomuse Society, which, like the Agricultural gatherings at a more recent period in Italy, appears to have cloaked its aims under a title calculated to avert suspicion. The Hetairia had a decided relation to Russian influence, as well as to Greek independence; but it was influence of a

* Gordon, i. 42; Finlay, i. 120.

popular kind, such as we have witnessed in every energetic operation during the present year. All the European Governments were alike hostile at the time. Still, in the case of Russia, there was this difference, that the Hellenes might not irrationally regard her as the natural enemy of their enemy. The ramifications of this society were wide, and its uses, at least its preliminary uses, would seem to have been considerable.*

23. It was not, however, by the advised counsel of the conspirators that the time of the outbreak was finally determined; but by the war between Sultan Mahmoud and his formidable vassal, Ali Pacha of Joannina in Albania, which appeared to offer an opportunity for action too tempting to be slighted. It was in the year 1821, and in the region of the Principalities, that the movement began. But it was essentially Greek,† and could only live and thrive on its own soil. In Southern Greece it marked its origin, with fatal energy, in a widespread massacre of the dispersed Mussulman population. It rose to nobler efforts, and to great exploits; but I am not required to attempt, for the present purpose, the details of military history. It offers in detail a chequered picture of patriotism and corruption, desperate valour and weak irresolution, honour and treachery, resistance to the Turk and feud one with another. Its records are stained with many acts of cruelty. And yet who can doubt that it was upon the whole a noble stroke, struck for freedom and for justice, by a people who, feeble in numbers and resources, were casting off the vile slough of servitude, who derived their strength from right, and whose worst

* Finlay and Gordon seem to differ much in their estimates of the efficiency of the Hetairia.

† Finlay, i. 169.

acts were really in the main due to the masters, who had saddled them not only with a cruel, but with a most demoralising, yoke?* Among the propositions, which seem to be applicable to the facts collectively, are these: first, that it lay beyond the power of Turkey to put down the rebellion, without the aid of Ibrahim's ability and of the Egyptian forces;† secondly, that gratitude for what Greece had once been and done produced much foreign aid, especially in the noble forms of individual devotion, as from Byron, Church, Gordon, Hastings, and others: thirdly, that the efforts made would have been ineffectual to achieve a complete deliverance, without foreign assistance of another sort.

24. Every traveller in Greece and its islands will speedily learn that upon the list of virtues obliterated from, or rather impaired in, the general Hellenic mind, the sense of gratitude is not included. Nowhere is it more lively.

One of the most brilliant names of our political history is also one of the names dearest to the heart of Greece. It is the name of George Canning. Let us now see by what wise and bold action that place in the fond and tenacious memory of a country, and a race, was obtained.

25. The war of the Revolution reached at first very widely over the range of territories inhabited by the Hellenic race, from Macedonia to Crete; but after a time came to be contracted, as far as land operations were concerned, within limits narrower than those of the historical Greek Peninsula. The moderate capacity and

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* See, on this subject, a noble passage from Lord Russell's 'Memoirs of the Affairs of Europe,' which is cited by the Bulgarian Deputies at p. 25 of their recent pamphlet. † Gordon, ii. 171.

indifferent morality, but too observable among the Greek leaders, convinced the acute and penetrating mind of Lord Byron that the difficulties of the enterprise were vast. In August 1824, before Ibrahim with his Egyptian forces had taken part in the quarrel, the Greek Government entreated England to take up the cause of independence, and frustrate the schemes of Russia.* Mr. Canning received this letter on November 4th, and answered it on the 1st of December. In his reply he only promised that Great Britain would mediate, on the request of Greece, with the assent of the Sultan, a friendly sovereign who had given to this country no cause of complaint. The chief importance of this answer lay, first, in the fact that it included the recognition of a government† authorised to act for the Greeks, and thus of their latent right to form themselves into a State: secondly, that it indicated a step on which, when taken by them, he would be prepared to found further proceedings. He had indeed already, in 1823, by a recognition of the Turkish blockade of the Greek ports, given to the insurgents the character of belligerents.‡ But it seems plain on grounds of common sense, although in 1861 the question came to be clouded by prepossessions, that a measure of this nature is properly determined by considerations of fact, rather than of principle.

26. In August 1825, the military pressure, through the invasion of the Peloponnesos by the Egyptian force, had become severe: and an act, as formal and authoritative as the condition of a State still in embryo would

* Finlay's 'Greek Revolution,' ii. 166; Gordon, ii. 283.

† Tricoupi, 'Hellenikè Epanastasis,' vol. iii. p. 193.

‡ 'La Russie et la Turquie,' par Dmitri de Boukharow. Amsterdam.

permit, then declared that "the Greek nation places the sacred deposit of its liberty, independence, and political existence, under the absolute protection of Great Britain."

Mr. Canning at once perceived the full significance of the step; and entered upon perhaps the boldest and wisest policy, which has been exhibited by a British Minister during the present century. It did not consist in empty but offensive vaunts of the national resources, or loud proclamations of devotion to British interests, of which Britons, like other nations in their own cases respectively, have little need to be reminded. Neither did it rest on those guilty appeals to national fears and animosities, which it is too much to expect that the body of a people can withstand when they come to them with the sanction of authority. On the contrary, its leading characteristic was a generous confidence in the good sense, and love of liberty, which belonged to his countrymen, and a brave and almost chivalrous belief that they would go right if their leaders did not lead them wrong.

27. Before Mr. Canning took office in 1822, the British Government viewed the Greek rebellion with an evil eye, from jealousy of Russia. According to Finlay,* its aversion was greater than that of "any other Christian Government." Its nearest representative, Sir Thomas Maitland, well known in the Ionian Islands as King Tom, after breaking faith with the people there by the establishment of a government virtually absolute in his

* 'Greek Revolution,' ii. 161; Gordon, i. 315. Also compare Tricoupi, 'Hellenikè Epanastasis,' i. 339 *seqq.*; ii. 219; iii. 267. On the change in the English policy, and its effect, see Tricoupi, iii. 191–194. The majority of Mr. Canning's colleagues did not sympathise with him: but he had the advantage of a thoroughly loyal Chief in Lord Liverpool.

own hands, endeavoured (but in vain) to detect by the low use of espionage the plans, yet in embryo, of the Revolution. For no man could there be a greater temptation to indulge feelings of hostility to the despotic governments of Europe, than for a Minister, who was more hateful in their eyes than any Secretary of State that either before or since has held the seals of the Foreign Office. But he saw that the true method of preventing the growth of an exorbitant influence, of disarming Russian intrigue, and shutting out the power of mischief, was for England to assume boldly her own appropriate office as the champion of freedom, and thus to present her figure in the eyes of those who were struggling to attain the precious boon. Invested with a sole authority by the address of the Greeks, and thereupon at once tendering, through Mr. Stratford Canning, his distinguished cousin, the mediation of England to the Porte, he at the same time sought to associate with himself as partner in his office that Power, who, as he well knew, had it in her hands either to make or mar his work.*

28. The circumstances were in some respects propitious. Alexander, who had been perplexed with perpetual balancing between his Orthodox sympathies and his despotic covenants or leanings, died before the close of 1825: and Nicholas, his successor, expended the first-fruits of his young imperial energies in repelling the mediation of England as to his own quarrel with the Porte, but also in accepting, with all the energy of his formidable nature, that partnership in the patronage of the struggling Greeks, which was tendered to him by the Duke of Wellington on the part of the British Govern-

* Compare Tricoupi, 'Hellenikè Espanastasis,' iii. 278.

ment.* In Greece itself, the effect is described by Tricoupi in few words: ἡ Ἑλλας ἤγγλιζεν ὅλη: all Greece became English.†

29. Had Mr. Canning been a man of infirm purpose, or of narrow and peddling mind, he might readily have found excuses for disclaiming special concern in the quarrel between the Sultan and his subjects. The party, by which Lord Liverpool's Government was supported, did not sympathise with that or with any other revolt. The Philhellenes of England were but a sect, limited in numbers and in influence. But, above all, there had been then no ground to fear lest Russia, by an affected or real protection, should shut out this country from her proper office. Russia had surrendered herself, in the main, to the debasing influence of Metternich.‡ She had in 1823, in the character of an advocate for the Greek cause, produced a plan for dividing the country into three Hospodariates, to be governed by native rulers, with the fortresses in the hands of Ottoman garrisons; and had even alleged, as a ground for its adoption, that it highly favoured the principal families, and would detach them from the interests of the insurrection. Its single merit was, that it covered the entire range of the Hellenic lands. But it seemed to give ground for the accusation of Finlay,§ that its aim was to keep Greek feeling in a state of chronic irritation, and thus to perpetuate the need of Russian intervention. At the outset of the war, the attitude of this great State had been one of undisguised hostility.‖ It not only dismissed Hypsilantes,

* Compare Tricoupi, 'Hellenikè Espanastasis,' iv. 2, 3.
† *Ibid.* iii. 267. ‡ 'La Russie et la Turquie,' p. 82.
§ 'Greek Revolution,' ii. 165. ‖ *Ibid.* i. 155 *seqq.*

who commanded in the Principalities, from the Russian army, and gave the necessary consent for the entry of Turkish troops into those provinces to put down the insurrection, but it ejected from Russian territory, under circumstances of great severity, a hundred and fifty Greeks, who were refused admission into Austria, and into the Sardinia of *that* day, and who only by means of private alms were enabled to return to their country.* But Russia had also controversies of its own with the Porte, arising out of the articles of the Treaty of Bukharest (1812); and indirectly those controversies favoured the cause of the insurrection, by requiring Turkish troops to be moved upon the northern frontier of the empire.

30. It was under these circumstances that Mr. Canning made his far-sighted appeal to the Czar. And it was by the concurrence of the two countries that the work received an impetus such as to secure success. In the month of April 1826, an important protocol was signed at St. Petersburg, of which the leading terms are as follows. Greece shall be a tributary State, governed by authorities of its own choice; but with a certain influence reserved to the Porte in their appointment. The Greek people shall have the exclusive direction of their foreign relations. The lands of Turkish proprietors shall be purchased by the State. The Second article provides for an offer of mediation with the Porte; and the Third for the prosecution of the plan already declared, should the Porte refuse the offer. The delimitation of territory is reserved. The two Governments renounce, by a happy covenant, imitated in 1840, and again at the outbreak of

* 'Greek Revolution,' ii. 166; Gordon, ii. 82.

the Crimean War, all exclusive advantages, and all territorial aggrandisement. Lastly, the concurrence of the other three Great Powers is to be invited.* This protocol was followed, through the aid of British and French influence, by the Treaty of Akerman, which settled the outstanding differences between Russia, and the Porte, made further provision respecting the Principalities, and re-established in principle the autonomy of Servia.†

31. The offer of mediation agreed on in the protocol was refused by the Porte, which now relied on its military successes, and which had not to deal with an united Europe; though the France of the Bourbons, much to its honour, had associated itself with the Courts of England and of Russia. The refusal brought about the signature, in July 1827, of the Treaty of London. This treaty was the great ornament of the too short-lived Administration of Mr. Canning; as the policy, which it brought to decisive effect, was the crown of all his diplomacy. It provided for a renewed offer of good offices to the Porte, and for compulsory measures to give practical effect, in case of a renewed refusal, to the protocol of 1826. But, after not many days, Mr. Canning was no more.

32. Then followed, in rapid succession, the declaration of a compulsory armistice, the consequent destruction of the Turkish fleet by the battle of Navarino in November, the dismissal of the Ambassadors from Constantinople, the war declared in April 1828, on Russian grounds, by the Czar, and the advance of his conquering armies to the capture of Adrianople in August 1829. At that point the Emperor Nicholas perceived from many signs, and doubtless among them from the attitude of England,

* 'La Russie et la Turquie,' pp. 92–94. † *Ibid.* pp. 95–101.

the prudence of a halt. But to him, and to his country, aided by the good offices of Prussia, redounded the final honour of including in the Russian Treaty of Peace the provisions of July 1827. The tenth article of the Treaty of Adrianople is the international charter of the independent existence of Greece.* Though the Sultan had vaguely agreed to the concession before the Treaty, at the instance of England and France, yet his willingness to comply may be set down, in the main, to the formidable nearness of the Russian army.

33. A British subject can, as such, find little pleasure in tracing the later stages of the history. It is indeed easy to understand why in 1829, with Constantinople opened to the Russian armies, the British Government should have been disturbed. But it is not so easy either to comprehend, or to justify, the rapid change of tone and feeling which followed the accession of the Duke of Wellington to power in January 1828; and which stigmatised the battle of Navarino, in the Royal speech at the commencement of the session, as an untoward (as it was certainly unexpected) event. An error, not perhaps more striking, but yet more grievous in its consequences, was the narrow amount of territory accorded to the new Kingdom, as if at once to abate the high hopes and rebuke the noble daring of its people, and to condemn the infant State to a deplorable weakness, and a perpetual tutelage.

34. Finlay says, with truth, that the Revolution of Greece was the people's revolution. They exhibited a tenacity and valour, not less than that of the American

* Finlay, 'Greek Revolution,' ii. 222; 'La Russie et la Turquie,' pp. 102–113.

colonists in their famous revolt, which some despotic sovereigns showed themselves very ready to assist. We need not resent that assistance. It brought to a sharper and speedier crisis a war, which would otherwise have been interminable, between the two most tenacious and self-reliant nations in the world. The same service was done to Turkey by the Three Powers; and from higher motives. Their abstinence would not have replaced the Sultan in a real sovereignty. Fortresses taken, armies discomfited, would have seemed to be, but would not have been, the end. The hill, the forest, and the blue sea would have given refuge to their hardy children; and the contest would have been dispersedly but resolutely maintained by a race, to whom as yet, except in the Black Mountain, no equals in valour have appeared among the enslaved populations of the East. But if this was a notable resemblance, there was another yet more notable contrast, between the cases of America and Greece. The populations directly interested were not very different in number. Of quick and shrewd intellect there certainly was no lack in either. But the solid statesmen, the upright and noble leaders, who sprang forth in abundance to meet the need in the one case, were sadly wanting in the other. The colonists of America had been reared under a system essentially free; and they rose in resentment against an invasion of freedom but partial, and comparatively slight. The revolted Hellenic population had for four centuries been crushed and ground down under a system, far from uniform in a thousand points, yet uniform only in this, that it was fatal to the growth of the highest excellence. It is in and by freedom only, that adequate preparation for fuller freedom can be made.

35. The uneasiness of Greece in its provisional con-

dition, under Capodistrias as the President of a republican Government, was extreme; and diplomacy still did it a service, greater than perhaps it knew, in offering, or promoting the offer of, its crown to Prince Leopold * of Saxe Coburg, first among the Statesman-Kings of his day, or perhaps his century. He at first accepted the Hellenic throne; but the intrigues of Capodistrias, in representing difficulties, and also in creating them, appear to have so far darkened the prospect, as to have brought about his resignation. With that resignation passed away the hope of a brilliant infancy for Greece. The small number of princes, disposable for such a purpose as filling the vacant kingship, was probably further reduced by the jealousies of reigning families and their States. And, though the average capacity of the members of royal houses may be considerably above that of the community at large, but a very small part, out of a very small total, can be expected to rise to the standard of faculty and character required in order to meet the arduous calls of such a position.

36. King Otho was neither a depraved, nor a neglectful, sovereign. But he had no conception of free government; the stage on which he had to act admitted only of its exhibition in Lilliputian proportions: and there were no indigenous statesmen suited to supply his deficiencies. Strangers were brought in for ministers. The spirit of faction, and, worst of all, of foreign faction, prevailed at the centre. Absolutism was the medicine applied to the infirmities of the country; weakness and disorder were the result. And when a Constitution was established in 1843, it was alike premature and defective, both in itself, and in that it had to be worked by a Sovereign incapable

* Finlay, ii. 224; Tricoupi, iv. 380, 381.

of comprehending it. In 1862, the patience of the people was finally exhausted, and King Otho disappeared. Perhaps it is only as from that year, that free Greece ought to be considered as put upon its trial. And even when the stage was thus cleared, and a Sovereign of promise was at length secured for the country, it was the promise of boyhood only, and some seasons had to pass before the young King George attained the years of active manhood.

37. This outline, so general and so slight, would require, of course, correction, as well as development, if made applicable to details. But some review of the past is necessary, in order to secure a fair chance of judging rightly of the present. And here we encounter a school of thought, whose maxim it is that the emancipation of Greece has resulted in a total failure. Let me now first show that competent judges have not thought so, and afterwards ask, whether this sentence of sweeping condemnation is warranted by the facts.

The Seven Islands, which bore the name of the Septinsular Republic, are scattered along the coast, from Epiros to the extreme south of the Morea. They are independent in thought and feeling of one another; and in the partition of the offices of government, under the British Protection, a keen rivalry prevailed. No one probably will be found to hold, that that chapter of our history is worthy of its general strain. Sometimes, when we preached constitutional doctrine to Continental sovereigns, the case of the Ionian Islands was cast in our teeth. It was at one time my duty to study carefully the history of the connection, and I must say that, though the general intentions of the Protecting Power were good, the reproach was in various respects well

deserved; even down to a period, when King Tom and his system had been apparently repudiated. To share a common subordination is not a principle of common life. The Islands had no other principle of such life, except one, that of their Hellenic nationality. And this, which was a reality, and an honour, some Englishmen were led absurdly to deny, because the Italian language was in use among the ruling class, with a very limited infusion, if any, of Italian blood. Why did we not, on the establishment of a free Greece, seize the opportunity of putting an end to a relation manifestly provisional, and relieving them and ourselves from a position which in any other view was false from the root upwards, by allowing them to take their natural place as part of the newly constituted State?

38. The question appears a reasonable one. Yet we have no reason to suppose that even Mr. Canning contemplated such a measure. It is probable, that he found himself bound hand and foot by a military tradition, supposed to draw its origin from the great Napoleon. If Napoleon did indeed teach, as is said, the great military value of Corfu, it would be interesting to observe at what period of his career he promulgated the doctrine. Was it after, or was it before, six or eight thousand of his veteran troops in that Island, under Berthier, were neutralised, for all the years from the French conquest to his abdication, by a couple (I believe) of small British vessels?* Even in the times of sailing ships, and of an artillery which has

* These troops returned to France in 1814; and I found it currently stated in the Islands, though I have never been able to ascertain the facts, that, liberated by his defeat and abdication, they were among the very first to join his standard on the arduous occasion of his return from Elba.

since been not so much improved as transformed, and with reference also to the monopolising schemes of an aggressive power, it may be asked, what element of strength did Corfù secure for a possessor who had not the command of the sea? and what real addition did it make to the military resources of one who had? Of the military burden, for a country like this, of maintaining garrisons of six or eight thousand men, whether in Corfù or in the islands collectively, it is needless that I should speak.

39. No man was more keenly sensitive than Lord Palmerston on subjects connected with military power, or more alive to the defective state, and only qualified progress, of free Greece. Yet, in 1862, when first the prospect of free government in an effective form was opened for that country, he with Lord Russell proposed, and his Cabinet promptly agreed, to make arrangements for the surrender of the Protectorate, and the incorporation of the Seven Islands with the continental State. This was a practical witness to the judgment passed by that Cabinet, and especially by Lord Palmerston and Lord Russell, on the hopefulness of the future for Greece. Had they not had confidence in her prospects, they could not have deemed it wise and right to promote the transfer of the Ionian population from British protection to the rule of the young King.

40. But this was not all. It is within my knowledge that they were most desirous, even at that late period, to retrieve the error, committed at the inception of the Hellenic State by the deplorable restriction of its territory. In no spirit of unfriendliness to the Porte, they wished for the assignment of Thessaly and Epiros to Greece, subject to the conditions of suzerain and tribute. Our own surrender of the Protectorate gave us, in a measure,

occasion to consider what arrangements might be most conducive to the general tranquillity of the East. Happy would it have been for all concerned, if these opinions could have taken practical effect. But, even with Governments the most advanced in civilisation, the standard of wisdom as to territorial questions is not uniformly high. As gold for individuals, so land has for States a meretricious fascination.

41. Nothing could at that time have been gained by a public discussion of the subject. Indeed, it would have been ungenerous to Turkey, then, as was still hoped, seriously engaged in giving effect to the reforms she had so solemnly promised in 1856, to disturb the slumbering Eastern Question by mooting a plan of which a refusal, if made known, would have placed her in an invidious position. The position is now wholly different. She has herself trodden under foot those promises, bought from her with such an effusion of Western blood and treasure. She has completely liberated, for free discussion, both friends and foes, and also such as, disclaiming either enmity or admiration, believe that her best chance of continuing to hold a position in Europe depends upon the speedy adoption of large and liberal arrangements for the virtual self-management of internal affairs in some or all of her European provinces. But I deem it also important to redeem, during the life-time of his fellow-labourer, Earl Russell, the memory of Lord Palmerston from the wrong done it by those, who believe or argue that, if now alive, he would have been found to plead the obligation of maintaining the integrity of the Ottoman Power as paramount to the duty of granting to her afflicted subjects simple, broad, and effective guarantees for their personal and civil liberties.

42. Mr. Finlay, publishing in 1861 the History of the Greek Revolution, has complained that the progress of the country in industry and population had not then answered to the expectations formed of it. But he has nowhere uttered a word to imply that its emancipation was other than a great good conferred upon the Hellenic race, as well as a gain for Europe by the extinction of a flaming element of discord. I have adverted at various points to the faults, in Greece and out of it, which have restricted, but not destroyed, the fruits of the Canning policy. Yet let us not conceal from ourselves, that real and most important progress, has, after all, been achieved.

43. At the time of the Revolution, not only did the whole dominant class, or rather the collected fragments of a dominant class, present, as their leading features, weakness, selfishness, and venality, but the people was partially barbarised, both by servitude, and by the professions of the pirate and clepht; so that the war which they waged was terribly defaced by acts of cruelty. But the revolutions which they made, and justly made, in 1843 and in 1862, did them honour by their freedom from the taint of blood. Greece, internally considered, is now an element, not of disturbance, but of stability, in the Levant. As the country does not molest Europe, so the people, always sound at heart, do not molest the Government; but obey the laws, which indeed are borne better, perhaps, than they deserve. The evil of transitory ministries, and shifting majorities, is but a secondary symptom; and has often found its parallel in our own substantially well-governed, and always orderly, Australian colonies. Brigandage has, indeed, been greatly favoured both by the nature of the country, and by the strong

countenance it received from traditions anterior to the Revolution, when it wore the guise of patriotism. But it had long since become occasional and limited, at the time when England was shocked and harrowed by a deplorable, but single outrage, of a kind from which Italy has been but lately purged, and Sicily, we must fear, is not yet purged altogether.

44. The venality, unblushing and almost universal among public men at Constantinople, hides its head in Athens; much as it did in England under Sir Robert Walpole. Recently detected in the gross transactions between certain ministers and certain bishops, it was brought to trial, and severely punished, by the regular unbiassed action of the Courts. In this small and almost municipal State, the independence of the Judiciary appears to be placed beyond question; of itself an inestimable advantage. The higher clergy live in harmony with the State, the lower with the people; and the correspondence of our Foreign Office would show instances of their liberal feeling, such as are likely to exercise a beneficial influence upon Eastern Christendom at large. Their union with the people at large makes them an important element of strength to the social fabric. It was indeed an union cemented by suffering. On Easter Day, in April 1821, the Patriarch Gregorios* was arrested in his robes, after divine service, and hanged at the gate of his own palace in Constantinople. After three days he was cut down, and his body delivered to a rabble of low Jews, who dragged it through the streets, and threw it into the sea. Gordon enumerates about twenty Bishops,

* Gordon, i. 187; Finlay, i. 230; Tricoupi, 'Hellenikè Epanastasis, vol. i. pp. 102–107, chap. vi.

who were massacred or executed by the Turks in the early stages of the Revolution.* As for the priests, they suffered everywhere, and first of all.†

45. The statistical record, moreover, of the progress of Greece, drawn from public sources, is far from being wholly unsatisfactory.

The population, which stood in 1834 at 650,000, had risen in 1870 to 1,238,000; that is to say, it had nearly doubled in thirty-six years; a much more rapid rate of increase than that of Great Britain, and yet further in advance of the ordinary European rate. With the Ionian Islands, Greece must now contain a number of souls considerably beyond a million and a half.

In 1830, Greece had 110 schools, with 3249 scholars. In 1860, it had 752 schools, with 52,860 scholars. The University of Athens, which in 1837 had 52 students, in 1866 could show 1182.

The revenue, which was £275,000 in 1833, was £518,000 in 1845, and £1,283,000 in 1873; or probably about a million, after allowing for the Ionian Islands.

For the shipping and trade of Greece, the figures, though imperfect, are not unsatisfactory. The number of Greek seamen, augmented by the addition of the Ionian Islands, was in 1871 no less than 35,000. But before that annexation they were 24,000: or almost three times as many, in proportion to population, as those of the United Kingdom. The tonnage is over 400,000 for 1871. Before the union with the Ionian Islands, the imports and exports averaged for 1853–7, £1,546,000; but for 1858–62, £2,885,000. For 1867–71 they had risen to £4,662,000. That portion of Greek trade which is carried

* Gordon, i. 187, 188, 190, 194, 306.

† *Ibid.* i. 193.

on with the United Kingdom, and which was in 1861 £923,000, had risen in 1871 to £2,332,000.

Neither, then, in a material, nor in a political and social view, is there any ground to regret the intervention of the Powers on behalf of Greece.

46. I will now resume the argument on the future of the Hellenic subjects of the Porte.

The title of the Armenians, and of the Hellenic provinces of the Ottoman Empire, to have their case considered at the approaching Conference, is not, as I have already stated, analogous to that of the Slavonic countries. For these have exhibited their claim in the most effective form, by rising against the Sultan, and by defeating, in two of them at least, his efforts to pacify them through desolation. Perhaps, in reason, the identity of grievance might be taken for granted; but the Hellenes may justly be put to the proof. Will their *locus standi* so far be admitted at the Conference, as to allow them the opportunity of making good their case? Without prejudice to the general merits, it is plain that this admission cannot be withheld, if they are able to sustain, by adequate evidence, the statements which were boldly assevered at the meeting in the Pnyx, but for which the evidence has not been disclosed to the world. Let us suppose, now, the question to stand for decision, at a meeting of the Conference, whether its care is to extend to any other than the Slavonic provinces. I will proceed to state some reasons, which might well give bias to an Englishman in favour of the affirmative; and especially (as I think) to an Englishman slightly tinctured with Russophobia, or the kindred, but more advanced, disease of Turcomania.

47. In the first place, it is the judgment of the Otto-

man Government that the changes it may be required to make shall extend to all the provinces of the empire. It will not be easy for that Government to claim that, when the immediate and primary case of the Slavs has been disposed of, the door shall be closed against others, whose equality of title she has herself asserted. Next as to Russia. It may be doubted whether her interests will render her anxious to widen the field of interposition. What generosity may prompt her to attempt, I dare not at present conjecture; but, as I believe she cannot always be exempt from the selfishness of which we ought sometimes to be very conscious in ourselves, so it has been well proved that the Emperor and his people are open, certainly not less than we are, to the generous emotion which has recently, and I believe effectively, thrilled through this island.

48. With some very limited exceptions on the Austrian frontier, I apprehend it to be beyond doubt, that the hopes of the Christians in European Turkey have been directed either to this country or to Russia. As between the two, there are a variety of circumstances, which might conceivably direct their hopes either to the one or to the other. It is too often and too hastily assumed, that they all work in the same line, the line leading towards Russia. My own belief is that these populations would all prefer aid from England, if it were to be had: all, even including Slavs and Wallachs. It is true that they both are united to Russia by a double tie; the Slavs by those of religion and of race, the Wallachs by the tie of religion and perhaps of recollection; for, though Russia may have used them in her own interest as tools against the Porte, it was to her power that they owed those local immunities, which put them in a con-

dition to become, after the Treaty of Paris, a State virtually free. But both even of these races have other ties with England: first, in the possession or desire of popular institutions; secondly, in that they have not to fear from her, even as possible, either absorption or aggression. But the Wallachs are happily out of the question; and as to the Slavs, I feel that it is vain to pursue the discussion with special reference to England, after the course which affairs have taken in 1875 and 1876.

49. The present inquiry is as to the Hellenic races; and here the matter stands very differently. Only in a single point have they sympathies which would lead them by preference toward Russia; it is the point of religion. Were these countries within the Latin Church, community of religion might greatly weigh; for it would imply some antagonism to all other forms of Christianity. Within the Greek Church this is not so, because it is constituted on the original principle of local distribution, rejects the doctrine and practice of supremacy, and claims no jurisdiction beyond its own borders. Mr. Finlay speaks of the strong leaning of the Ionian population to Russia. This may have been true, and with very good reason for it, in the time of Sir Thomas Maitland; especially in the Island which, according to Gordon,* "groaned for years under the iron rod of a wretch, whose odious tyranny would have disgraced a Turkish Pacha." But, by degrees, the treatment of the Ionian people by the English was greatly altered for the better. Eighteen years ago, I was engaged in a mission to the Islands, and became convinced that the notion of the prevalence of

* Vol. i. p. 318. [I regard this language as seriously exaggerated; but the treatment of the case was not creditable to this country.—W. E. G., 1878.]

Russian leanings there was altogether visionary; that the desire of the people was to be Greeks in polity, as they were Greeks in blood and feeling; but that, as long as they could not be politically Greeks, they preferred an association with the British Crown to any other association whatsoever.

50. Since that time, events most important in their bearing on the present inquiry have occurred in the department of ecclesiastical affairs. If, on the score of religion, there was then a qualified affinity with Russia, there is now a positive antagonism. The four or five millions of Bulgarians, who were then in their traditional intercommunion with the patriarchal see of Constantinople, are now severed from it by an ecclesiastical schism; and of that schism Russia is believed by the Hellenic race to have been, through its Ambassador, General Ignatieff, the most active and powerful fomentor. And this although it has been alleged that, a master of the *finesse* of diplomacy, and knowing the blind hostility of Ali Pacha to everything proposed or supported by Russia, he put the Porte on the side of the Bulgarians by advisedly taking himself the side of the Patriarch.*

51. It is remarkable, that so little has been said or heard on this important subject in the West. The reason is, that its direct consequences have been purely negative. The hundred eyes, and hundred hands, of the Curia were directed from Rome to the Balkan Peninsula, in the hope of profiting by the quarrel; but in vain. It is hardily asserted that M. Bourée, the French Ambassador, supported with all the influence, if not with the wealth, of his country, the Papal operations; but in vain.† The

* 'Attention aux Balkans': Bucharest, 1876, p. 14. † *Ibid.* p. 15.

eighty or ninety millions of the Oriental Churches, though partially severed in communion, and even to a very small extent in doctrine, among themselves, form an united and impregnable phalanx as against the claims of the Papacy.

52. In the original outbreak of the Bulgarian quarrel, we may recognise, on the part of that people, a genuine aspiration of nationality. Under colour of obtaining more learned and competent men than could be found among an uninstructed population, a practice had grown up, dating from about a century and a half ago, of appointing Greek Fanariote bishops to Bulgarian sees. The demand of Bulgaria was, to take into its own hands the appointment of its Bishops, and of a chief Prelate with the title of Exarch. If I am correctly informed, it happened in the course of this controversy, as of many others, that right changed sides as it went on. The Patriarch offered that the Church of Bulgaria, like that of Russia and of Greece, should become an independent national Church; but stipulated that, like them, it should be limited within local boundaries. On the Bulgarian side, it appears to have been contended that wherever there were Bulgarians, constituting a local majority, the jurisdiction of the national Church should extend. This claim directly traverses the principle of local distribution,* on which the Oriental Church claims, in conformity with the Ante-Nicene Church, to be founded. The claim was refused. Excommunication followed. The Russian Church declined to support the sentence of the See of

* [That is, if the claim be pushed to the extent of which it is verbally susceptible, and urged without regard to territorial continuity.—W. E. G.,1878.]

Constantinople. Another of the Patriarchs took the same view; and was deposed. Russia, having the means in her power, took an active part against the successor who was appointed. In a word, although the religion of the Bulgarians remains in doctrine and rites precisely what it was before, the tranquil East has been thrown into the abyss of ecclesiastical disturbance; and with a chief share in producing such a state of things the Russian influence is, whether justly or unjustly, credited. It is even stated that, by confiscating the proceeds of estates in Bessarabia, Russia has deprived the Patriarch, and the Greek establishments in Roumelia, of a large part of their means of subsistence;* not to mention the crowning allegation of a fierce Hellenising adversary, which is that she desires to define an ecclesiastical Bulgaria reaching beyond the Balkans, in order that she may thus herself eventually control the mountain passes with military force.

53. Now it is with Constantinople that the whole Hellenic race feels itself, in matters of religion, to be inseparably associated. Constantinople is in the strictest sense, notwithstanding the undue subserviency to the overweening pressure of the Porte which has at times and in certain respects lowered the dignity of that great See, an ecclesiastical centre to the Hellenic race. That race resents every disparagement inflicted on it. So far therefore as religion is concerned, it is at this moment a ground of real and strong revulsion from Russia, not of attraction to it.

54. No full and accurate view of the questions connected with the Christian subjects of Turkey can be

* 'Attention aux Balkans,' p. 21.

obtained, without taking into count the dualism that subsists among them, as between Hellene and Slav. They are sharers in a common religion; and this bond of sympathy is primary. They are also sharers in their sufferings; but they are to some extent rivals in their dreams. Between them, they conceive themselves to have the heirship of Eastern Europe, and they have some tendency to clash about the division of the inheritance before the day of possession has arrived. The Slav is stronger in numbers: the Hellene feels that, during the long and rough night of the great calamity, the remaining genius of his race supplied the only lamps of light, which flickered in the storm and in the gloom. As between Hellene and Turk, the Czar has borne in their eyes the aspect of a champion. As between Hellene and Slav, he has rather the position of a possible adversary. And all the circumstances of the present moment accentuate and sharpen the outlines of that position. Only when the place of advocate has been altogether vacant, has the Hellenic race been disposed to give to Russia that position. The prospect of Russian predominance in the Levant is just as oppressive to their rising hopes, as that of a Greek Empire at Constantinople is distasteful even to the mighty and wide-ruling Emperor of all the Russias.*

55. I am arguing for others, rather than myself. I find abundant reasons, altogether apart from those which I have last advanced, for desiring that the opportunity of the present crisis should be used, after meeting its

* The Greek conception of Russian policy is pointedly expressed by Tricoupi, in reference to the project of 1823. 'Hellanikè Epanastasis,' III. 189, chap. xii. Also iii. 263.

primary necessities, to act more broadly on ideas such as were unquestionably and strongly held by Lord Palmerston and Lord Russell in 1862, and to arrange with the Porte for the concession to the Hellenic Provinces of all that may be found reasonable. I am firmly convinced that the antagonism of interests between them and the ruling Power, which many assert and assume, does not in truth exist. The condition of Turkey is bad as matters now are: what would it have been if the festering sore of the Greek Revolution had been permitted to pass, by neglect, into a gangrene? I believe that Suzerainty over a large range of country would then have been better for both parties, than independence in a very small one: but that either the one or the other was better than the doctrine that we have no more to do with a quarrel between the Sultan and his subjects than with any other similar quarrel, and than a practice in accordance with that doctrine. Why should we be alarmed at the sound of Suzerainty? It is a phrase of infinite elasticity. Even in the present Turkish Empire, Suzerainty exists in half-a-dozen different forms, as over Tunis, Egypt, Samos, Roumania, and Servia. What it implies is a practical self-management of all those internal affairs on which the condition of daily life depends, such as police and judiciary, with fixed terms of taxation, especially of direct and internal taxation, and with command over the levy of it. Where these points are agreed on, there is little left to quarrel about.

56. There is, therefore, for any who think in this way, ample ground, both for belief and action, without reference to the position of this or that European Power. But, in the minds of many, the actors have, as to the Eastern Question, a larger place than the acts. To them I desire

to point out that, if they think it urgently required for England, in the face of Russia, to establish an independent position and influence in the Levant, by some more enduring means than vaunting menace or mere parade, or proclaiming schemes of the most unmitigated selfishness, they have now such an opportunity as never before was offered. Of that people who still fondle in their memories the names of Canning and of Byron, there are in the Levant we may safely say four millions, on whose affections we may take a standing hold, by giving a little friendly care at this juncture to the case of the Hellenic Provinces. They want, not Russian institutions, but such a freedom as we enjoy. They want for their cause an advocate, who is not likely to turn into an adversary; one whose temptations lie in other quarters; who cannot (as they fondly trust) ask anything from them; or, in any possible contingency, through durable opposition of sympathies or interests, inflict anything upon them.*

57. The recollections of Lord Byron have been recently revived in England by a well-meant effort.† Among them, there is one peculiarly noble. It is that of his chivalrous devotion to the Greek cause; a devotion, of which his unsparing munificence was far from being the most conspicuous feature. In the days which preceded the revolutionary war, when Greece lay cold and stark in

* In the *Times* of November 18, will be found a report, copied from the *Kölnische Zeitung*, of a conversation, held by the reporter, with General Ignatieff. The degree of reliance due to it may be a question. But the sentiments towards the Greek provinces ascribed to that diplomatist were of the cold and discouraging character, which I should have anticipated.

† [The allusion is to a plan of monumental commemoration, which had been announced shortly before.—W. E. G., 1878.]

her tomb, her history and her fate drew forth from him some precious utterances of immortal song:

> "They fell devoted, but undying:
> The very gale their names seemed sighing:
> The waters murmured of their name;
> The woods were peopled with their fame;
> The silent pillar, lone and grey,
> Claimed kindred with their sacred clay:
> Their spirits wrapped the dusky mountain;
> Their memory sparkled o'er the fountain:
> The meanest rill, the mightiest river
> Rolled mingling with their fame for ever:
> Despite of every yoke she bears,
> That land is glory's still, and theirs."

These lines are from 'The Siege of Corinth,'* published in 1816. More beautiful still, if more beautiful be possible, were the lines of 1813 in 'The Giaour' from the image of a dead body, which began:—

> "So fair, so calm, so softly sealed,
> The first, last look by death revealed."

And his ever-wakeful Muse stood ready to greet the first effort of resuscitation. In 'The Age of Bronze,' written in 1823,† he hailed the revival thus:—

> "'Tis the old aspiration breathed afresh
> To kindle souls within degraded flesh,
> Such, as repulsed the Persian from the shore
> When Greece *was*—No! she still is Greece once more."

58. But Lord Byron brought to this great cause, and to the dawn of emancipation, for the East then all in grave-clothes, not only the enthusiasm of a poet, or the reckless daring of a rover. He treated the subject, which

* XV. † VI.

both shaped and absorbed the closing period of his life, with the strongest practical good sense, and with a profound insight, which has not been shamed by the results. It is not unnatural to suppose, that a sympathetic sense of the lofty part he played may have been among the encouragements which brought into action the bold policy of Canning; nor to hope, that the contemplation of it may yet supply a guiding light to some British statesman called to open its capabilities, as well as to encounter its embarrassments,

"in una selva oscura
Che la diritta via era smarrita." *

* Dante, Inf. I. 2.

VII.

MONTENEGRO,

OR TSERNAGORA:

A SKETCH.*

1877.

1. It is sometimes said, in relation to individuals, that the world does not know its greatest men. It might at least as safely be averred, in speaking of large numbers, that Christendom does not know its most extraordinary people. The name of Montenegro, until within the last two years, was perhaps less familiar to the European public than that of Monaco; or even than that of San Marino. And yet it would, long ere this, have risen to world-wide and immortal fame, had there been a Scott to learn and tell the marvels of its history, or a Byron to spend and be spent on its behalf. For want of the *vates sacer*, it has remained in the mute inglorious condition of Agamemnon's antecessors.† I hope that an interpreter between Montenegro and the world has at length been found in the person of my friend Mr. Tennyson;‡ and I gladly accept

* Reprinted from *The Nineteenth Century* for May 1877. The references are principally to—1. *Le Monténégro Contemporain.* Par G. Frilley, Officier de la Légion d'Honneur, et Jovan Wlahoviti, Capitaine au Service de la Serbie. Paris, 1870. 2. *Montenegro und die Montenegriner geschildert von* Spiridion Goptchevitch. Leipzig, 1877.

† Hor. Od. IV. ix. 25.

‡ A sonnet by Mr. Tennyson opened the Number, and immediately preceded this article.

the honour of having been invited to supply a commentary for his text. In attempting it I am sensible of this disadvantage; that it is impossible to set out the plain facts of the history of Montenegro (or Tsernagora in its own Slavonic tongue) without begetting in the mind of any reader if strange, as nearly all are strange, to the subject, a resistless suspicion of exaggeration or of fable.

2. The vast cyclone of Ottoman conquest, the most formidable that the world has ever seen, having crossed the narrow sea from Asia in the fourteenth century, made rapid advances westward; and blasted, by its successive acquisitions, the fortunes of countries, the chief part of which were then among the most civilised, Italy alone being excepted, of all Europe. I shall not here deal with the Hellenic lands. It is enough to say that Bulgaria, Serbia (as now known), Bosnia, Herzegovina, Albania, gradually gave way.

3. Before telling the strange tale of those who, like some strong oak that the lightning fails to rive, breasted all the wrath of the tempest, and never could be slaves, let me render a tribute to the fallen. For the most part, they did not succumb without gallant resistance. The Serbian sovereigns of the fifteenth century were great and brave men, ruling a stout and brave people. They reached their zenith when, in 1347, Stephen Dushan entitled himself Emperor of Serbs, Greeks, and Bulgarians. In an evil hour, and to its own ruin, the Greek Empire invoked against him the aid of the Ottoman Turks. In 1356, he closed a prosperous career by a sudden death. On the fatal field of Kossovo, in 1389, treachery allied itself with Ottoman prowess to bring about the defeat of the Serbian army; and again it was by treacherous advances that a qualified subjection was converted into an absolute ser-

vitude. The West, with all its chivalry, can cite no grander examples of martial heroism than those of Marko Kraljevitch, so fondly cherished in the Serbian lands, and of George Castriotes or Scanderbeg, known far and wide, and still commemorated in the name of a very humble *vicolo* of Rome.

4. The indifference, or even contempt, with which we are apt to regard this field of history, ought to be displaced by a more rational, as well as more honourable, sentiment of gratitude. It was these races, principally Slavonian, who had to encounter in its unbroken strength, and to reduce, the mighty wave, of which only the residue, passing the Danube and the Save, all but overwhelmed not Hungary alone, but Austria and Poland. It was with a Slavonic population that the Austrian Emperor fortified the north bank of the Save, in the formation of the famous military Frontier. It was Slav resistance, unaided by the West, which abated the impetus of the Ottoman attack just to such a point, that its reserve force became capable of being checked by European combinations.

5. Among the Serbian lands was the flourishing Principality of Zeta. It took its name from the stream, which flows southward from the citadel of rock towards the Lake of Scutari. It comprised the territory now known as Montenegro or Tsernagora, together with the seaward frontier, of which a niggardly and unworthy jealousy had not then deprived it, and with the rich and fair plains encircling the irregular outline of the inhospitable mountain. Land after land had given way; but Zeta ever stood firm under the Balchid family. At last, in 1478, Scutari was taken on the south, and in 1483 the ancestors of the still brave population of Herzegovina on the north submitted to the Ottomans. Ivan Tchernoievitch, the

Montenegrin hero of the day, hard pressed on all sides, applied to the Venetians for the aid he had often given, and was refused. Thereupon he, and his people with him, quitted, in 1484, the sunny tracts in which they had basked for some seven hundred years, and sought, on the rocks and amidst the precipices, surety for the two gifts, by far the most precious to mankind, their faith and their freedom. To them, as to the Pomaks of Bulgaria, and the Bosnian Begs, it was open to purchase by conformity a debasing peace. Before them, as before others, lay the *trinoda necessitas;* the alternatives of death, slavery, or the Koran. They were not to die, for they had a work to do. To the Koran or to slavery they preferred a life of cold, want, hardship, and perpetual peril. Such is their *Magna Charta;* and, without reproach to others, it is, as far as I know, the noblest in the world.

6. To become a centre for his mountain home, Ivan had built a monastery at Cettinjé, and declared the place to be the metropolis of Zeta. What is most of all remarkable in the whole transaction is, that he carried with him into the hills a printing-press.* This was in 1484, in a petty principality; tenanted by men worsted in war, and flying for their lives. Again, it was only seven years after the earliest Volume had been printed by Caxton in the rich and populous metropolis of England; and it was when there was no printing-press in Oxford, or in Cambridge, or in Edinburgh. It was only sixteen years after the first printing-press had been established (1468) in Rome, the capital of Christendom: only twenty-eight years after the appearance (1456) of the earliest printed book, the first-born of the great discovery.

* Frilley and Wlahoviti, p. 18.

7. Then and there,

"They few, they happy few, they band of brothers,"*

voted unanimously their fundamental law, that, in time of war against the Turk, no son of Tsernagora could quit the field without the order of his chief; that a runaway should be for ever disgraced, and banished from his people; that he should be dressed in woman's clothes, and presented with a distaff; and that the women, striking him with their distaffs, should hunt the coward away from the sanctuary of freedom. And, now for four centuries wanting only seven years, they have maintained in full force the covenant of that awful day, through an unbroken series of trials, of dangers, and of exploits, to which it is hard to find a parallel in the annals of Europe, perhaps even of mankind.

8. It was not to be expected that the whole mass of any race or people should have the almost preterhuman energy, which their lot required. All along, from time to time, the weaker brethren have fallen away; and there were those who said to Ivan, as the Israelites said to Moses, "Wherefore have ye made us to come up out of Egypt, to bring us unto this evil place?"† The great Ivan died in 1490, and was succeeded by his eldest son George, who in 1499 was persuaded by his Venetian wife to go back into the habitable world; not of Islam, however, but at Venice. Worse than this, his younger brother Stephen had gone with a band of companions to Constantinople, and had proposed to Bajazet the Second the betrayal of his country. He, and those whom he took with him, were required to turn Mahometans, and they did it.

* Shakespeare, 'Henry V.' † Numbers xx. 5.

None could be so fit, as traitors, to be renegades. They then set out, with an Ottoman force, for the work of conquest. They were met by George, and utterly defeated. But these victors, the men of the printing-press as well as of the sword, were no savages by nature; only afterwards, when the Turks in time made them so. They took back their renegade fellow-countrymen into Montenegro, and allowed them the free exercise of their religion.*

9. On the retirement of George, which seems only to have become final in 1516,† the departing Prince made over the sovereign power to the Metropolitan. And now began, and lasted for 336 years, an ecclesiastical government in miniature over laymen, far more noble than that of the Popes in its origin, and purer in its exercise, as well as in some respects not less remarkable.

10. The epithet I have last used may raise a smile. But the greatness of human action, and of human character, do not principally depend on the dimensions of the stage where they are exhibited. In the fifth century, and before the temporal power arose, there was a Leo as truly Great as any of the famous mediæval Pontiffs. The traveller may stand upon the rock of Corinth, and look, across and along the gulf, to the Acropolis of Athens; and may remember, with advantage no less than with wonder, that these little States, of parochial dimensions, were they that shook the world of their own day, and that have instructed all posterity. But the *Basileus*, whom Greece had to keep at arm's length, had his seat afar; and, even for those within his habitual reach, was no grinding tyrant. Montenegro fought with a valour that rivalled, if it did not surpass, that of Thermopylæ and

* F. and W. p. 19. † Goptchevitch, p. 6.

Marathon; with numbers and resources far inferior, against a foe braver and far more terrible. A long series of about twenty Prelates, like Moses, or Joshua, or Barak, or the son of Jesse, taught in the sanctuary, presided in the council, and fought in the front of the battle. There were among them many, who were admirable statesmen. These were specially of the Niegush family, which came in the year 1687 to the permanent possession of power: a power so little begirt with the conveniences of life, and so well weighted with responsibility and care, that in the free air of these mountains it was never coveted, and never abused.

11. Under the fourteen Vladikas, who had ruled for 170 years before this epoch, the people of Montenegro not only lived sword in hand, for this they have since done and still do, but nourished in their bosom an enemy, more deadly, say the historians,* than the Pashas and their armies. Not only were they ever liable to the defection of such as had not the redundant manhood, required in order to bear the strain of their hard and ever-threatened existence; but the renegades on the banks of the Rieka, whom they had generously taken back, maintained disloyally relations with the Porte, and were ever ready to bring its war-galleys by the river into the interior of the country. At last the measure of patience came to be exhausted. Danilo, the first Vladika of the Niegush dynasty, had been invited, under an oath of safe conduct from the Pasha of Scutari, to descend into the plain of Zeta, among the homes of his ancestors, for the purpose of consecrating a church. While engaged on this work, he was seized, imprisoned, and cruelly tortured.† At

* F. and W. p. 21.

† *Ibid.* p. 22; G. p. 8

last he was released on a ransom of 3000 ducats; a sum which the hillsmen were only enabled to make up by borrowing in Herzegovina. It was felt that the time had arrived for a decisive issue; and we come now to a deed of blood which shows that for those human beings with whom the Turk forced himself into contact, and who refused to betray their faith, there were no alternatives but two; if not savages they must be slaves, if not slaves they must come near to being savages.

12. It was determined to slay by night every one of the renegades, except such as were willing to return to the faith of their fathers. The year was 1702; and the night chosen was that which divided Christmas Eve from Christmas Day. The scale was not large, but the operation was terrible; and the narrative, contained in an old *volkslied*, shows that it was done under that high religious exaltation, which recalls the fiery gloom of the *Agamemnon*, and the sanguinary episodes of the Old Testament.

"The hallowed eve draws onwards. The brothers Martinovitch kindle their consecrated torches. They pray fervently to the new-born God. Each drains a cup of wine; and seizing the sacred torches, they rush forth into the darkness. Wherever there was a Turk, there came the five avengers. They that would not be baptised were hewn down every one. They that embraced the Cross were taken as brothers before the Vladika. Gathered in Cettinjé, the people hailed with songs of joy the reddening dawn of the Christmas morning; all Tsernagora now was free!" *

13. The war had been a standing rather than an intermittent war; and each party to it was alternately aggressor and defender. The Turk sought to establish his supremacy by exacting the payment of the *haradsch*, the poll

* G. p. 9.

or military service tax, paid in kind, which sometimes, in the more open parts, as we may suppose, of the territory, he succeeded in obtaining. Once the collector complained that the measure used was too small. The tax-payer smashed his skull with it, and said: "That is Tsernagora measure." * But the Montenegrins were aggressive as well as the Turks. Of the fair plains they had been compelled to deliver to the barbarian, they still held themselves the rightful owners; and, in carrying on against him a predatory warfare, they did no more than take back, as they deemed, a portion of their own. This predatory warfare, which had a far better justification than any of the Highland or Border raids that we have learned to judge so leniently, has been effectually checked by the efforts of the admirable Vladikas and Princes of the last hundred years; for, as long as it subsisted, the people could not discharge effectually the taint of savagery. It even tended to generate habits of sheer rapine. But the claim to the lands is another matter; there is no lapse of title by user here; the bloody suit has been prosecuted many times in the course of each of twelve generations of men. That claim to the lands they have never given up, and never will.

14. From 1710 onwards, at intervals, the Sovereigns of Russia and of Austria have used the Montenegrins for their own convenience when at war with Turkey. During the war of the French Revolution the English did the like, and, by their co-operation and that of the inhabitants, effected the conquest of the *Bocche di Cattaro*. To England they owe no gratitude; to Austria, on the whole, less than none, for, to satisfy her, the district she did not

* G. p. 9.

win was handed over to her with our concurrence. She has rigidly excluded the little State from access to the sea, and has at times even prevented it from receiving any supplies of arms. Russia, however, from the time of Peter the Great, though using them for her own purposes, has not always forgotten their interests, and has commonly aided the Vladikas with a small annual subvention, raised, through the liberality of the Czar now reigning, to some 3000*l.* a year;* the salary of one of our Railway Commissioners. Nor should it be forgotten that Louis Napoleon, seemingly under a generous impulse, took an interest in their fortunes, and made a further addition to the revenues of the Prince, which raised them in all to an amount such as would equip a well-to-do English country gentleman, provided that he did not bet, or aspire to a deer-forest, or purchase Sèvres or even Chelsea porcelain.

15. The most romantic and stirring passages of other histories may be said to grow pale, if not by the side of the ordinary life of Tsernagora, at least when brought into comparison with that life at the critical emergencies, which were of very constant recurrence. What was the numerical strength of the Bishop-led community, which held fast its oasis of Christianity and freedom amidst the dry and boundless desert of Ottoman domination? The fullest details I have seen on this subject are those given by Frilley and Wlahoviti. The present form of the territory exhibits the figure which would be produced it two roughly drawn equilateral triangles, with their apices slightly truncated, had these apices brought together, so that the two principal masses should be severed by a narrow neck or waist of land. The extreme length of the.

* Stated by Goptchevitch as high as 4000*l.* a year.

Principality, from the border above Cattaro on the west to Mount Kom, the farthest point eastwards of Berda, is about seventy miles; the greatest breadth from north to south is a good deal less; but the line at the narrow point from Spuz on the south to Niksich on the north, both of them on ground still Turkish, does not exceed twenty miles. The reader will now easily understand the tenacity with which a controversy seemingly small has just been carried on at Constantinople between the delegates of Prince Nicholas and the Porte; with *andirivieni* almost as many as marked the abortive Conference of December and January, or the gestation of the recent Protocol.

16. At these points the plain makes dangerous incisions into the group of mountains;* and from them the Turk has been wont to operate. The population of his empire is forty millions; and I believe his claims for military service extend over the whole, except the five millions (in round numbers) of free people, who inhabit the Serbian and Roumanian principalities. Let us now see what were the material means of resistance on the other side. About A.D. 1600, there are said to have been 3500 houses and 8000 fighting men in Montenegro. The military age is from twelve to fifty; and these numbers indicate a population not much, if at all, over 30,000. This population was liable to be thinned by renegadism and constant war; but since the early siftings, the operation of the baser cause appears to have been slight. On the other hand, freedom attracts the free; and tribes, or handfuls, of Turkish subjects near Montenegro have had a tendency to join it. Until a few years back, it never had

* F. and W. pp. 89–91.

a defined frontier; it is only in recent times that its eastern triangle, that of Berda, has been added to Tsernagora proper. About 1800, the population had risen to 55,000. In 1825, to 75,000. In 1835, the official calendar of Cettinjé placed it at 100,000, and in 1865 at 196,000.

17. This included the districts of Grabovo, Rudine, and Joupa, conquered under Prince Danilo. For the mere handful of mountaineers has been strong enough, on the whole, not only to hold, but to increase, its land. Yet, on the establishment of free Serbia, a tendency to emigrate from the sterile rocks into that well-conditioned country was naturally exhibited; and two battalions composed of the children of Montenegrins helped to make up that small portion of the army of General Tchernaieff, on which alone, in the operations of the recent war, he could confidently rely.

18. While the gross population of Montenegro, in men, women, and children, was slowly growing through three centuries from some thirty to some fifty thousand, we must inquire with curiosity what amount of Turkish force has been deemed by the Porte equal to the enterprise of attacking the mountain. And here, strange as it may seem, history proves it to have been the general rule not to attack Montenegro except with armies equalling or exceeding, sometimes doubling or more, in numbers, all the men, women, and children that it contained. In 1712, under the Vladika Danilo, 50,000 men crossed the Zeta between Podgoritza and Spuz. Some accounts raise this force beyond 100,000.* Danilo assailed their camp before dawn on the 29th of July, with an army, in three divi-

* F. and W. p. 23. G. p. 10.

sions, which could hardly have reached 12,000 men. With a loss of 318 men, he slew, at the lowest estimate, 20,000. And in these alone, so far as I know, of all modern wars, it seems not uncommon to find the slain among the Turks exceeding the gross number of the high-land heroes arrayed against them. Great is the glory of the Swiss in their Burgundian wars for freedom; but can it be matched for a moment with the exploits of the Bishops of Montenegro and their martial flocks?

19. Once more the heart of the little nation relieves itself in song.

"The Seraskier wrote to Danilo: 'Send me your paltry tribute, and three of your best warriors for hostages. Refuse, and I will lay waste the land from the Morea to the salt-sea * with fire and sword, and will seize you alive,† and put you to death by torture.' As he read this letter, the Vladika wept bitterly. He summoned the heads of communities to Cettinjé. Some said, 'Give them the tax;' but others, 'Give them our stones.' . . . They determined that they would fight to the last man. They swore with one accord that all they would give the Turk should be the bullet-rain of their muskets."

And thus continues the tale. Three Montenegrins went down to the Turkish encampment by night, and traversed the slumbering masses; just as, in the tenth Iliad, Odusseus and Diomed moved amid the sleeping allies of Troy. Vuko, one of the three, said to his comrades: "Go you back; I abide here to serve the cause." They returned to Cettinjé, and said: "So many are the Turks, that, had we three all been pounded into salt, we should

* G. p. 10. The Morea was not then Turkish. Does the "salt-sea" mean the White Sea?

† As opposed to the ordinary practice in these wars, of death on the field without quarter.

not be enough to salt a supper for them." How this recalls the oldest census in the world, the census of Homer, who says:* "Were the Achaians divided into parties of ten, and every Trojan employed in serving them with wine, one for each party, many a ten would lack a wine-server." But, not to terrify their friends, they added that this vast host was but a host of cripples. So the people heard mass, received the benediction of their Vladika, and then set out upon the errand of victory or death. Vuko had induced the enemy to rest by the Vladinia, on the plea that they would not find water between that stream and Cettinjé. Here, before dawn, came down on them the promised bullet-rain. They were slaughtered through three days of flight; and the bard concludes: "O my Serbian brothers, and all ye in whose breast beats the heart of liberty, be glad; for never will the ancient freedom perish, so long as we still hold our little Tsernagora!"

20. The very next year, the Turks assembled 120,000 of their best troops for the purpose of crushing the mountaineers, whose numbers fell within the satirical description applied by Tigranes to the Romans: "Too many for an embassy, too few for an army." But even this was not enough of precaution. Thirty-seven headmen of Montenegro, who had proceeded to the Turkish camp to negotiate with the commander, were basely seized and put to death. The Turks now ventured to assail a force one-tenth of their own numbers, and deprived of its leaders. They burned the monastery; they carried thousands of women and children into slavery; and then, without attempting to hold the country, they marched off

* Hom. Il. ii. 128.

to the Morea, while the men of Tsernagora descended from their rocky fastnesses and rebuilt their villages.* They powerfully befriended Austria and Venice in the war they were then waging, and, as was too commonly the case, were left in the lurch by their allies at the peace of Passarowitz in 1719. The Turks accordingly made bold to attack them, in 1722, with 20,000 men under Hussein Pasha. One thousand Montenegrins took this General prisoner, and utterly discomfited his army.† In 1727, another Turkish invasion was similarly defeated. In 1732, Topal Osman Pasha marched against the Piperi, who had joined them, with 30,000 men; but had to fly with the loss of his camp and baggage. In 1735 the heroic Danilo passed into his rest, after half a century of toil and glory.

21. These may be taken as specimens of the military history of Montenegro. Time does not permit me to dwell on what is perhaps the most curious case of personation in all history, that of Stiepan Mali, who for many years together passed himself off upon the mountaineers as being Peter III. of Russia, the unfortunate husband of Catherine; and who, in that character, partially obtained their obedience. But the presence of a prince reputed to be Russian naturally stimulated the Porte. Again Montenegro was invaded, in 1768, by an army variously estimated at 67,000, 100,000, and even 180,000 men. Their force of 10,000 to 12,000 was, as ever, ready for the fight; but the Venetians, timorously obeying the Porte, prohibited the entry of munitions of war. Utter ruin seemed now at length to overhang them. A cartridge was worth a ducat, such was their necessity;

* G. p. 12. † G. p. 13. F. and W. p. 25.

when 500 of their men attacked a Turkish division, and had for their invaluable reward a prize of powder. And now all fear had vanished. They assailed before dawn the united forces of the Pashas of Roumelia from the south, and of Bosnia from the north. Again they effected the scarcely credible slaughter of 20,000 Turks together with 3000 horses, and won an enormous booty of colours, arms, munitions, and baggage. So it was that the flood of war gathered round this fortress of faith and freedom, and so it was that the flood was beaten back. *Afflavit Dominus, ac dissipantur.*

22. In 1782 came Peter* to the throne, justly recorded, by the fond veneration of his countrymen, as Peter the Saint. Marmont, all whose inducements and all whose threats he alike repelled, has given this striking description of him: "Ce Vladika, homme superbe, de cinquante ans environ, d'un esprit remarquable, avait beaucoup de noblesse et de dignité dans ses manières. Son autorité positive et légale dans son pays était peu de chose! mais son influence était sans bornes."† As Bishop, statesman, legislator, and warrior, he brought his country safely through eight-and-forty years of scarcely intermitted struggle.

23. Down to, and perhaps after, his time, the government was carried on as in the Greece of the heroic age. The sovereign was Priest, Judge, and General; and was likewise the head of the Assembly; not a representative Assembly, but one composed of the body of the people, in which were taken the decisions that were to bind the whole as laws. This was called the Sbor; it was held in the open air; and when it became unruly, the method of

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* F. and W. pp. 35–59. † I quote from F. and W. p. 495.

restoring order was to ring the bell of the neighbouring church. Here was promulgated for the first time in the year 1796, by Peter's authority, a code of laws for Montenegro; which had hitherto been governed, like the Homeric communities, by oral authority and tradition. In 1798 he appointed a body of judges; and in 1803 he added to the code a supplement. With the nineteenth century, in round numbers, commenced the humanising process, which could not but be needed among a race whose existence, for ten generations of men, had been a constant struggle of life and death with the ferocious Turk. From his time, the *haradsch* was no more heard of.*

24. Here is the touching and simple account of the calm evening, that closed his stormy day:

"On the 18th of October, 1830, Peter the First, who was then in his eighty-first year, was sitting, after the manner of his country, by the fireside of his great kitchen, and was giving to his chiefs, assembled round him, instructions for the settlement of some local † differences which had arisen. The aged Vladika, feeling himself weak, announced that his last hour was come, and prayed them to conduct him to the humble cell which, without fire, he inhabited as a hermit would Arriving there, he stretched himself on his bed; urged upon his chiefs to execute with fidelity the provisions set forth in the Will he had that day dictated to his secretary; and then, in conversation and in prayer, rendered up his soul to God. So died this illustrious man, whom a Slavonic writer has not scrupled to call the Louis XIV. of Tsernagora, but who in a number of respects was also its Saint Louis."‡

25. Thirty-five years after his death, Miss Mackenzie

* G. p. 21, n.

† Among the Plemenas, which may be called Parishes: subdivisions of the eight Nahias, say Hundreds. All Montenegro would make but a moderate county.

‡ F. and W. p. 58.

and Miss Irby, in their remarkable tour, visited the country. They found still living some of those who had lived under St. Peter; and thus they give the report of him which they had received:

"There are still with us men, who lived under St. Peter's rule, heard his words, and saw his life. For fifty years he governed us; and fought and negotiated for us; and walked before us in pureness and uprightness from day to day. He gave us good laws; and put an end to the disorderly state of the country. He enlarged our frontier, and drove away our enemies. Even on his deathbed, he spoke words to our elders, which have kept peace among us since he has gone. While he yet lived, we swore by his name. We felt his smile a blessing, and his anger a curse. We do still." *

The voice of his people declared him a Saint. Did the Vatican ever issue an award more likely to be ratified above?

26. I have already indicated resemblances between the characteristic features of Montenegro, and of Homeric or Achaian Greece. One of the most remarkable among them is the growth of men truly great in small theatres of action. Not Peter the First only, but his successors, will bear some comparison with those, whom the great Greek historians of the classic period have made so famous. To Peter the First succeeded his nephew Radatomovo, aged seventeen years. He was thereupon invested with the ecclesiastical habit and the sovereignty; and in 1833, when aged only twenty, he received at St. Petersburg episcopal consecration. Sir Gardner Wilkinson informs us that he was nearly six feet eight inches in height, and thoroughly well proportioned. His skill with the rifle was such that, when one of his attendants tossed a

* 'Travels of Miss Mackenzie and Miss Irby,' p. 628 (ed. 1867). Also see Goptchevitch, p. 21.

lemon into the air, he would readily put a bullet through it. At nineteen the cloud of Turkish war broke upon him from Scutari; for he had refused to accept a *berat* from the Porte, which would have sealed him as a vassal. The pasha's advanced guard of several thousand men* was defeated by a body of 800 Montenegrins, at the head of whom the Pope Radoviti fell bravely fighting; and no more was heard of the invasion.

27. But this Vladika, following up St. Peter's work, set his face sternly against all such lawless habits as remained in the country. In his modes of repression there are curious traits of manners. The man-slayer was shot;† but the thief was ignominiously hanged. In the matter of shooting there was a great difficulty; for the terrible usage of the *vendetta*—which had by no means been extirpated from the Ionian Islands twenty years ago—bound the kin or descendants of a man to avenge his death on the person who slew him. The expedient adopted was to shoot by a large platoon, so that the killer could not be identified. I read that, before brigandage and the *vendetta* could be thoroughly put down, some hundreds of lives‡ were taken; more, probably, than were ever lost in the bloodiest battle with the Turk. Internal reform, which partook of a martial character, was the great task of this reign. But not exclusively. Under him was performed one of the feats incredible except in Montenegro. Ten men, in 1835, seized by a *coup de main* the old castle of Zabliak, once the capital of Zeta; held it for four days against 3000 Turks; and then surrendered it only by order of the Vladika, who was anxious to avoid a war. Nearly all his battles were victories.

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* F. and W. p. 30. G. p. 23. † G. p. 22. ‡ G. p. 39.

28. This giant had received at St. Petersburg a high education, and was a cultivated man. A friend of mine has seen and admired him at Venice. He goes by the title of "the hero, statesman, poet Vladika"; and his verse has given him a high place in Slav literature. He is thus described:*

"One while he was to be seen as a captain, sword in hand, giving an example of every military virtue at the head of his troops; another, as a priest and preacher, carrying the cross alone, and subduing his wild compatriots into gentleness; again, as an inexorable judge, ordering the execution of culprits in his presence; or as a prince incorruptible, and refusing all the favours by which it was sought to fetter his independence."

29. Down to his time, there had been a civil governor who acted under the metropolitan as sovereign; but the holder of the office was deposed for intriguing with Austria, and, when the Vladika died, at thirty-nine, no successor had been appointed. This perhaps tended to accelerate the change, which was effected on the death of Peter the Poet in 1851. But a share in it was due to that subtle influence, the love of woman, which has so many times operated at great crises upon human affairs. The young Danilo, the nephew of the deceased Vladika, designated for the succession, was attached to a beautiful girl in Trieste; and the hope of union with her could only be maintained in the event of his avoiding episcopal consecration, which entailed the obligation of celibacy. The Senate almost unanimously supported him in his determination; and thus was effected a change, which perhaps was required by the spirit of the times. The old system, among other points, entailed a great difficulty

* F. and W. p. 62.

with respect to regulating the succession, which, among a people less simple and loyal, would have been intolerable.

30. So, then, ended that line of the Vladikas of Montenegro; who had done a work for freedom, as well as for religion, never surpassed in any country of the globe. Of the trappings and enjoyments of power, they had known nothing. To them, it was endeared, as well as sanctified, only by burdens and by perils. Their dauntless deeds, their simple self-denying lives, have earned for them a place of high honour in the annals of mankind; and have laid for their people the solid groundwork, on which the future, and a near future as it seems, will build.

31. Danilo did no dishonour, during his short reign, to the traditions of his episcopal predecessors. He consummated the great work of internal order, and published in 1855 the statute-book which remained in force until 1876. In the war with Omar Pasha (1852–3), the military fame of the country was thoroughly maintained, under admirable leaders, though as usual with inferior arms and numbers. During the Crimean struggle, he maintained the formal neutrality of his country, though it cost him a civil war, and nearly caused the severance of Berda from the ancient Montenegro.* In May 1858, his brother Mirko revived and rivalled, at Grabovo, all the old military glories of Tsernagora. Having no artillery, and very inferior arms, the Montenegrins swept down from the hill upon the gunners of the Turks, and destroyed them. In this battle the Ottoman force, enclosed in a basin or *corrie*, without power of retreat, displayed a desperate valour, for which on most other occasions in Montenegro they have not been by any means so remarkable. Nor

* F. and W. pp. 65–70. G. p. 35.

was their numerical superiority so manifold as it commonly had been. They were defeated with the loss of several thousand lives, of fourteen guns, colours, baggage, and munitions. From the bodies of many dead were taken English as well as French medals, obviously granted for the Crimean war, which were seen by Miss Mackenzie and Miss Irby among the collection of trophies at Cettinjé.*

32. The victory of Grabovo produced a great excitement among the Rayahs of Turkey. But the great Powers of Europe came to the help of the Porte and its huge empire, against the Lilliputian State, that is scarcely a speck upon the map. It had to abide a diplomatic verdict. A Commission, sitting at Constantinople, accorded to it the advantage of establishing in principle the delimitation of its frontiers; and in 1859 admitted its envoy, notwithstanding the protest of Ali Pasha, to take part in its deliberations. But the Powers had in 1857 determined at Paris that, in return for some small accretion, and for access to the sea, Montenegro should definitively acknowledge the suzerainty of the Porte.† Her refusal was positive, despite the wishes of the Prince. It was to French,‡ not British, advocacy that she seems to have owed a declaration of May 1858,§ which acknowledged the independence of the Black Mountain.

33. In August 1860, Prince Danilo was shot on the quay at Cattaro. The assassin was prompted by a motive of private revenge, for which different grounds are assigned. Like his predecessors, he lived and died a hero. In what estimation he was held, let Miss Mac-

* Mackenzie and Irby, p. 610.

† F. and W. p. 72.

‡ It is fair to say that there is, as far as I know, no English account of the affair.

§ F. and W. p. 73.

kenzie and Miss Irby testify. On his death, his body had been carried up the Mountain, and deposited in a church. For many weeks afterwards, as they tell us, this church was filled, morning, noon, and all night through, by his people, men, women, and children; and stalwart warriors, like the rest, were, as of old, dissolved in tears.

34. Danilo was succeeded by his nephew Nikita, the present Prince of Montenegro. He had not, at his accession, completed his nineteenth year. It is characteristic of the Principality that his own father Mirko, the victor of Grabovo, contentedly gave way to him. Goptchevitch, the brother of his aunt Princess Darinka, acquaints us that he set out with two fixed ideas—the first, to prosecute the civilising work among his people; the second, to liberate the sister Serbian lands still in servitude.* This writer appears disposed, in regard to the present Sovereign, rather to play the part of critic than of eulogist; but ascribes to him great merit in his political conduct, and in the prosecution of social reforms. Soon after his accession, Montenegro was worsted, after a long resistance, in a war with Turkey. She had been driven to her crags, when diplomatic mediation, this time on her behalf, brought about a settlement. It was then proved that an Empire of 35,000,000 *could* gain the advantage against a tribe under 200,000. Only, however, when she could concentrate against it all or nearly all her forces; when she had a general, not a Turk, of the ability of Omar Pasha; when she had reformed her whole armament by means of vast European loans; and when Montenegro had but her old muskets and old ways.

* G. p. 40.

35. Since that time, a great change has taken place. The army has been organised in 30 battalions, 800 strong; and now for the first time we hear of an endeavour to establish a certain strength of cavalry. The fighting men are reckoned at 35,000; but the military age begins at twelve. The obligation for offensive service runs only from seventeen; but it appears that the zeal of patriotism carries the people, while yet boys, into the ranks. The force available for general operations, between seventeen and fifty, amounts to 24,000. The arms have been greatly improved; two-thirds having breechloaders, all (as is stated) revolvers, and most of them carrying also the *handschar*. During the war from July to October 1876, we heard much of the Turkish victories over a Serbian army composed principally of peasants put suddenly into the ranks, with a *salting* of real soldiers; but very little, in comparison, of their failures and defeats in the conflict with Montenegro.

36. Goptchevitch has supplied* a detailed account of the operations. I shall refer only to the most remarkable. On the 28th of July, the men of Tsernagora encountered Muktar Pasha, and for once with superior force. Four thousand Turks were killed, but only seventy men of Montenegro. Osman Pasha was taken; Selim was among the slain. At Medun, on the 14th of August, 20,000 Turks were defeated by 5000 of these heroic warriors; and 4700 were slain. On the 6th of September, five battalions of Montenegro defeated Dervisch Pasha in his movement upon Piperi, and slew 3000 of his men. On the 7th of October, Muktar Pasha, with 18,000 men, drove three Montenegrin battalions back upon Mirotinsko

* Pp. 188–193.

Dolove. Here they were raised, by a junction with Vukotitch, to a strength of 6000 men. Thus reinforced, they swept down upon Muktar, and, after an action of sixteen hours, drove him back to Kloluk, leaving 1500 dead behind him. On the 10th of October, Dervisch Pasha effected an advance from the south, until he found himself attacked simultaneously at various points, and had to retreat with a loss of 2000 men. On the 20th of October Medun was taken, and the Ottoman general fled to Scutari, leaving garrisons in Spuz and Podgoritza. The armistice arrested this course of disasters, when the southern army (Dervisch) had been reduced from 45,000 to 22,000, and the northern (Muktar) from 35,000 to 18,000.

So much for that "indomitable pluck"* of the Turks, which has since moved the enthusiastic admiration of a British Minister.

37. Goptchevitch reckons the slain on the Turkish side at 26,000; on the side of Montenegro, at 1000. And there is no wonder if we find the Montenegrins now aspire to breechloaders and to cavalry: they captured from their enemies (with much besides) 12,000 breech-loaders and 1500 horses. Montenegro brought into action, in all, 25,000 men; 17,000 of her own, 2000 allies, and 6000 insurgents from the Turkish provinces: a fact, this last, highly indigestible for those who contend that rebellions in Turkey are not sustained by natives, but by foreigners. The entire Turkish force directed against Tsernagora is stated at the enormous total of 130,000. It was, of course, chiefly Asiatic.

* [It is a reality: but apparently for the most part in defensive operations. Von Moltke, in his work on the campaign of Diebitsch, has given his weighty judgment on the Turkish soldier.—W. E. G., 1878.]

38. It will be observed that the whole of these figures are taken from a work on the Slavonic side. We have no other authority. The author has had the best means of information; and the statements are written not for our information, but for that of the sober and studious Germans. They are such as might, at first sight, well provoke a smile of incredulity. Yet, strange to say, they are in pretty close conformity with the general, the nearly unbroken, tenor of a series of wars reaching over four centuries. This is the race which, when asked for tribute, offered stones; whose privations were such, that on one occasion, having taken some hundreds of Turkish prisoners, they gladly accepted in exchange the same number of pigs; who clothe the coward in the garb of woman, but whose women freely grasp the rifle in the hour of need; and yet, whose men of war weep like women for the dead prince they love; and whose fathers, in 1484, carried the printing-press with them to the mountains.

39. What became of that printing-press? Probably, when, not long after the removal to the hills, a vast army of Ottomans penetrated to Cettinjé and burned the monastery, it perished in the flames. The act of carrying it there demonstrated the habits, and implied the hopes, of a true civilisation. But those habits and those hopes could not survive the cruel, inexorable incidents of the position. Barbarous himself in origin, and rendered far more barbarous by the habitual tyranny, incident of necessity to his peculiar position in these provinces, the Turk has barbarised every tribe about him, excepting only those whom he unmanned. The race of Tsernagora, with their lives ever in their hand, have inhabited not a territory, but a camp; and camp life, bad at the best, is

terrible in its operation, when it becomes continuous for twelve generations of men. It was only a fraction of the brutality and cruelty of Turks that, in course of time, was learned by the mountaineers. But even that fraction was enough to stir a thrill of horror.

40. Of the exposure of the heads of the slain I cannot speak so strongly as some, who appear to forget that we did the same thing in the middle of the last century, which Montenegro carried on into this one; and that a Jacobite, fighting for his ancient line of kings, may fairly bear comparison with a race which had claimed a commission not only to conquer all the earth, but to blast and blight all they conquered. On both sides this was a coarse, harsh practice, and it was nothing more. The same cannot be said of the mutilation of prisoners. There was an undoubted case of this kind during the late war, when a batch of Turks had their noses or upper lips or both cut away. Now this is certainly very far less bad than burning, flaying, impaling, and the deeds worse even than these in Bulgaria, for which rewards and decoration have been given by the Porte. But it was a vile act; and we have to regret that no measures have been taken by the British agency, which published it, to trace it home, so that we might know the particulars of time, place, and circumstance; and learn whether it was done by Montenegrins, or by their allies, who have not undergone the civilising influence of the last four reigns in Tsernagora.

41. The unnaturally severe conditions, which have been normal in Montenegrin existence, will be best of all understood by the ideas and usages, which have prevailed among themselves towards one another. Firstly, we are told that death in battle came to be regarded as natural

death; death in bed as something apart from nature. Secondly, agriculture, and still more all trading industry, fell into disrepute among these inveterate warriors, and the first was left to the women, while they depended upon foreign lands to supply the handicrafts. Thirdly, when a comrade was wounded in battle so as to be helpless, the first duty was to remove him; but if this were impossible from the presence of the enemy, then to cut off his head, so as to save him from the shame or torture which he was certain to incur if taken alive by the Turks. Not only was this an act of friendship, but a special act of special friendship. There grew up among the mountaineers a custom of establishing a conventional relationship, which they called bond-brotherhood; and it was a particular duty of the bond-brother to perform this fearful office for his mate. In fact, the idea of it became for the Montenegrin simple and elementary, as we may learn from an anecdote, with a comic turn, given by Sir Gardner Wilkinson.

42. When the Austrians and Montenegrins were fighting against the Turks, allies of the French, on a certain occasion a handful of men had to fly for their lives. Two Austrians were among them, of whom one had the misfortune to be what is called stout. When the party had run some way, he showed signs of extreme distress, and said he would throw himself on the ground, and take his chance. "Very well," said a fellow-fugitive, "do not lose time, say your prayers, make the sign of the cross, and I will then cut off your head for you." As might be expected, this was not at all the view of the Austrian in his proposal; and the friendly offer had such an effect upon him, that he resumed the race, and reached a place of safety. Under the steady reforming influences, which

have now been at work for nearly a hundred years, few vestiges of this state of things probably remain.

43. But I will dedicate the chief part of my remaining space to the application of that criterion which is of all others the sharpest and surest test of the condition of a country; namely, the idea it has embraced of woman, and the position it assigns to her.

This is both the weak, the very weak, and also the strong point of Montenegro. The women till the fields, and may almost be said to make them; for Lady Strangford testifies that she saw various patches of ground in cultivation, which were less than three feet square, and it seems that handfuls of soil are put together even where a single root will grow. More than this, over the great ladder-road between Cettinjé and Cattaro, the women carry such parcels, bound together, as, being over ten pounds in weight, are too heavy for the post; and Goptchevitch records the seemingly easy performance of her task by a woman, who was the bearer of his large and long portmanteau.* Consequently, though the race is beautiful, and this beauty may be seen in very young girls, as women they become short in stature, with harsh and repulsive features. Nor is their social equality recognised; since they not only labour, but perform menial offices for the men. One of our authorities† informs us that the husband often beats his wife. This, however, to my knowledge, was a practice which did not excite general repugnance, one generation back, among the Hellenic inhabitants of Cefalonia.

44. The portrait thus set before us is sufficiently ungainly: let us turn to its more winning features. Crime

* G. p. 81. † F. and W. p. 153.

of all kinds is rare in Montenegro: Miss Mackenzie and Miss Irby inform us that, in a year, the gaol had but two prisoners. But the crimes, or sins, which have reference to women, are, whether in their viler or their milder forms, almost unknown. Not violation only, but seduction and prostitution, says Goptchevitch, are not found in Montenegro.* The old law of the country punished all unchastity with death: a law, of which there seem to be traces also in Bulgaria. Everywhere the purity and modesty of the maiden enjoy an absolute respect; and a woman, in every defile, every hamlet of Tsernagora, is a perfect escort for the traveller. Moreover, even the French writer, to whom I am so much indebted, and who seems to view this matter through a pair of Parisian spectacles, candidly admits that the Montenegrin woman is quite satisfied with her state. "La Monténégrine semble du reste se complaire dans ce rôle d'infériorité et d'abjection."† If the condition of the women was not Parisian, neither, it may be truly said, was that of the men.

45. The women have the same passionate attachment with the men to family and country, and display much of the same valour. Goptchevitch supplies two most remarkable examples. A sister and four brothers, the four of course all armed, are making a pilgrimage or excursion to a church. The state of war with the Turk being normal, we need not wonder when we learn that they are attacked unawares on their way, in a pass where they have to proceed in single file, by seven armed Turks; who announce themselves by shooting dead the first of the brothers, and dangerously wounding the second. The

* G. pp. 76, 77. † F. and W. p. 150.

odds are fearful, but the fight proceeds. The wounded man leans against the rock, and, though he receives another and fatal shot, kills two of the Turks before he dies. The sister presses forward, and grasps his rifle and his dagger. At last all are killed on both sides, excepting herself and a single Turk. She asks for mercy; and he promises it, but names her maidenly honour as the price. Indignant, and perceiving that he is now off his guard, she stabs him with a dagger. He tears it from her hand, they close, and she dashes the wretch over the precipice into the yawning depth below.*

46. The second anecdote is not less singular. Tidings reach a Montenegrin wife, that her husband has just been slain by a party under the command of a certain Aga. Knowing the road by which they are travelling, she seizes a rifle, chooses her position, and shoots the Aga dead. The rest of the party take to flight. The wife of the dead Aga sends her an epistle. "Thou hast robbed me of both my eyes. Thou art a genuine daughter of Tsernagora. Come to-morrow alone to the border-line, and we will prove by trial which of us was the better wife." The Tsernagorine appeared, equipped with the arms of the dead Aga, and alone as she was invited. But the Turkish woman had thought prudence the better part of valour, and brought an armed champion with her, who charges her on horseback. She shot him dead as he advanced, and, seizing her faithless antagonist, bound her and took her home, kept her as a nursemaid for fourteen years, and then let her go back to her place and people.†

47. Such, in the rudest outline, is the Montenegro of history, and of fact. Such it was. Such it is. But

* G. p. 79. † *Ibid.* p. 78. F. and W. p. 159.

what will it be? On some points we may speak with boldness; on others it must be with reserve. However unskilful may be the hand which has ascribed these pages, it can hardly have expelled so completely from the wonderful picture both its colour and its form, as not to have left in it vestiges at least and suggestions of a character greatly transcending the range of common experience, and calculated to awaken an extraordinary interest. Montenegro, which has carried down through four centuries, in the midst of a constant surge of perils, a charmed life, we may say with confidence will not die. No Russian, no Austrian eagle will build its nest in the Black Mountain.* The men of Tsernagora, who have never allowed the very shadow of a Turkish title to grow up by silent prescription, will claim their portion† of an air and soil genial to man, and of free passage to and fro over the land and sea which God has given us.

48. It is another question whether their brethren of the Serbian lands will amalgamate with them politically on an extended scale, and revive, either by a federal or an incorporating union, the substance, if not the form, of the old Serbian State. Such an arrangement would probably be good for Europe, and would go some way to guarantee freedom and self-government to the other European provinces of Turkey, whether under Ottoman suzerainty or otherwise. There is another question deeper and more vital. Rudeness and ferocity are rapidly vanishing; when their last trace disappears, will the simplicity, the truth, the purity, the high-strung devotion, the indomitable heroism, lose by degrees their native tone and their

* In the arms of Montenegro appears a "sovran eagle" crowned.
† F. and W. p. 500.

clear sharp outline, and will a vision on the whole so glorious for them, so salutary and corrective for us,

"Die away,
And fade into the light of common day?"*

49. To the student of human nature, forty years ago, Pitcairn's Island offered a picture of singular interest, no less remote morally than locally from common life; a Paradise, not indeed of high intellect and culture, but of innocence and virtue. It became necessary to find for the growing numbers a larger site; and they were carried to Norfolk Island, when it had been purged of its population of convicts double-dyed in crime. The spot was lovely, and the conditions favourable; but the organism would not bear transplanting, and the Pitcairners fast declined into the common mass of men. Is this to be the fate of the men of Montenegro, when they substitute ease, and plenty, and power, and the pleasures and luxuries of life, for that stern but chivalrous wooing of Adversity, the "relentless power," in which they have been reared to a maturity of such incomparable hardihood? I dare not say: they have a firmer fibre, a closer tissue than ever was woven in the soft air and habitudes of Pitcairn; may they prove too strong for the world, and remain what in substance they are, a select, a noble, an imperial race!

50. In another point of view, they offer a subject of great interest to the inquiries of the naturalist. Physically, they are men of exceptional power and stature. Three causes may perhaps be suggested. The habits of their life have been in an extraordinary degree hardy, healthy, simple; if they have felt the pressure of want

* Wordsworth, 'Ode on Recoll. of Childhood.'

at times, they have never known the standing curse of plethora; nor, for them,

"Nova febrium
Terris incubuit cohors."

Next, may not the severe physical conditions of the Black Mountain have acted as a test, and shut out from the adult community all who did not attain to a high standard of masculine vigour? Among other notable features, they are a people of great longevity. Sir G. Wilkinson (Shade of Lewis, hear it not!) found among them, living together as a family, seven successive generations; the patriarch had attained the age of 117, with a son of 100. A youth at 17 or 18 very commonly marries a girl of 13 or 14.* But, thirdly, I conceive that moral causes may have co-operated powerfully with outward nature in this matter. *Fortes creantur fortibus et bonis.* The men, who went up with Ivan, were men of great souls; and this greatness, transmitted with blood and fortified by habit, may have assisted in supplying us with what seems to be a remarkable case of both natural and providential selection.

51. For the materials of this sketch, I have been principally indebted to the two works named at its head. They are, I believe, the best on the subject; one is large and elaborate, the other, also full, coming down almost to the very day. There is, as yet, no comprehensive book on Montenegro in our language. We have recently had articles on it in the *Church Quarterly Review* and in *Macmillan*, the latter guaranteed by the high name of Mr. Freeman. Sir Gardner Wilkinson led the way, thirty years ago, with some chapters on the Mountain, in his

* G. p. 76.

Dalmatian work. Dr. Neale has supplied some very brief but interesting notices. Lady Strangford's sketch is slight and thin, but marked by ample power of observation. Miss Mackenzie and Miss Irby were able to bestow far more of time and care on a subject well worthy of them, and have probably made by much the most valuable contribution extant in our language, under this as under other heads, to our knowledge of those South Slavonic provinces whose future will, we may humbly trust, redeem the miseries of their past. "Whereas thou hast been forsaken and hated, so that no man went through thee; I will make thee an eternal excellency, a joy of many generations." *

* Isaiah lx. 15.

VIII.

AGGRESSION ON EGYPT AND FREEDOM IN THE EAST.*

1877.

1. Any one whose thought and action have been engaged, like my own, for a twelvemonth past, with the Eastern Question in its very sorest place, namely, the point of contact between the race dominant while inferior, and the races superior yet subject, may well experience a sense of relief when the scene is shifted from Bulgaria, or from Constantinople, to Egypt. He passes at once from a tainted and stifling atmosphere to one which allows of respiration, and which is by comparison free, nay almost fragrant. It was therefore not without a qualified and relative pleasure that I found a writer eminently competent for the task was about to raise, in this Review, the Egyptian question. This phrase does not signify, as the uninstructed in modern diction might suppose, the question how Egypt should be handled for her own interests and the welfare of her people, but the question whether, and how, her and their political condition is henceforward to be determined by our interests, and for the welfare of our people. An investigation this, not particularly inviting

* [Reprinted from *The Nineteenth Century*, August 1877. But the closing part of the article is omitted, as it consists of matter contested between political parties.—W. E. G., 1878.]

from a moral point of view; but one which Mr. Dicey has twice approached * with a candour and a courage equal to the desire he shows to accommodate conflicting interests and claims, so far—and it is not very far—as the necessities of his case will permit.

2. Mr. Dicey is confident in the support of his countrymen. The occupation of Egypt by England, he thinks, is generally acknowledged both at home and abroad to be only a question of time.† He lifts the subject out of the wide whirlpool of the general controversy. He does not join in the wild, irrational denunciations of Russia, so dear if not to the people yet to the clubs; and he appears to think we could not be justified in upholding a vicious government of European Turkey by any considerations of our own advantage. It may be that he is correct in his estimate of the tendency and probable verdict of public opinion. It is not to be denied, that the territorial appetite has within the last quarter of a century revived among us with an abnormal vigour. The race of statesmen who authoritatively reproved it are gone, or have passed into the shade; and a new race have succeeded, of whom a very large part either administer strong incentives, or look on with indifference. The newspaper press, developed in gigantic proportions, and, in its action on domestic subjects, absolutely invaluable, is to a great extent wanting in checks and safeguards to guide its action on our foreign affairs, where all the weights are in one scale, and we are, as it were, counsel, judge, and jury for ourselves.

3. Nations indeed, are quite as much subject as indi-

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* *The Nineteenth Century*, June 1877, Art. X., and August 1877, Art. I.

† P. P.

viduals to mental intemperance; and the sudden flush of wealth and pride, which engenders in the man arrogant vulgarity, works by an analogous and subtler process upon numbers who have undergone the same exciting experience. Indeed, they are the more easily misled, because conscience has not to reproach each unit of a mass with a separate and personal selfishness. With respect to the Slav provinces, the "strong man" of British interests, of traditional policy, and of hectoring display, has been to a great degree kept down by a "stronger man"; by the sheer stern sense of right and wrong, justice and injustice, roused in the body of the people by manifestations of unbounded crime. But it may be very doubtful whether, in questions where ethical laws do not so palpably repress the solicitations of appetite, the balance of forces will be so cast among us as to insure the continuance of that wonderful self-command, with which the nation has now for so long a time resisted temptation, detected imposture, encouraged the feeble virtues, and neutralised the inveterate errors of its rulers.

I am sensible, then, of the good which a discussion about Egypt may affect, as a counter-irritant, in abating inflammatory action nearer to a vital organ. I nevertheless incline to believe that every scheme for the acquisition of territorial power in Egypt, even in the refined form with which it has here been invested, is but a new snare laid in the path of our policy. I will then endeavour succinctly, and I hope temperately, to test the proposal upon the several particulars of Mr. Dicey's argument, to which I must now briefly refer.

4. His first and fundamental proposition is that the preservation of our dominion in the East is only less important to us than the preservation of our national inde-

pendence.* His next, that the bare possibility of Russia's obtaining the command of the Bosphorus makes it matter of urgent necessity (or again of "absolute imperative necessity" †) that we should secure our route to India. The third step in the argument is joined with the second: the route, of which we must thus be masters, is the route of the Suez Canal. ‡ Fourthly, it is held that the Canal "must be kept open to our ships at all times and under all circumstances." § And fifthly, the "command of the Canal" involves "the occupation of the Delta" of the Nile. This is called, in same passages, the occupation of Egypt; and I believe there is a closer connection between the two than Mr. Dicey seems to imagine. But, in strictness, he scarcely means more than the Delta.

5. And, for the benefit of those among us who are nervous at the visions of responsibility and charge thus evoked from the mist of the years to come, he holds that nothing will be required of us "for the future" but— ‖

a. The erection of a few forts on the Syrian side of the Isthmus (query, with nobody in them?).

b. The presence of a small British garrison at Alexandria (query, in the presence of the rather large and very respectable army of the country?).

c. An ironclad at Port Said. (But why nothing at the other end; when our dangers from Russia through the valley of the Euphrates and the Persian Gulf are about to be so formidable?)

d. A Resident at Cairo; or the transfer of the governing power to an Administrator appointed with our consent. ¶

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* *The Nineteenth Century*, vol. i. p. 666. † *Ibid.* p. 684.
‡ *Ibid.* p. 668. § *Ibid.*; also p. 669.
‖ *N. C.* vol. ii. p. 12. ¶ *N. C.* vol. i. p. 682, and vol. ii. p. 13.

6. Now I must, in fairness, at once tender some admissions.

First, that there are foreign Powers, and Russia in all likelihood among them, who would with pleasure see us engaged in this operation.

Secondly, it is recommended by the benevolent consideration that the government of Egypt is bad, and that if we were its masters we ought to be able to seal more speedily the doom of slavery, and to relieve the people from much of severe and grinding oppression.

7. Lastly, I myself approach the question under adverse prepossessions. It is my firm conviction, derived, I think, from my political "pastors and masters," and confirmed by the facts of much experience, that, as a general rule, enlargements of the Empire are for us an evil fraught with serious, though possibly not with immediate danger. I do not affirm that they can always be avoided; but, that they should never be accepted except under circumstances of a strict and jealously examined necessity. I object to them because they are rarely effected except by means that are more or less questionable, and that tend to compromise British character in the judgment of the impartial world; a judgment, which I hope will grow from age to age more and more operative in imposing moral restraint on the proceedings of each particular State.

8. I object to them, further, because we already have our hands over-full. We have undertaken responsibilities of government, such as never were assumed before in the whole history of the world. The cares of the governing body in the Roman Empire, with its compact continuity of ground, were light in comparison with the demands now made upon the Parliament and Executive of the United Kingdom. Claims made, and gallantly, or confidently at

least, confronted; yet not adequately met. We, who hail with more than readiness annexations and other transactions which extend and complicate our responsibilities abroad, who are always ready for a new task, yet leave many of the old tasks undone. Forty years have passed since it was thought right to reform fundamentally our municipal corporations; but the Corporation of London, whose case called out for change much more loudly than any other, we have not yet had time or strength to touch. Our currency, our local government, our liquor laws, portions even of our taxation, remain in a state either positively discreditable, or at the least inviting and demanding great improvement; but, for want of time and strength, we cannot handle them. "For the romance of political travel we are ready to scour the world, and yet of capital defect in duties lying at our door we are not ashamed."*

9. I protest upon another ground, which, if not more broad and solid than the two foregoing grounds, is yet at least more palpable. The most pacific of prudent men must keep in his view the leading outlines of the condition which we shall have to accept in future wars. As regards the strength, the spirit, the resources of the country, we have nothing to fear. Largely dependent at other times on timber, hemp, and metal of foreign origin for the construction of our navy, we now find ourselves constituted, by the great transition from wooden to iron ships, the principal producers of the one indispensable raw material, and the first ship-manufacturers of the world. But one subject remains, which fills me with a real alarm.

10. It is the fewness of our men. Ample in numbers

* See Article on 'England's Mission,' *The Nineteenth Century*, September 1878; and the reprint in a tract (Hodges, 1878), p. 15.

to defend our island-home, they are, with reference to the boundless calls of our world-wide dominion, but as a few grains of sand scattered thinly on a floor. Men talk of humiliation: may we never be subjected to the humiliation of dependence upon vicarious valour, bought dear and sold cheap in the open market. Public extravagance does not with us take the humour of overpay to our common soldiers and our common sailors. In war time, we must ungrudgingly add (and it is no easy matter) to the emoluments of the services. But, after we have done all that is possible, we shall not have done enough. It will still remain an effort beyond, and almost against, nature, for some thirty or thirty-five millions of men to bear in chief the burden of defending the countries inhabited by near three hundred millions. We must not flinch from the performance of our duty to those countries. But neither let us, by puerile expedients, try to hide from ourselves what it involves. To divest ourselves of territory once acquired is very difficult. Where it is dishonourable, it cannot be thought of. Even where it is not, it is likely to set in action some reasonable as well as many unreasonable susceptibilities. If then we commit an error in adding to territory, it is an error impossible or difficult to cure. It fills me with surprise that the disproportion between our population and our probable duties in war is so little felt, especially (so far as I know) by professional men, as a prudential restraint upon the thirst for more territory. The surrender of the Ionian Protectorate was not founded on a desire to husband our military means; but, even as estimated by that result, it was one of the very best measures of our time.

11. I must now frankly demur to each and all, in succession, of the arguments, which are supposed to render

some kind of occupation in Egypt expedient, and even imperative.

The first of them is, that the retention of our Indian dominion is a matter comparable in some sense with, and next in importance to, our national independence. Now I do not wish to stimulate our national pride. Ministrations at that altar are already far too much in request. But I confess my belief that a high doctrine of the dependence of England upon India is humiliating, and even degrading. I admit, in whole or in part, no such dependence. I hold, firmly and unconditionally, that we have indeed a great duty towards India, but that we have no interest in India, except the wellbeing of India itself, and what that wellbeing will bring with it in the way of consequence. If, in a certain sense and through indirect channels, India is politically tributary to England, the tribute is one utterly insignificant: it is probably not near a hundredth part of the sheer annual profits of the nation, nor near a fourth part of the unforced gains of our commercial intercourse with that country. India does not add to, but takes from, our military strength. The root and pith and substance of the material greatness of our nation lies within the compass of these islands; and is, except in trifling particulars, independent of all and every sort of political dominion beyond them.

12. This dominion adds to our fame, partly because of its moral and social grandeur; but partly also because foreigners partake the superstitions, which still to no small extent prevail among us, and think that in the vast aggregate of our scattered territories lies the main secret of our strength. Further, it imposes upon us the most weighty and solemn duties; duties, nowhere so weighty and solemn as in India. We have of our own motion wedded the

fortunes of that country, and we never can in honour solicit a divorce. Protesting, then, against the sore disparagement which attaches to this doctrine of dependence, I am so far in practical agreement with the argument on the other side, that I fully aver we are bound to study the maintenance of our power in India, under the present and all proximate circumstances, as a capital demand upon the national honour.

13. But, alas! this agreement is but for a moment; and it "starts aside like a broken bow" when we observe an assumption which underlies all the arguments for an occupation in Egypt, namely, the assumption that the maintenance of our power in India is after all, in its Alpha and its Omega, a military question; though subject, we may hope, to the condition that it is to be maintained without violation of the moral laws. Now this appears to me to be an inversion of the due order of ideas; an inversion dangerous to us and most degrading to India. I hold that the capital agent in determining finally the question whether our power in India is or is not to continue, will be the will of the two hundred and forty millions of people who inhabit India, their positive or their negative will, their anxiety, or at least their willingness, to be in connection with us rather than encounter the mischiefs or the risks of change. The question who shall have supreme rule in India is, by the laws of right, an Indian question; and those laws of right are from day to day growing into laws of fact. Our title to be there depends on a first condition, that our being there is profitable to the Indian nations; and on a second condition, that we can make them see and understand it to be profitable. It is the moral, and not the military, question which stands first in the order of ideas, with reference to the power of England in India, as

much as with reference to the power, in England itself, of the State over the people.

14. Moreover, these truths are no longer to be regarded as truths of the study only. It is high time that they pass from the chill elevation of political philosophy into the warmth of contact with daily life; that they take their place in the working rules, and that they limit the daily practice, of the agents of our power; that they not only obtain recognition, but likewise acquire familiarity with the thought and the habitual temper of the British people: for unless they do, we shall not be prepared to meet an inevitable future, we shall not be able to confront the growth of the Indian mind under the very active processes of education which we ourselves have introduced, or to develop the copious resource, and the powers of elastic adaptation, which the tide of on-coming needs is certain to require.

15. Again, however, my line of march approximates to that of the opponent. As I admit army administration to be a great question at home, while denying that it is the prime vital function of the State, so I must allow the military question to be great, and even relatively somewhat greater, for India, as a vital condition of our power and standing there. But again, approximation is to be followed by early and wide divergence. The possibility, I am told, of Russian power on the Bosphorus requires us, as matter of absolute necessity,* at once to secure our route to India. Why? And first, is Russian power on the Bosphorus a practical possibility? As far as I can judge, in the belief of nineteen-twentieths of Europe, it is not. We have indeed, by incredible folly, brought about

* Vol. i. p. 684.

a state of things which has greatly weakened the admirable barrier some years ago erected in Roumania; and the same perversity and blindness have given to the Russians a separate foothold in Bulgaria, which we have compelled to hail the Czar as her sole deliverer. But that man must estimate strangely first the prudence of Russia, secondly the force of Russia, thirdly the disposition and the power of Europe at large, who can think that our errors have even now made probable what I grant they have brought within the verge of abstract possibility.

16. We do not, however, because it is possible our house may be broken into, sit up all night and every night. We seem, many of us, to have, with all our bold assumptions, but a small stock of self-respect; and too readily to let our fears befool us. One moment we describe Russia with contempt as bankrupt, the next we enthrone her as omnipotent in Constantinople, and having placed her there we next gratuitously supply her, who cannot at sea look even Turkey in the face, with an unbounded store of fleets and armies, which she is at once to use, seemingly out of sheer depravity, in stopping the Suez Canal, while the fleets of England, France, Italy, and Austria are to look on in stupefied dismay. Anticipations of this kind have their explanation, not in any state of facts rationally examined, but in what Dr. Carpenter calls unconscious cerebration: they are the products of an overheated brain. The grisly phantom rises from the deep, now a little nearer, and now a little farther off; sometimes at one point of the compass, and sometimes at another. In 1859 and the following year, it was from France. About 1862, he migrated to the American shore, and glared on us from that horizon. In 1870, he recrossed the Atlantic, and inspired the notorious 'Battle of Dorking.' He loves travel and variety of

costume, and he now wears a Russian dress. Alas! and must it thus ever be with this nation, once so manly and so self-possessed? Is perpetual panic to wait as a scourge upon the grossness of our prosperity, like gout and its impish train of mischiefs on the intemperance of the proverbial alderman?

17. But let us take all these dreams already to have become realities. Still it will perhaps be admitted that this all-conquering, all-devouring Russia will have to make at any rate a portentous effort, when she is to leap from Constantinople to Calcutta, and when, in order to do it with more security, she stops the Suez Canal, to cripple our power, and secure her own safety there. She will surely not put herself under such a strain, except for an adequate result. Suppose the very worst. The Canal is stopped. And what then?

18. A heavy blow will have been inflicted on the commerce, the prosperity, the comfort of the world. We, as the great carriers, and as the first commercial nation of Christendom, shall be the greatest losers. But it is a question of loss and of loss only. It is a tax and a tax only. What came and went quick and cheaply must come and go slow and dearer; and less will come and go accordingly. We have, however, in full proportion to other countries the ability to bear loss, for we have much more to draw upon. But it is wearisome to pursue in detail a preposterous hypothesis. I turn then to the military question, and ask how much will Russia have gained, after she has brought into the hard form of fact the impossible and the incredible?

19. The answer is, that she will have introduced an average delay of about three weeks into our military communications with Bombay, and less with Calcutta. It

seems to be forgotten by many, that there is a route to India round the Cape of Good Hope, as completely as if that route lay by the North-west Passage. Yet the discovery of the new water-path, when it was achieved, was an event greater in relation to the contemporary condition of the world, than the *percement* of the Isthmus of Suez has been for the nineteenth century; and the name of Ferdinand de Lesseps will not be brighter in history than that of Vasco de Gama. I need not say that the Cape route to India is still largely used, though the Canal draws the picked portion of the trade. But no through service to India for mails and passengers has been organised or could live. The Cape itself lies halfway; and it may be termed also equidistant from Calcutta and from Bombay. The important and growing settlements of that region have not, however, escaped the eye of British enterprise. Two services of large vessels carry the mails weekly from England; and the energy of Mr. Donald Currie, who conducts one of these services, has reduced the passage to twenty-three, twenty-two, and even twenty-one days. Supposing that in time of war we were compelled to resort to this route, we must double the period just named to cover the entire distance to India; and the result is a loss of three weeks to Bombay, and less to Calcutta, as compared with the present route by Brindisi. But, as the Continent cannot be counted on for war time, we must make the comparison with the voyage from Southampton, which lengthens the present passage by some days, and thus reduces the loss below three weeks. This will hardly make the difference to us between life and death in the maintenance of our Indian Empire. The grim Autocrat of the Russias (such we must paint him) will be disappointed, when we escape his clutches after all.

20. Indeed, Russia or no Russia, it seems to be very doubtful whether confident reliance can be placed upon the Canal for our military communications with India, under the varied and shifting contingencies of war. I make no doubt whatever that we shall secure and firmly hold whatever can be attained by maritime supremacy at both extremities of the Canal. But neither maritime supremacy nor the promised forts on the Syrian side will secure unbroken freedom of passage along a water-way where there is only a depth of twenty-four to twenty-eight feet, with a general width sufficient for one vessel, to be obstructed. "Given four-and-twenty hours' time," says Mr. Dicey,* "and a company of sappers and miners in undisturbed possession of any portion" of its sandy banks, and damage might be done "which would not only render the Canal impassable for the moment, but which could not be repaired for weeks or months." Even if it were possible to hold the line, approaching a hundred miles, as a continuous fortification, it does not at once appear how the Canal could be secured against the furtive scuttling of ships. If it cannot, what becomes of all the costly care for the military custody of the banks? And in what position would England be placed before the world, if, for the sake of convenience on our military road to India, we insist on bringing about dangers to the Canal, from which, as the commercial and pacific highway of the world, it might but for us be free? Upon the whole it would not surprise me to learn that the authorities of our War Department, aware of all the difficulties of the case, have already discounted them by laying their account with a return to the old route of the Cape for times of war.

* Vol. i. p. 669.

21. But I have not yet exhausted the topics of scruple and objection. And I next ask, why is the territorial occupation of Egypt needful or useful for the military command of the Canal in time of war? Why will it not suffice, supposing this command to be necessary and to be practicable, to secure it by the proper measures at sea, and if needful by land, at the proper time? They would then be free, as I shall show, from the unlimited embarrassments, with which any permanent scheme seems to be begirt; and they would carry with them their only possible warrant in the overruling necessities of the moment.

22. Shall we be told that prevention is better than cure, and that we might have to wrench the country out of other hands? I ask out of what hands? Even the fabulous energies of Russia are not credited with including such a measure in her plans. It is, on the contrary, traditional with her to make over Egypt to our mercies. It will be remembered, with what patience or even favour our ill-contrived and useless purchase of an interest in the Canal was regarded by great part of Europe: a measure which might have given rise to serious complications, had there been a disposition elsewhere to view it in the same spirit of implacable suspicion as that which we ourselves are too apt to indulge. Nor is there a single Power, which even the most inflamed imagination can at present conceive to cherish plans for anticipating us in the military occupation of Egypt. So that, if we raze out all our earlier protest, and admit all the propositions that have been (I think) confuted, there is not a shadow of a case for these fussy schemes, as I must call them, for involving us in difficulties at which I will now further glance.

23. Some of the less temperate of our adventurers (I must not call them buccaneers) in the South-east Medi-

terranean, unlike Mr. Dicey, include in their annexations the Island of Crete. This proposal would be indeed formidable, were it likely, as it is not, to be seriously entertained. If Austria and Russia, or either of them, should be tempted to extend their dominions by the incorporation of neighbouring Slav provinces, whose desire it is not to change masters but to be free, they will do it, as I believe, under the strong disapproval of the British nation, a disapproval which might some day find a vent. Yet even they would have some apologies, in consideration of religion, race, and neighbourhood, for such a proceeding which we could not plead. Mr. Dicey seems to think, and it is quite possible, that an intervention of British power in Egypt might not be wholly disagreeable to the people of the country. But who has made this assertion respecting Crete? Has she not fought, and fought right well, for freedom? Although indeed she obtained, in doing it, but niggard measures either of aid or justice from the Powers of Europe. What Greek is there so debased, so grovelling, that he would consent to part on any terms from the bright inheritance of the name bequeathed him by his sires?

24. In the case of subjects of the Porte, it may be that the sense of insult is lost in a more grinding sense of injury. But, in my view, nearly the most daring insult ever inflicted by man upon men is the proposal of Midhat Pasha in his Turkish "Constitution" to Slavs, to Armenians, and above all to Hellenes, that they shall become "Ottomans." Crete is one of the oldest seats of European civilisation. It ought to have formed an original portion of free Greece. It is united with the Greek continent by every tie that can bind men, save the one still lacking of political organisation: by common race, history, feeling, anguage, and (for the large majority) religion. Differing

from the Slav and yet more from the Armenian countries, it scarcely yet reckons two centuries of bondage. We found it well, on high grounds of principle and feeling, to allow Corfù and its sister islands to join themselves to Greece. I have a word to say, in this matter, even on what we owe to Turkey. But be that much or be it little, I trust and believe we shall never set the abominable precedent of reducing into a new political subordination an island which is a member of a recognised and partly free Christian family, and which has written in the best blood of its citizens, scarcely yet dry, its title to share that freedom.

25. Reverting to Egypt, I observe that Mr. Dicey dwells on the smallness of the territory. This smallness, he says, makes it absolutely impossible for two rival governments to be within its limits.* He proposes, however, all along, that we shall have, as far as it reaches locally, a supreme control in government; for we are to hold secure military possession, to keep down the taxes, and to check oppression.† Yet he also proposes that the sphere of our commanding influence is to be confined to the Delta. There appear to be here some inconsistencies. Of what use is military command within the Delta for the custody of the Canal? And is not the dualism of government, once renounced, also resumed?

26. But I am not acting as a critic. What I seek to impress is, that territorial questions are not to be disposed of by arbitrary limits; that we cannot enjoy the luxury of taking Egyptian soil by pinches. We may seize an Aden and a Perim, where is no already formed community of inhabitants, and circumscribe a tract at will. But our

* Vol. i. p. 674.

† Vol. ii. p. 13.

first site in Egypt, be it by larceny or be it by emption, will be the almost certain egg of a North African Empire, that will grow and grow until another Victoria and another Albert, titles of the Lake-sources of the White Nile, come within our borders; and till we finally join hands across the Equator with Natal and Cape Town, to say nothing of the Transvaal and the Orange River on the south, or of Abyssinia or Zanzibar to be swallowed by way of *viaticum* on our journey. And then, with a great Empire in each of the four quarters of the world, and with the whole new or fifth quarter to ourselves, we may be territorially content, but less than ever at our ease; for if agitators and alarmists can now find at almost every spot "British interests" to bewilder and disquiet us, their quest will then be all the wider, in proportion as the excepted points will be the fewer.

27. Egypt proper is indeed a small country. Our most recent and most comprehensive informant, Mr. M'Coan,* fixing its boundary at the First Cataract, points out that the French, in 1798, found a cultivable surface of only 9600 square miles, since extended to 11,350. It cannot be allowable to suppose one portion of this tract under our supreme controlling authority, and another free from it. Moreover, it is vain to disguise that we shall have the entire responsibility of the government, if we have any of it at all. Mr. Dicey says we must prevent intolerable oppression. I hold that we shall have to deal with all oppression, tolerable or not; and therefore and beyond all things with the entire taxation of the country, which is the fountain-head of the oppression, both tolerable and intolerable. In an Egypt controlled and developed by us,

* 'Egypt as it is.' London, July 1877, p. 19.

every detail of the popular life and state will be familiar to the English and the European eye. It will not be shielded by remoteness, as is even now the interior of our Indian communities; it is nowhere, so to speak, out of sight of the Nile.

28. Nor could we, as in our free colonies, divest ourselves of direct responsibility through the gift of self-government. If we could, the problem, simplified in one aspect, would be complicated in another; for who can say what would be the opinion of a self-governing Egypt on the question whether it would go to seek a master in the British Isles, or whether it would prefer an independent domesticated ruler, identified with its religion, not alien to its race, and rooted already by blood in the recent traditions of its resurrection and its growth? Be it the Foreign Secretary, or be it the Colonial Secretary, or be it an Egyptian Secretary of State, manufactured *ad hoc*, I cannot envy him his prospective charge: and though he would give certainty and finality (as the Russians everywhere do) to the abolition of slavery, and would import a multitude of improvements under the eye of our Parliament, and stimulated by its interpellations and debates, I am far from being entirely sure that the action of our popular system might not prove greatly too vivid and direct to please the sheiks and the fellaheen, even while it might profit them.

29. I fear, again, that we should be making a very dangerous experiment on the common susceptibilities of Islam. Not the absurd and even wicked susceptibilities freely imputed to our Mohammedan fellow-subjects of India by many of the Turkish party in this country; who threaten us with the revolt of forty millions of men unless we are content to stand among the supporters of the most cruel

and mischievous despotism upon earth. This threat we know how to appreciate. But the susceptibilities, which we might offend in Egypt, are rational and just. For very many centuries, she has been inhabited by a Mohammedan community. That community has always been governed by Mohammedan influences and powers. During a portion of the period, it had Sultans of its own. Of late, while politically attached to Constantinople, it has been practically governed from within: a happy incident in the condition of any country, and one which we should be slow to change. The grievances of the people are indeed great; but there is no proof whatever that they are incurable. Mohammedanism now appears, in the light of experience, to be radically incapable of establishing a good or tolerable government over civilised and Christian races; but what proof have we that in the case of a Mohammedan community, where there are no adverse complications of blood, or religion, or tradition, or speech, the ends of political society, as they understand them, may not be passably attained?

30. And it is worthy of remark that, at this very moment, Mohammedan sympathies appear to be operating in Egypt with great force. It is known with what powerful effect Egypt, though willing enough to make war on the Turk for her own advantage, yet was also ready to assist him in his quarrel against the subject Christian race in the Morea, and again in Crete. Even so at this juncture we have before our eyes the curious spectacle of a vassal who is doing much more than he has bound himself to do. At the outbreak of the present war, the Khedive proposed to support the Sultan by means of a force, which was to be raised and paid by voluntary contributions. But by quick degrees this cloud has been consolidated into a very real

whale. Egyptian forces of sensible amount have already entered the field; further reinforcements are said to be in preparation; and it is also hinted that the Khedive, after having refused a short time back to share in the disgrace of the Turkish repudiation (by remitting his tribute to the Sultan, instead of sending it, as in good faith he ought, to Constantinople), is now ready, for the dear sake of his religion, to court shame and sacrifice morality.

> "Te propter eundem
> Extinctus pudor, et quâ solâ sidera adibam
> Famor prior."*

Viewing all these facts, I for one am inclined, on prudential grounds, to say, "Hands off."

31. But if this be so with reference to the confined area of Egypt proper, much more must we be moved to abstain when we consider that Egypt proper is not alone in question. The rulers of a narrow country have striven hard to extend their authority over a space proportioned to its primeval dignity, and to the day when it contended with Assyria for the empire of the world. From the seat of their recognised dominion, they have directed the eye and stretched out the arm over all Nubia to Dongola, and beyond it into the Beled-es-Soudan or country of the blacks, which reaches without a boundary away beyond Abyssinia, and as far as the frontier of Zanzibar. It is a territory, says M'Coan, five times larger than that ruled by the Pharaohs, the Ptolemies, and the Caliphs; for administrative purposes it already touches Gondokoro; and a glance at the map will show that from this point to the Mediterranean we have a reach of nearly two thousand

* Æn. iv. 321.

miles, with an area, according to M'Coan, more than twice that of the Austrian Empire.* The population of Egypt proper approaches six millions, and that of Nubia and the Upper Nile is taken at ten to eleven millions.† Now, as relations of some kind have been contracted by the Khedive with this vast region and large population, the questions must press upon us with relentless force, first, whether, to protect a few score miles of canal, we are to take the charge of two thousand miles of territory; and, if not, then, secondly, at what point and by what process we are to quash the relations of superiority and subordination already formed, and to repudiate the obligations they entail?

32. It is urged with truth, that we receive from some quarters encouragement to enter upon these undertakings. For one I should attach more weight to this encouragement could I find sufficient proof that each and all the Powers of Europe are bent on consolidating the peace of Europe. But a suspicion has gone abroad that in some minds a disposition prevails to seek for safety, or to secure pre-eminence, in setting their neighbours by the ears. Nor can I entirely dismiss this suspicion with all the promptitude, nay, all the indignation, which might be desired. It is with quite a different sentiment that I turn to consider the probable attitude of one Power in particular, namely, France. In one part of his argument, Mr. Dicey seems to rely upon her momentary weakness. ‡ In its later development, he has arrived at the more comfortable conclusion that the statesmen of France "are ready to acquiesce in any policy which might strengthen England's interests in

* 'Egypt as it is,' chap. i. p. 19. † *Ibid.* chap. ii. p. 22.
‡ *The Nineteenth Century*, vol. i. p. 671.

the Isthmus of Suez."* Without entering into details that could not be profitable, I must record an emphatic dissent. My belief is that the day, which witnesses our occupation of Egypt, will bid a long farewell to all cordiality of political relations between France and England. There might be no immediate quarrel, no exterior manifestation; but a silent rankling grudge there would be, like the now extinguished grudge of America during the civil war, which awaited the opportunity of some embarrassment on our side, and on hers of returning peace and leisure from weightier matters. Nations have good memories.

33. These remarks make no pretension to exhaust the subject; yet I think they suffice to show how radically inexpedient are the vague schemes now more or less afloat for our occupation of Egypt. They are directed exclusively against its sole occupation. I am not aware of any cause or warrant for any occupation of it whatever. But a joint occupation would be in most respects an essentially different scheme, and would require a separate treatment.

34. There remains, however, one point yet to be touched. It is the aspect of these schemes as before the high tribunal of international law and right. It is but just a twelvemonth, since we were instructed from official quarters to regard the re-establishment of the *status quo ante* as the desirable and normal termination of the Eastern crisis, both then and now subsisting. For a few months longer, we still heard much of the maintenance of the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire, and of upholding the treaties of 1856. Of late these formulæ seem to have been worn threadbare. Causes, like persons,

* *N. C.* vol. ii. p. 6.

may take the benefit of an *alias*, especially if it be euphonious; and the popular or less unpopular *alias* of the hour is the consecrated ensign of "British interests." *In hoc signo vinces.* Now it is most singular that the propagandism of Egyptian occupation seems to proceed principally from those who were always thought to be the fastest friends to the formula of independence and integrity, and on whom the unhappy Turk was encouraged to place a blindfold reliance. I have heard of men on board ship, thought to be moribund, whose clothes were sold by auction in their hearing by their shipmates. And thus, in the hearing of the Turk, we are now stimulated to divide his inheritance.

35. Now I am one of those who hold it inadmissible, nay monstrous, to plead the treaties of 1856 as guaranteeing a lengthened licence to cruel oppression beyond all hope of remedy. But if I find the Turk incapable of establishing a good, just, and well-proportioned government over civilised and Christian races, it does not follow that he is under a similar incapacity when his task shall only be to hold empire over populations wholly or principally Oriental and Mohammedans. On this head, I do not know that any verdict of guilty has yet been found against him by a competent tribunal. Mr. Dicey, in his considerate way of approaching the question, proposes that we should purchase the Egyptian Tribute, and this nearly at the price of Consols. I admit that we thus provide the Sultan with abundant funds for splendid obsequies. But none the less would this plan sever at a stroke all African territory from an empire likely enough to be also shorn of its provinces in Europe. It seems to me, I own, inequitable, whether in dealing with the Turk or with any one else, to go beyond the just necessity of the case. I object

to our making him or anybody else a victim to the insatiable maw of these stage-playing British interests. And I think we should decline to bid, during his lifetime, for this portion of his clothes. It is not sound doctrine, that for our own purposes we are entitled to help him downwards to his doom.

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